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1. SUMMARY: These appeals arise from a declaratory 
judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the Federal 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. 
§§ 1201-1328. 
2. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS: Appellanm in No . 79-1596 
(appellees in Nos. 79-1538 and 79-1567) are a voluntary 
~ssociation of coal producers engaged in .surface coal mining 
operations in Virginia; t~mvn of Wise, Virginia; and the 
c:]:J: ommonwealth of Virginia. Along with 63 coal company members of 
the Association and l,. individual landovmers, appellants filed 
suit in the DC W.D. Virginia against the Secretary of the Interior, 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the surface mining act was un-
constitutional and an injunction against its enforcement. Plain-
tiffs argued that the Act was beyond the scope of the commerce 
power and that it violated Equa~ Protection because of its dis-
~ 
proportionate economic impact in south~ves t Virg inia, the Tenth 
Amendment because it usurped the "integral governmental function" 
of land use regulation, the Just Compensation Clause because of 
the restrictions imposed, and the Due Process Clause because it did 
not provide for a hearing before the imposition of civil penalties 
and cessation orders. Appellants in No. 79-1567 intervened as 
defendants; they are a citizens' group and the Town of St. Charles, 
Virginia. 
The Act provides for a two-tiered regulatory structure . 
The interim regulatory phase, now in effect, is based on federally 
promulgated performance standards fm~ restoration of land to the 
- 2 -
original condition, segregation and stabilization of topsoil, 
water quality, coal mine waste piles, use of explosives, re-
vegetation, and spoil disposal. § 515(b). The Secretary is 
responsible for enforcing the interim regulations, but states 
that actively assist in the enforcement shall be granted financial 
reimbursemento State-issued permits for interim operations must 
1/ 
conform to the federal performance standards.-
The second stage of enforcement depends on permanent 
regulations promulgated by the Secretary but implemented by either 
a state or federal enforcement program. Any state interested in 
assuming permanent regulatory authority over surface coal mining 
within the State must submit to the Secretary a proposed program 
demonstrating that the State environmental protection laws and 
regulations will implement the federal standards and that the State 
can and will enforce them. The Secretary must approve each propos-
ed program. The Secretary 
Vi~tedo (All but three coal-mining states submitted 
plans, but the Secretary has acted on only two of them o) In addi·· 
tion, the Secretary must develop a federal implementation program 




Portions of the interim regulations have been challenged in 
the DDC. Some of the enforcement provisions at issue here were 
attacked in that litigation and upheld. The appeal to CA DC was 
argued June 5, 1979. · 
'!:.I 
Litigation on certain of the permanent regulations is underway 
in the DDC. 
I ~..-_.... 
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Enforcement includes cessation orders issued under 
§ 521 without upon a showing of 11 imminent 
danger to the health or safety of the public" or "signif i cant, 
immediate environmental harm to land, air, or water resources." 
There is an automatic civil penalty which must be paid into 
escrm.v before the operator may contest either the order or the 
penalty amount. (By regulation, the operator may request a 
conference prior to payment into escrow.) A hearing must be held 
prior to a final order of payment; and if return of the penalty 
is necessary, it is made with interest. 
A violation notice may be issued upon a lesser showing 
of danger than is required for a cessation order. The operator 
is allowed up to 90 days for compliance. There are daily penalties 
for continued violations, and a cessation order may follov;r noncom-
pliance. 
Once the order or notice is issued, the operator has 
30 days to apply to the Secretary for reviewo The Secretary has 
another 30 days to conduct a hearing and render a written decision . 
An action for judicial review in federal district court follows 
wit bin another 30 days o Alternatively, a cessation order vJill ex-
pire if no hearing is held within 30 days at or near the mine site. 
The operator may also petition for temporary relief from a cessa-
tion order or violation notice. The Secretary must render a deci-
sion within 5 days on a cessation order and "expeditiously" on a 
violation notice. A hearing must be held before relief can be 




In February 1979, following a hearing on plaintiff's 
motion for a preliminary injunction, the DC enjoined the 
Secretary from enforcing§§ 502-522 of the Act, the principal 
regulatory and enforcement provisions. CA 4 reversed, finding 
that the DC had applied an incorrect standard. While that ap~ 
peal was pending, the DC held a 13-day trial and subsequently 
granted plaintiffs a permanent injunction against certain portions 
of the Act. 
The court rejected the Commerce Clause challenge, which 
was based on the regulation of private,' nonfederal land. The 
court stated that it must defer to the congressional finding in 
§ 101 of the Act that surface coal mining has adverse effects on 
commerce. The court further found that Congress bad a real and 
substantia.l,rational basis for enacting surface mining legislation 
to protect commerce and the national interest. Congress would 
-
therefore be limited only by other express provisions of the Con-
stitution. The court also rejected on the Equal Protection and 
substantive due process challenges, .and they are not in issue in 
this Court. 
The court held, however, that the Act "displace[d] the 
~
States' freedom to structure integral operations in reas of 
traditional governmental functions, National League of Cities, 
426 U.s. [833,] 852," and therefore violated the Tenth Amendment. 
In particular, the court found that the requirement that steep 
slopes be returned to approximate original contour was not en-
vironmentally sound, did not serve the interests of the federal 
- 5 -
government, and was so burdensome on the Commonwealth as 
to threaten its economy. Finding also that the federal 
government would not be harmed by the permanent injunction, 
the court therefore enjoined enforcement of the· steep slope 
standards of§ 515(d) and (e). Other provisions that in-
fringed on the traditional governmental function, such as 
proximity to cemeteries, control of blasting, and establishment 
of sediment ponds, "while offensive," were not so burdensome 
to the State as to threaten its economy or affect its land use 
planning functions; and their enforcement would not be enjoined. 
In a supplemental memorandum) the DC clarified its order to 
state that the injunction against § 515(d) should not be con-
strued to allow the placement of spoil on downhill slopes, except 
in accordance with the federal standards. 
/ The court also held that § 515(d) and (e) violated the 
{Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The facts of 
the case put it on all fours with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393 (1922). Again, because it was economically and 
physically impossible to comply with the steep-slope reclamation 
provisions~ the requirements effectively prohibited mining and 
resulted in a physical property restriction, a nearly complete 
diminution in the value of the land, as well as loss of future 
profits. Section 522, _which prohibits mining within a certain 
proximity to houses, public buildings, schools, churches, com-
munity buildings, parks, or cemeteries, was similarly unconsti.-
tutional. Enforcement was enjoined until such time as the federal 
government smv fit to obtain the land by eminent domain and pay-




Finally, the court expressly rejected certain contrary 
conclusions of the DDC and held that certain of the Act's en-
forcerncnt provisions violated due process. The court found that 
inspectors had issued unjustified and arbitrary cessation orders, 
causing irreparable harm to the mining companies, because they 
were making subjective decisioas. Accordingly, the court enjoined 
the issuance of orders under § 521 without a prior hearing "until 
such· time as Congress [made] provisions to correct the use of 
subjective criteria." With more objective guidelines, the Act 
would provide adequate due process guarantees for summary admin-
istxative action with the exception of the 5-day reply provision 
of § 525(c) for action on the oper~tor's application for temporary 
relief. The court would allow only 24 hours and enjoined§ 525. 
The civil penalty provisions of § 518 were enjoined because of the 
imposition of penalties for violations "prior to an adjudication 
of fault." Summary imposition of penalties would be allowed if 
temporary relief were available. The Secretary should be required 
to act under § 525(c) within 24 hours and not merely expeditiously. 
And judicial review under § 526(c) should be available for viola-
tion notices as well as cessation orders. In a supplemental 
opinion, the court stated that§§ 518, 521, and 525 were enjoined 
only insofar as they related to summary issuance of cessation 
orders and civil penalties, which could be issued or imposed only 
in accordance with the court's prior opinion. The court stated 
that the order did not affect issuance of violation notices under 
§ 521 or their review under § 525. 
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3. CONTENTIONS: No. 79-1538 . . The SG argues that ------ ~ 
(a) Sections 515(d) and (e) do not violate the 
Tenth Amendment. National League of Cities does not apply 
because the Act regulates only coal mine operators not States; 
the States are not required to expend any funds or enforce the 
Act (although they are encouraged to assume enforcement). 
Moreover, regulation of coal mining is not an integral govern-
mental function protected by the Tenth Amendment. The land use 
consequences are minimal because the purpose of the Act is a 
return of the land to the original condition, and the States are 
then free to exercise their full powers over the land. Finally, 
Congress made findings contrary to the DC's conclusion that the 
steep-slope requirements were economically infeasible and physically 
impossible; and in any event, economic impact does not give rise 
to a Tenth Amendment violation. 
Response: The motion to affirm calls specious the 
SG ' s contention that the Act regulates only coal mine operators and 
not states. The Act regulates by usurping the regulatory powers of 
the States over land use. The motion otherwise relies on the DC's 
decision. 
(b) The takings questions under § 515 (d) and 522(e) 
are not ripe for decision because there is no particular piece of 
property involved. On the merits, the SG argues that Congress found 
the § 515 techniques feasible and practical; and given that the Act 
serves a substantial public purpose, the only Fifth Amendment ques -
tion is whether the regulation prevents any beneficial use of 
- 8 -
property. Use of the property, even mining, and even surface 
mining is not prohibited; it is only regulated. Section 522 is 
expressly made subject to valid existing rights; and the pro-
hibitions do not prevent underground miningo 
Response: The SG's contention that the issues are 
not ripe is frivolous. Plaintiffs demonstrated to the DC that 
they had property interests in lands subject to the Act and that 
the Act prevented them from surface mining their coal. The motion 
othexwise relies on the decision below. 
(c) The due process rulings are premature. No 
plaintiff received a cessation order or civil penalty. In any 
event, neither provision invalidated amounts to a denial of due 
process. First, emergency action under § 52l(a)(2) is appropriat~ 
where personal · harm is imminent or significant en.vironment:a 1 
damage likely. More particular the standard cannot be, and the 
procedure as a ~.vhole is adequate, as the DDC and the SD Iowa have 
found. Second, the DC misunderstood § 518 by confusing the actual 
assessment of a penalty and the initial notice to the operator of 
the proposed amount of the penalty. Only the latter precedes a 
hearing, and even it follows a conference. The escrow requirement 
is a reasonable solution to the problem of nonpayment of fines. 
[Note: The SD Iowa found a substantial likelihood that it violated 
due process.] In a footnote, the SG states that the reduction of 
the Secretary's reply time on the application for temporary relief is 
an undisguised substitution of the court's judgment. 
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Response.: A pre-sanction hearing is required 
because of the substantial operator interests at stake. 
Their interests include working capital, so the requirement 
of prepayment of penalties is unconstitutional. 
No. 79-1567. Appellants' arguments do not differ 
significantly from the SG 's. 
No. 79-1596. Appellants urge the Court to take 
the case, including the questions not otherwise appealable, 
as a wholeo Accordingly, appellants argue that the Act exceeds 
the authority of Congress to regulate interstate con~erce. In 
contrast to other. mining legislation, the Act is directed not 
to the "commerce" aspects of surface mining but entirely to the 
land use aspectso Appellants contend that the Court has never 
held, nor even intimated, that land as such is subject to regu-
lation under the Commerce Clause. They argue that the Act thus 
presents the question whether regulation is a genuine exercise 
of the commerce power or is simply a cloak for assumption of 
federal control of land use functions and police powers not 
heretofore recognized under the commerce powero 
brief on behalf of eight States 
in support of appellants. 
The SG relies on § 101 of the Act: and asserts that 
there is a rational basis for the findings that surface mining 
affects commerce. Thus the judicial inquiry is c.omplete. In 
any event, there is no basis for appellants' distinction between 
- 10 -
the concededly permissible regulation of mining operations 
and the allegedly improper regulation of aspects of land use. 
The decision below should be affirmed to the extent that it 
upholds the Act under the Commerce Clause. 
4. DISCUSSION: The DC held significant portions of 
the federal legislation unconstitutional; accordingly, probable 
jurisdiction should be noted in No. 79 -1538. No. 79-1567 pre-
sents the same issues, but a response should be called for first. 
Given Congress' findings that energy production in general and 
surface mining in particular affect interstate commerce, findings 
that would not seem to be significantly different from those upon 
which other environmental legislation is based, the Commerce 
Clause issue appears to be correctly decidedo Yet it might be 
more efficient to accept the issue as presented in No. 79-1596 
as well because the DC seemed almost to ignore these same findings 
3/ 
in dealing with the Tenth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment issues. 
There are motions to affirm in Nos. 79-1538 and 79-1596. 








Appellants seem limited to seeking review by appeal to this 
Court. See' 2~ 28 U.S.C. § 1252; and see§ 1254, which provides 
for cert only to theCA 's, to which appellants could not go .::tft:er. 
the SG filed his appeal. The alternative to "noting" tbe "appeal11 
would be to affirm. 
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FROM: Paul Cane 
RE: 
Question Presented 
Two of these cases are consolidated; the third is 
being argued in tandem with the other two. In each case, 
States and mining interests contend that certain aspects of the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 are 
unconstitutional under a variety of theories. . 
q~ ~~~~ot--
~_!~~~~~A:!.~~ 






These consolidated cases involve scattershot 
constitutional attacks on Congress' 1977 strip mining law. One 
set of cases involves suits by Virginia and its mining 
interests [I discern no recusal problem]; the other is a suit 
by Indiana and its mining interests. The issues in the cases 
are remarkably similar, so I address them in one memo. 
The statute is Congress' attempt to remedy some of 
the abuses that it perceived in strip mining. The principal 
substantive provisions of the Act require that the mining 
company do no permanent damage to the land in the course of 
extracting coal. Two particular provisions are relevant in 
this case 0 one is the "stee_p slope" p~sion. It essentially 
~......, 
requires the land to be restored to its original contour after 
coal is removed. 
with this aspect 
The Virginia parties are primarily concerned 
of the law. The other provision co~"prime ----
farmlands." ---- It permits mining of coal on such land, but requires that the fertile soil be preserved and replaced, and 
' ~ ---------------------------------------farming resumed, when mining is completed. The Indiana parties -----------object primarily to this aspect. 
Although the parties from the two states attack 
different portions of the law, their legal theories are 
essentially identical. The statute is said to be 
unconstitutional because: 
(A) it governs matters that Congress cannot reach 
through the Commerce power; 
3. 
(B) it violates powers reserved to the States by the 
lOth Amendment, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 u.s. 
833; 
(C) it violates equal protection and substantive due 
process (Indiana parties only); 
(D) it is a "taking" without just compensation; 
(E) its enforcement mechanisms violate procedural due 
process. 
Discussion 
There is little need to review the background of the 
well-known constitutional theories under which appellants hope 
to prevail. I 1 11 therefore turn to their arguments. Rather 
than summarizing all the arguments party-by-party, I 1 11 deal 
with them issue-by-issue. 
A. Commerce Power 
1. United States: Congress made explicit findings 
11..... '-l 
linking this statute to its power to regulate commerce. It - ~-----------------------------------found that: 
many surface mining operations result in 
disturbances of surface areas that burden 
and adversely affect commerce and the 
public welfare by destroying or diminishing 
the utility of land for commercial, 
industrial, residential, recreational, 
agricultural, and forestry purposes, by 
causing erosion and landslides, by 
contributing to floods, by polluting the 
water, by destroying fish and wildlife 
habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by 
damaging the property of citizens, by 
creating hazards dangerous to life and 
property by degrading the quality of life 
in local communities, and by counteracting 
governmental programs and efforts to 
conserve soil, water, and other natural 
resources. [Moreoever,] surface 
mining and reclamation standards are 
essential in order to ensure that 
competition in interstate commerce among 
sellers of coal produced in different 
States will not be used to undermine the 
ability of the several States to improve 
and maintain adequate standards on coal 
mining operations within their borders. 
4. 
If there is a rational basis supporting Congress' belief that 
the regulated activity affects commerce, the Court must defer.~~ 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 tnA-
~ 
(1964). In this case, it is plain that Congress rationally 
could find that strip mining and its incidents affect commerce. 
~-----------------------------------------------------------------While it is true that the states typically enjoy substantial 
that does not mean that Congress, 
portion of that power. 
power to regul~te~d use, 
if it chooses, can preempt a 
A. 
2. Challengers: This statute is a regulation of 5~f 
~~-
land use. This is the sort of subject matter that historically _  
has been regulated by States. Land itself is not in commerce.~
The district co~Ffound that, "while the Act ultimately ~ 
t;2e-l-~ . f f . h affects the coal mine operator, 1ts pervas1ve e ect 1s on t e 
States' legislative authority and on State control of land 
within its boundaries." 
3. My reaction: I think the Commerce Clause ~ 
argument by the States is frivolq us. Even the district court,  
which struck down major portions of the law, rejected the ~ 
It was settled long ago that the
~A---
Commerce Clause argument. 
Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate in virtually any  
sphere that it deems important. Some of the congressional 
··-
5. 
"findings" fairly might be characterized as "boilerplate," but 
the law is clear that such recitations, unless completely 
implausible, are sufficient to withstand Commerce Clause 
difficulties. 
B. Tenth Amendment ~ : 
1. Unite~Stater National League of Cities v. 
Usery, supra, is the leading case. It struck down a federal 
law that "significantly altered or displaced the States' 
abilities to structure employer-employee relationships in such 
areas as fire prevention, police protections, sanitation, 
public health, and parks and recreation," which are activities 
typically "performed by state and local governments in 
discharging their dual functions of administering the public 
law and furnishing public services." In this case, by 
contrast, the mining restrictions are not directed at the -
------------------------------~------
Regulation of ( 4A-~ States, but rather solely at private activities. 
~ coal mining hardly can be deemed an "integral governmental 
function." As Justice Blackmun noted in his crucial concurring
opinion in National League of Cities, that case "does not ~ 
outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection,  
where the federal interest is demonstrably greater." It is 
true that the strip mining law does i~=~!~~ impose 
restrictions on land use. It also is true that land use is 
something typically controlled by local governments. But that 
does not mean that Congress cannot preempt the power of local 
governments to remedy a perceived evil. There is no 




The States argue, infra, for the need for local solutions to 
specific local problems. The law includes a variance 
provision, 
--.,...... 
§ 515 (d), if the basic statutory requirements are 
unnecessary or unwise in particular cases. 
The States also argue that there are "less intrusive 
means" that Congress could have chosen in regulating strip 
mining. This argument misses the point. The "less intrusive 
means" requirement is applicable where suspect classes are 
disadvantaged or fundamental rights infringed. In the sphere 
of economic regulation, however, there is no constitutional 
requirement that Congress tailor its legislation narrowly. The 
States interests are represented in the national legislature. 
It is there that the States should make their objection to the 
scope of the Act. 
2. Challengers: There is no more integral function 
of local government than land use regulation. Land conditions 
vary from place to place, and it is impossible to develop a 
nationwide rule. Thus, regulating land is truly one of the 
fundamental "attributes of sovereignty" retained by the States. 
In Virginia, for example, the federal law makes no sense 
because it requires backfilling the mined land to its original 
contour. As the district court found, much land in Virginia is 
naturally so steep that it is useless in its original contour. 
Ideally, after land has been strip-mined, it could be levelled 
and filled to make it susceptible to some productive use. 
State governments know local problems like this and can adopt 




The variance provision suggested by the government is 
essentially irrelevant because under no circumstances can a 
variance be granted that dispenses with the need to cover the 
"highwall." 
The Supreme Court should defer to the findings of 5 ~ 
It found that ~ fact by the district court. 
the provision requiring "return to 
approximate original contour" for all 
operations, regardless of the condictions, 
is the most intrusive practical aspect of 
the Act .... Virginia is particularly 
affected by this legislation because 95% of r 
its stri able reserves are located on 
s opes in excess o twenty degree ~ , and, 
t~~e approx i ma t e original contour 
provision comes into play with regard to 
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[Because of the Act,] the State has 
lost control over the economic development 
that could take place in southwest 
Virginia. The Commonwealth is being 
deprived of its right to dictate whether 
this land could be better used for some 
other purpose. 
There are less intrusive means available to regulate. 
Where, as here, the federal law infringes so substantially on 
fundamental state interests, Congress constitutionally must 
draft its legislation more narrowly to permit States to 
exercise their traditional land-use control authority. 
3. My reaction: I agree with the federal 
government. This is not a case like National League of Cities. 9 ~ 
~ J....1/ 
No fundamental function of local government, such as police and
fire protection, is at issue. Congress, perceiving a problem~ 
of national scope, found it necessary to legislate nationally. ---






law does not work well in some geographic areas. But this is 
an argument that should have been made to Congress. When 
Congress paints with a broad brush in legislation with national 
import, the Court is not permitted to strike it down because it ~ 
believes the brush was somewhat too broad as applied in some 
cases. 
C. Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process (Indiana) ' 
1. United States: It is true that there are no %0 ..-
~ 
variance procedures for the "prime farmlands" at issue in th
Indiana case. But there is no equal protection or due process~~ 
problem. The standard of review is for arbitrariness or~• ~ 
t:::L-~ 
caprice. In the context of economic regulation, Congress need ~~
not treat every region of the country differently. The~~ 
district court misapprehended the nature of judicial review ~) ·~ 
 
this respect. It believed that it was necessary to find an S(',t? ~ 
"overriding national interest," citing Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 
426 u.s. 88 (1976). That case is inapposite. Heightened 
scrutiny was necessary there because it involved restrictions 
on aliens by an administrative agency. In this case, the 
decisionmaker is Congress and there is no suspect or quasi-
suspect class. 
2. Challengers: Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, supra, 
establishes that a discrimination of this sort is 
unconstitutional unless justified by an "overriding national 
interest." The government does not even try to defend the 
distinction, but hides behind a "presumption of rationality." 
If Indiana had a variance provision, it would not be forced to 
9. 
confine land to farming uses when other uses might be more 
economical. 
3. My reaction: The federal government is plainly 
correct. The law must be sustained unless irrational. There 
is no irrationality here, simply because Congress--pressured by 
representatives of some localities--saw fit to grant a variance 
provision for hillside areas. Indeed, this is precisely the 
kind of "input" that a representative government should hear 
and respond to. 
D. Taking Without Compensation 
1. United States: The "taking" argument is deeply 
flawed. First, there is a threshold problem. The challengers 
identify no particular piece of property that has been taken. - -1<...0 J 
"Taking" cases make clear that the decision in any case depen~~ 
on "ad hoc factual inquiries" into the specific restraints~~ 
placed on each particular parcel of land. Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). Here, the challengers 
simply say the law on its face is a taking. Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, --- U.S. --- (1980), indicated that the mere enactment 
of a law rarely can be a taking. Instead, the taking inquiry 
depends heavily on the facts and circumstances of each case. 
Even if the challengers can surmount these 
jurisdictional problems, there is no taking. There is no 
showing--certainly none sui table for a facial attack on the 
statute--that landowners are being deprived of all use of their 
land. The statute does impose strict environmental standards, 
but these were intended to be technology-forcing. Uniform 
10. 
rules encourage production of equipment capable of meeting 
industry's requirements. Congress made specific findings of 
feasibility. The district court, after a short trial, made 
findings to the contrary. But these should not overturn the 
product of seven years of congressional deliberation. 
A taking depends on the character of the government 
action and its economic impact. "Where an owner possesses a 
full bundle of property rights, the destruction of one strand 
of the bundle is not a taking." Andrus v. Allard, 444 u.s. 51 
(1979). In this case, some uses remain for the land even if 
mining is impossible. The legislature is not constitutionally 
required to permit the owner to make the best economic use out 
of land. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), is 
inapposite. That case was a private injunctive suit based on 
regulation of specific property. This case is a facial 
challenge. 
In any event, this case is akin to those that have 
permitted takings where necessary to abate a public nuisance. 
Nothing in Pennsylvania Coal is inconsistent with those cases. 
2. Challengers: The ownership of coal interests is 
an estate in land. If extraction is prohibited by statute, 
such is a taking under the fifth amendment. Pennsylvania Coal, 
supra. The Virginia challengers point out that experts 
testified that most hillside land is worthless unless mined. 
The Indiana challengers point out that the district court 
explicitly found that the technology required on prime 
---------------------------------------------------------------~ farmlands was to achieve. No mining can be 
' .. 
11. 
permitted if neighboring land is subject to "high level of 
management," because the statute requires the mined land to be 
brought up to the yield of the neighboring land. 
3. My reaction: I think the United States is right, 
at least with respect to the threshold question. It is odd, in 
light of their stance on the Tenth Amendment issue, that the 
challengers in effect argue here that the statute is a taking 
on its face. In their lOth Amendment argument, the Virginia 
parties noted that the propriety of land use regulations turn 
heavily on the facts of each case. They asserted that land use 
regulation requires "detailed, terrain-specific inquiry." Now, 
however, they seem to take the opposite viewpoint, asserting 
that the mere enactment of the statute is a taking. This 
cannot be right. Decisions on takings are inherently fact- ,~ 
bound. Kaiser Aetna, supra. Moreover, there has been no -
attempt to exhaust the hillside variance procedure to ascertain 
--------~--------'-----------------------precisely what restrictions have been imposed. Cf. Agins, 
supra. Thus, because there is no specific piece of land 
identified to the court that allegedly was "taken," I conclude 
that there is no ripe case or controversy on this issue. 
E. Enforcement Procedures 
1. United States: There are two kinds of 
enforcement orders. Routine violations are corrected pursuant 
to § 521 (a) (3), in the form of a "notice to abate." The owner 
need take no action until the inspector's initial position is 
upheld after a hearing. This method of enforcement is not 
challenged. The disputed method concerns the issuance by 
~ ... 
12. 
federal inspectors of an immediate "cessation order" without a 
hearing. Immediate "cessation orders" may be issued only if 
the inspector determines that a mine is in violation of the Act 
or a permit condition, and if the mine 
creates an imminent danger to the health or 
safety of the public, or is causing, or can 
reasonably be expected to cause 
significant, imminent environmental harm to 
land, air, or water resources •••. 
Within five days of that order, the mine owner may seek review 
of the decision with the Secretary of the Interior. That 
decision, in turn, is subject to judicial review. 
The United States argues that any challenge to this 
system is premature and that, in any event, the system comports 
with due process. It is premature because the complaint does 
not allege that any plaintiff has received a summary cessation 
order. The constitutionality of a pre hearing cessation order 
turns heavily on balancing the owner's interest against the 
public interest in abating hazards. It is impossible to strike 
that balance in the abstract. A court must know precisely the 
kind of imminent danger identified by the inspector. Evidence 
at trial did show that one plaintiff, the Paramont Mining 
Corp., did receive one summary order. But the record is devoid 
of evidence that this order caused any significant financial 
loss to Paramont. 
Even if the challenge is ripe, the statutory practice 
is constitutional. A mine owner is entitled to a prompt 
hearing and both administrative appeals and judicial review. 
Thus, even though he is forced to shut down in the meantime, 
13. 
the infringement is relatively brief. That infringement is 
small when weighed against the possibility of imminent risk to 
the public welfare. 
Similarly, it is constitutional to require that fines 
and assessments be prepaid. Congress identified nonpayment as 
a problem that needed resolution. The system Congress adopted 
is constitutional because all money paid is promptly refunded 
with interest if no violation is found. 
2. Challengers: Due process requires that a hearing 
occur before a shutdown, and a finding of a violation before 
fines must be paid. With respect to the former, it is plain 
that even a shutdown of a couple of days could irreparably harm 
a mine owner. With respect to the latter, the government's 
interest in collecting fines is weak in comparison to the 
burden of prepayment on the mine operator. Deprivation of 
capital impairs investment and could cause mine owners to shut 
down. 
3. My reaction: I lean to agreement with the 
government. There are serious jurisdictional problems in the 
challenge to the prehearing cessation orders because the 
challengers failed to allege and prove any specific 
deprivation. On the merits, I think the system of prehearing 
cessation orders is constitutional. Constitutionality depends 
heavily on the risk to be avoided weighed against the burden on 
those subjected to the orders. ~Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319 (1976). In this case, Congress created a provision to 
permit prompt administrative action in matters of great 
14. 
exigency. The challengers suggest that inspectors may be 
abusing their privileges under that provision. But the burden 
must be on the challengers to compile a record demonstrating 
abuse. There is no such record here. 
Similarly, I think Congress probably can 
constitutionally require prepayment provided that there is a 
mechanism for prompt return, with interest, when liability is 
adjudged. There is such a provision in this case. Nothing in 
the record documents that inspectors very often err in noting 
probable violations. Absent such a showing, I lean to hold for 
the government on this issue. 
Summary 
The posture of this case, taken as a whole, is 
curious. The case was brought as a facial constitutional 
attack. Yet, the case law is clear that such attacks are 
~
unsuccessful, almost by definition, with respect to the 
"taking" and procedural due process arguments. 
Constitutionality under those theories invariably turns on the 
specific facts of each case. To prevail under those theories, 
the challengers should have made more narrowly focused attacks 
as applied to the circumstances of a particular parcel of land. 
The other legal theories Ufcommerce clause ,~enth 
--------------------~ 
amendment) are amenable to facial constitutional challenges. 
--;-"'\ 
And, if we were writing on a clean slate, the challengers' 
arguments would deserve sympathy. But the scope of Congress' 
power under the commerce clause has long been resolved. The 
commerce clause undoubtedly permits Congress to legislate with 
15. 
respect to strip mining. The tenth amendment question may be 
closer, but this does not seem to me to be a case like National 
League of Cities in which the integrity of local government 
arguably is threatened. As you noted the other day, the strip 
mining Act may appear to be unwise as applied to particular 
parcels in a particular region such as Virginia. But this does 
not make the law unconstitutional. The Court should be slow to 
declare irrational the product of the legislative forge. In 
the sphere of economic regulation, Congress is entitled to 
legislate nationally. Its effort may not perfectly resolve 
problems at the local level. But the states interests are 
represented in Congress, and it 
should , appeal when their special 
slighted by the broad brush of 
is to Congress that states 
problems are about to be 
national legislation. J. 
Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 
(1980). 
For these reasons, I would uphold the 
constitutionality of the law in all respects. 
P.W.C. 02/22/81 
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MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: February 25, 1981 
RE: No. 79-1538 et al., Strip Mining Cases 
The purpose of this memo is to identify some 
of the sections of the Strip Mining Act that would be 
·' 
permitted, and some that would be unconstitutional, under 
the Tenth Amendment theory we discussed today. In the short 
time available to me this afternoon, I have compiled a 
• i 
summary of many such sections, but this list is not 
exhaustive. [As you noted, the Act is very long.] We had 
<. 
thought that we could divide the provisions of the Act into 
two groups: one prescribing mining techniques that would be 
constitutionally permissible; the other mandating post-
mining uses that would be constitutionally impermissible. I 
find, however, that there is an intermediate category of 
regulation, that pertaining to reclamation techniques, that 
has some characteristics of each of the prior ones. 
1. Permissible Regulation of Mining Techniques 
a. [30 U.S.C.] § 1265{b) (1) requires operators to 
"conduct surface coal mining operations so as to maximize 
the utilization and conservation of the solid fuel resource 
being recovered." 
; . 
.• .. , 
.\ 
2. 
b. (b) (4) requires the operator to "stabilize and 
protect all surface areas including spoil piles .•. to 
effectively control erosion and attendant air and water 
pollution." 
c. (b) (9) requires the operator to "conduct any 
augering operation associated with surface mining in a 
manner to maximize recovery of mineral reserves remaining." 
d. (b) (12) requires the operator to "refrain from 
surface mining within 500 feet from active and abandoned 
underground mines." 
2. Questionable Regulation of Reclamation Techniques 
a. [30 u.s.c.] § 1265(b) (2) requires restoration of 
"the land affected to a condition capable of supporting the 
uses which it was capable of supporting prior to any mining, -
or higher or better uses of which there is reasonable 
likelihood." 
b. (b) (3) requires that the operator "backfill, grade, 
and compact . . • to provide adequate drainage and to 
achieve an ecologically sound land use compatible with the 
surrounding region." Under certain circumstances, such land 
"shall be shaped and graded in such a way as to prevent 
slides, erosion, and water pollution and is revegitated." 
3. 
c. (b) (6) requires restoration of "the topsoil or the 
best available subsoil which is best able to support 
vegetation." 
d. (b) (7) requires the operator, for all prime 
farmlands, to "replace and regrade the root zone material • 
. . with proper compaction and uniform depth over the 
regraded spoil material." 
3. Impermissible Regulation of Post-Mining Uses 
a. [30 u.s.c.] § 1265(c) requires that land be 
returned to its premining use except when a permit is 
granted "where an industrial, commercial, agricultural, 
residential or public facility use is proposed, [and that 
use] will be (i) compatible with adjacent land uses; (ii) 
obtainable according to data regarding expected need and 
market; ... (iv) supported by commitments from public 
agencies . (vi) planned ... so as to integrate the 
mining operation and reclamation with the postmining land 
use." 
b. With respect to prime farmlands, such land must be 
returned to farming use, § 1260 (d) (1) , and to a yield equal 
to the prevailing yield before mining. 
c. After reclamation, a bond must be posted with the 
government. Such bond is not fully refunded until post-
mining operations are conducted in accordance with the 
premining use for a period of five years (ten years for 
prime farmlands). [This statement was taken from a brief 
and is not disputed, but I can't immediately locate the 
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MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell ~ 
FROM: Paul Cane 1-oe 
DATE: March 4, 1981 
RE: Nos. 79-1538, The Strip Mining Cases 
I have thought about these cases in 
somewhat greater detail. I continue to think that there 
is no merit to (1) the commerce clause argument, (2) the 
substantive due process and equal protection arguments 
[Indiana parties], and (3) the procedural due process 
arguments. 
The tenth amendment and "taking" questions 
are closer. I propose herein two approaches that you 
could take in your voting and writing. Th~ould 
involve an opinion dissenting in part on the tenth 
--------------------------~-----
amendment issue by analogy to National League of Cities. 
--=--------' 
The ~ould simply involve a concurring opinion to 
make clear to future litigants the correct manner to 
perfect their "taking" claims. I favor the latter 
because, on balance, I'm not fully persuaded by my own 
tenth amendment argument. But I sketch out herein the 






I. A Tenth Amendment Dissent 
Land-use regulation is the 
quintessentially local activity. Each distict court found 
that the Act is unwise as applied to the steep slopes of 
Virginia and some of the farmlands of Indiana. To be 
sure, it is beyond cavil that land use can be regulated. 
But local governments are most aware of the benefits and 
burdens associated with various uses of land. Absent some 
problem of interstate externalities, it therefore is the 
local government that is in the best position to decide 
which land uses to permit and which to ban. 
property owners ought to be able to deal 
Similarly, 
with the 
governmental entity that is most 
knowledgeable about local problems. 
accessible and 
Your Conference notes, however, indicate 
that the Justices were not sympathetic to this argument. 
They did not think that National League of Cities v. 
Usery--the leading tenth amendment statement--governed 
this case. The SG in its brief sought to distinguish that 
case by pointing out that it dealt with interferences in 
the employer-employee relationship in such areas as fire 
prevention and police protection which are public-service 
3. 
activities typically performed by state and local 
governments. 
It is at least plausible to argue that 
land-use control is entitled to even more constitutional 
protection than the relationship between local service 
employees and the local government. I believe it is true 
that local governments generally did not undertake to act 
in a proprietary (i.e., service) capacity until long after 
they acted in a governmental (i.e., legislative) capacity. 
State tort law originally distinguished for sovereign 
' 
immunity purposes between the actions of local governments 
qua proprietor and those qua government. The latter 
actions were accorded greater immunity than the former 
because the latter were believed to be closer to the 
traditional core of governmental functions. 
My prior memo to you divided many of the 
provisions of this Act into three categories: (1) 
execution of strip mining; (2) restoration of mined land; 
and (3) post-mining uses of that land. In light of 
precedent, I believe that the first two categories are of 
the sort that Congress is entitled to regulate as 
indicents of the interstate commerce in coal. I believe, 
however, that the third category of provisions arguably is 
,, 
~.~i.:'?,·~ 




of the sort reserved to the tenth amendment under the 
analysis described above. 
I recommend against this approach because 
it does nothing to help the local governments in the 
second category of provisions. In many respects, these 
are the least rational as applied to particular 
localities. But, in light of precedent, I do not think it 
is possible to write a persuasive opinion contending that 
these are out of Congress' reach. And if only "category 
three" restrictions can be invalidated, there is another 
reason for rejecting the tenth amendment approach. Post-
mining use restrictions can be addressed on a case-by-case 
basis upon a showing of proper hardship under the "taking" 
analysis described below. 
II. A "Taking" Concurrence 
Under this option, you could write a 
concurring opinion making clear that the Court does not 
intend to foreclose appropriate "taking" suits. 
Both District Courts entertained facial 
fifth amendment attacks and declared sections of the Act 
unconstitutional. In the Virginia case, the District 
Court made general findings of fact on the "taking" 
question. It found that 95% of Virginia's coal lands were 
I , 
5. 
sloped at angles greater than 20 degrees. Further, these 
coal fields were "small tracts, usually less than one 
hundred acres." On steep slopes, 
the cost of production of coal is increased 
up to 70 percent. On occasion, the 
economic impracticality of strip mining 
coal is outweighed by physical realities. 
Equipment may not be available to cover the 
highwall on a steep slope to restore the 
original contour. 
Even when the land can be restored, the District Court found 
that such restoration would be foolish because steeply sloped 
land is of little value. Thus, restoration actually would 
reduce the value of the land. The variance provision in the 
Act is irrelevant because in all cases the land must be 
restored to cover the highwall. In sum, said the District 
Court, it is "economically and physically impossible to comply" 
with the Act. Therefore, the "steep slope" sections of the Act 
effect a "taking" and are unconstitutional. 
The Indiana Court dealt with the "prime 
farmlands" provisions of the Act. Under these provisions, an 
owner must get a permit to strip mine. To obtain a permit, he 
must show that he has the "technological capability to restore 
such mined area, within a reasonable time, to equivalent or 
higher levels of yield as non-mined prime farmland in the 




permit holder must post a bond, which will not be released 
until the "soil productivity has returned" to the 
equivalent levels of yield. The District Court found that "no 
study establishes that restoration can be achieved" to the 
required level if neighboring land was farmed under the "high 
yield" method. At best, postmining land could be farmed at a 
yield equivalent to that obtained before under "regular" levels 
of management. For these reasons, the District Court concluded 
that it was "technologically impossible" to reclaim prime 
farmland to the required level of productivity, and that the 
' law therefore amounted to an unconstitutional "taking." 
Provisions of the law that prohibit mining near public roads, 
cemeteries, dwellings, churches or schools also were found to 
be takings. 
The approaches of the two District Courts are 
flawed in similar ways. Recent cases of this Court make clear 
that the correct way to analyze "taking" claims requires 
identification both of a specific piece of property and the 
precise manner in which that property was taken. Agins v. City 
of Tiburon, u.s. (1980). Neither District Court 
follows this analysis. Instead, each makes quasi-legislative 
general findings applicable to the geographical area as a 




production is increased "up to 70 percent," and that equipment 
"may not be available" to effect the necessary restoration. 
The Indiana Court in effect shifted the burden of proof when it 
concluded that "no study establishes that restoration can be 
achieved" as required. The correct inquiry was whether the 
plaintiffs had established, for each parcel of land allegedly 
taken, that it was impossible for the necessary restoration to 
be achieved. The Indiana Court also erred by refusing to 
acknowledge that there was some uncertainty about the 
definition of the various levels of land management and that 
the government seemed to be willing to apply the Act in a way 
that ameliorates some of its harsh effects. Brief for SG at 
31-34; cf. Agins, supra. 
I recommend that we write a concurring opinion 
spelling out these errors in the District Court's "taking" 
analysis. We could then emphasize that the Court is not 
foreclosing subsequent suits properly brought. There are six 
suggestions that could be made to help future plaintiffs. 
First, it is necessary to identify a specific piece of property 
that was taken. This was the case in Pennsylvania Coal. 
Second, it is necessary to show that any applicable variance 
procedure has been exhausted. Cf. Agins, supra. Third, it is 





taking of that particular piece of land. Id. Fourth, 
~ 
extinguishing mineral rights can be a taking event if other 
uses of the property remain. [Pennsylvania Coal made clear 
that mineral rights could be an estate in land severable from 
the fee. A taking was found even though the state law had no 
effect on surface uses of the land.] Fifth, unreasonable post-
mining restrictions on use of the land, such as those discussed 
above, could be highly relevant to the question of a taking. 
Sixth, the remedy would not be a declaration that the relevant 
sections of the Act were facially unconstitutional, but only 
unconstitutional as applied to the particular piece of property 
at issue. Thus, Congress' regulatory scheme would not be 
disturbed except in specific cases on a specific showing. 
I prefer a concurring opinion on the taking 
issue to the tenth amendment argument. If you agree, we may 
get some help from Justice Brennan's dissent in San Diego, 
which I hear will be quite a manifesto. 
P.W.C. 03/04/81 
March 5, 1981 
79-1538 Andrus v. Virginia Surface Mining 
Dear Chief: 
As I •passed• at the Conference on the above 
cases, I now write to advise as follows: 
I agree with the majority that there is no merit 
to the respondents' arguments with respect to (i) the 
Commerce Clause, (ii) substantive due process and equal 
protection, and (iii) procedural due process. 
I am still not at rest on what I view as the Tenth 
Amendment/taking question. 
Although I could agree that Congress has the power 
to regulate the conducting of strip mining and perhaps the 
restoration of the mined land, this legislation goes very 
far indeed in imposing post-mining obligations on miners. 
The intrusion on traditional state and local land use 
control is substantial and pervasive, in addition to raising 
with respect to individual situations questions of •taking• 
without just compensation. Thus, I may try to work out a 
dissent with respect to post-mining regulation - although I 
recognize that this might not be easy. 
In sum, my tentative vote is to reverse in part 
and affirm in part. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
-
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
,jlt.Jlrtlttt <!Jllltrt llf tJrt ~t~ ,jtaftg 
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March 5, 1981 
79-1538 Andrus v. Virginia Surface Mining 
Dear Chief: 
As I "passed" at the Conference on the above 
cases, I now write to advise as follows: 
I agree with the majority that there is no merit 
to the respondents' arguments with respect to (i) the 
Commerce Clause, (ii) substantive due process and equal 
protection, and (iii) procedural due process. 
I am still not at rest on what I view as the Tenth 
Amendment/taking question. 
Although I could agree that Congress has the power 
to regulate the conducting of strip mining and perhaps the 
restoration of the mined land, this legislation goes very 
far indeed in imposing post-mining obligations on miners. 
The intrusion on traditional state and local land use 
control is substantial and pervasive, in addition to raising 
with respect to individual situations questions of "taking" 
without just compensation. Thus, I may try to work out a 
dissent with respect to post-mining regulation - although I 
recognize that this might not be easy. 
In sum, my tentative vote is to reverse in part 
and affirm in part. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
.:§u:punre <qcurt o-f tltt 'J!fuittb .:§htftg , 
'J)l~t$Jri:nghm.18. <q. 2!1~,.,~ 
CHAMBER S OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
March 5, 1981 
79-1538 Andrus v. Virginia Surface Mining 
Dear Chief: 
As I "passed" at the Conference on the above 
cases, I now write to advise as follows: 
I agree with the majority that there is no merit 
to the respondents' arguments with respect to (i) the 
Commerce Clause, (ii) substantive due process and equal 
protection, and (iii) procedural due process. 
I am still not at rest on what I view as the Tenth 
Amendment/taking question. 
Although I could agree that Congress has the power 
to regulate the conducting of strip mining and perhaps the 
restoration of the mined land, this legislation goes very 
far indeed in imposing post-mining obligations on miners. 
The intrusion on traditional state and local land use 
control is substantial and pervasive, in addition to raising 
with respect to individual situations questions of "taking" 
without just compensation. Thus, I may try to work out a 
dissent with respect to post-mining regulation - although I 
recognize that this might not be easy. 
In sum, my tentative vote is to reverse in part 
and affirm in part. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
.-.1 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§u-prtm.t Qftrttd trf tqt ~ttb .§hrlt.s' 
~as'Jringhm, ~. QJ. 20gtJ.l.~ 
May 8, 1981 
Re: 79-1538 and 79-1596 - Hodel v. Virginia 
Surface Mining 
Dear Thurgood: 
Although I voted the other way on the civil 
penalty issue, I am now satisfied that your proposed 
disposition is sound. Please join me in your opinion. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
.. 
• . . 
·I· 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.$)uvr.cmt (!Jl!ttrl !tf tfrt ~t~ ~ta±ts 
2)nasfrhtgton. ~- "f. 20~,1!,~ 
May 8, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1538 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Association 
Dear Thurgood: 
I plan to write separately in this case. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 











CHAM BER S OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.:§u:pr-tmt <!J!11trt cf tqt 'Jfurittlt ~fii&s 
... ltllfringLm, lB. <!J. 20~~;J 
May 8, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1538 Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & 
Reclamation Association 
Dear Thurgood: 
I plan to write separately in this case. 
Sincerely,~ 
Mr. Justice Ma rshall 











79-1538 and 79-1596 Surfrace Mining Cases 
Dear Thurgood: 
You have written a fine opinion, and I believe I 
will be able t v u ::::.::..1-- t~ol~ 
reservations. 
My p~n~ern, ~ ~ outset, has been 
Just Compensatio th~ you~art 
I agree with you~~!: p~t«Fn 
the 
IV. 
this facial att~ ~~' ~u have 
disposed of the is~l ~ee~ There are, however, 
some language chan ortant, and would 
appreciate your considering: ~ 
1. The quotation on page 20 from Agins is not 




"A statute regulating the uses that can be 
made of property effects a taking if the law 
'does not substantially advance legitimate 
state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 
u.s. 183, 188 (1928), or denies the property 
owner all economically viable use of his 
land •... ' Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 260. 
See Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) ." 
The words "the property" and "all" are not in the U.S. 
Reports. The clause in question reads: "denies an owner 
2. 
econmically viable use of his land ..• " Agins v. Tiburon, 
447 u.s. 255, 260. 
The addition of the word "all" could be viewed as 
a substantial change of substance. Although the language in 
our Just Compensation Clauses has not been uniform, I do not 
think the Court has ever held that no compensation need be 
paid so long as the owner retained some viable use of his 
land, however small. If, for example, an owner were left 
with 10% of his marketable coal and deprovided of 90%, 
surely there would be a compensable taking. In Agins, we 
emphasized that the owner in any event would retain a 











your opinion with Agins}, we made clear that our holding was 
"based on Penn Central's present ability to use the terminal 
for its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion". 438 
u.s., at 138, n. 36. 
The word "all" is repeated in the fifth line from 
the bottom of page 29, and in footnote 37 on that page, and 
near the top of p. 38. 
2. I am concerned also by the emphasis on "non-
mining uses", in a context that indicates "no taking" where 
some such uses remain, p. 29, n. 37. See also the sentence 
beginning at the bottom of p. 29 and carrying over to the 
top of p. 30, noting that the "act does not purport to 
regulate alternative uses". And the statement in n. 38 that 
owners "preseumably retain the option of simply leveling the 
land without first mining the coal", thereby creating 









Having been in the mining country of southwest 
Virginia, I am somewhat familiar with the terrain there. 
There are few possible "alterntive uses" to most of it. It 
tends to be rugged and rocky. The cost of leveling it in 
most places would be wholly prohibitive. 
Relative minor changes in language in n. 38 could 
limit what you say to suchmining land as is susceptible of 
being leveled economically to a higher use than cold mining. 
I would guess, however, that if there is in fact any such 
land that can be leveled and sold for $300,000, this would 
have been done years ago. Moreover, except where near a 
town or a plant site (both rather sparce in southwest 
Virginia) the leveled would be worthless for residential or 
commercial purposes, and the soil will grow little except 
scrup trees of no value. 
In a more fundamental sense, I do not think we 
canjustify the inference (see e.g. n. 37, n. 38) that so 
~ ,.• . . . 
\ 
. .,_ ~. 
r 










long as some "nonmining" use may be a~ailable, however less 
valuable than surface mining, there would be no compensable 
taking. 
As our cases have said, the underlying reason for 
the Just Compensation Clause is to make sure that the public 
at large - rather than a single owner - bears the burden of 
an exercise of state power that is in the general public 
interest. Agins, supra, at 260. 
* * * 
Although it has taken me much too long to identify 
(for illustrative purposes)language that concerns me, I 
think relatively few changes in language would be required. 
If you wish, I would be happy to suggest the changes. 
ARe we not also talking about dicta? Your holding 
in Part IV is clear cut: the taking issue is prematurely 














owners or operators. I would think it unnecessary to 
undertake an anticipatory summary of what may be the 
applicable law or relevant circumstances in future cases. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
. ' 
. ' . 
.,.,<i (;. 
~ . ' .. 
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79-1538 and 79-1596 Surfrace Mining Cases 
Dear Thurgood: 
You have written a fine opinion, and I believe I 
will be able to join you subject to the following 
reservations. 
My primary concern, from the outset, has been the 
Just Compensation Clause issue that you address in Part IV. 
th-is -facial- .at..ta..a-k·. For the most part, I think you have 
\.N~ t -r· e\,(!'1""' f , ~- ~'" 
disposed of the issue very well indeed.\ There-afe, hewe¥er, 
some language changes that I consider important, and would 
appreciate your considering~; 
;) . ' 
1~,\ -~~; 
( 1. ...The quotation on page 20 from Agins is not 
entirely accurate. Your draft states: 
·' 
"A statute regulating the uses that can be 







'does not substantially advance legitimate 
state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 
u.s. 183, 188 (1928), or denies the property 
owner all economically viable use of his 
land •••• ' Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 260. 
See Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York 
City, 438 U.S. 104 (l97S) .•• 
The words "the property" and "all" are not in the u.s. 
Reports. The clause i n question reads: "denies an owner 
2. 
econmically viable use of his land • • 11 Agins v. Tiburon, 
447 u.s. 255, 260. 
The addition of the word 11 al~' could be viewed as 
a substantial change of substance. Although the language in 
our Just Compensation Clauses has not been uniform, I do not 
think the Court has ever held that no compensation need be 
paid so long as the owner retained some viable use of his 
land, however small. If, for example, an owner were left 
J.tf "~ 
with 10% of his marketable coal and e~~e~de& of 90%, 
surely there would be a compensable taking. In Agins, we 
emphasized that the owner in any event would retain ~~· 
~L .... t . ·1\. Jl. 1 "'t ,.4. "t I ~ 









., .. ~. 




























· . . 
'1;, 
3. 
your opinion with Agins), we made clear that our holding was 
.. , c.._ 
"based on Penn Central's present ability to use the terminal 
for its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion". 438 
u.s., at 138, n. 36. 
The word "all" is repeated in the fifth line from 
the bottom of page 29, and in footnote 37 on that page, and 
near the top of p. 38. 
t&! ~;. r f'L..;;J:.~:J.., 
..... ~ I t m (<foncerned ~ by the emphasis on "non-
tvv"< t - ')t"'""" ... ; '"~....c~ t~~ . 
mining uses", J.n a coRt-e Itt that illlili-.awwe ~~taking" where 
~ 
some such us~ remain, p. 29, n. 37. See also the sentence 
beginning at the bottom of 9· 29 and carrying over to the 
top of p. 30, noting that the "act does not purport to 
regulate alternative uses". And the statement in n. 38 that 
.--
owners "pre~~mably retain the option of simply leveling the 
land without first mining the coal", thereby creating 
exceptional value per acre. 
t., 












Having been in the mining country of southwest 
Virginia, I am somewhat familiar with the terrain there. 
There are few possible "alterntive uses" to most of it. It 
tends to be rugged and rocky. The cost of leveling it in 
most places would be wholly prohibitive. 
Relative minor changes in language in n. 38 could 
limit what you say to suc1mining land as is susceptible of 
~tJ 
being leveled economically to a higher use than g a mining. 
/\ 
I would guess, however, that if there is in fact any such 
1 "'t(:...t"~~.ctt~el 
and l sold f-lf~""""""·~-.,..JM~Mo4&.._., 
) 
land that can be leveled this would 
have been done years ago. Moreover, except where near a 
"} 
town or a plant site (both rather spar~e in southwest 
' t 
' "· 'l,l 
Virginia)Athe leveled would be worthless for residential or 
) 
commercial purposes, and the soil will grow little except 
trees of no value. 
In a more- \damental sense ,_..,r aCi" Rpt think we 
can· ~tifl_' the ' inferende (see e ,,(:. 37, n. 3~ t~at so 






.. , .. 
•.; .. 
'·· 













5 • ..-\ 
long as some "nonmining" u\e may be available, howev'e,r less 
compe~able \aluable than surface minin\, there 
' '--_ .... 
', 
would be no 
/ 
ta i.ng. ,. 
As our cases have said, the underlying reason for 
the Just Compensation Clause is to make sure that the public 
at large - rather than a single owner - bears the burden of 
an exercise of state power that is in the general public 
~·~. . 
Although it has taken me much too long to identify 
1' 
(for illustrative purposes)f anguage that concerns me, I 
think relatively few changes in language would be ;e~ui~ed ~ 
( '\ (1...., .P /1 t..-tl rt· : ' t ~~ r 
I ,.. ~ · . -~ v' '1! ~ ,J:.fj ;,oiA. 
If you wish, I would be happy to suggest the changes. c..qvv{ ' ... +· Tel 
t' ,..,.._;) tC.r 1M': ~CI 





I 0 ;~ 
i~~V"" is clear..._~· the taking issue is prematurely / \..f ·~·. 
l 
presented, and remedies remain available to individual ) 
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owners or operators. -! wou.J.4 ~ ± t"'~ee&S-aaL.¥-.t.Q 
undertake an anticipatory summary of what may be the 
. , 
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,..,., o I 
~ ~. ~j':J.·~ ir/ ,: 
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pwc 79-1538 and 79-1596 Surface Mining Cases 
Dear Thurgood: 
You have written a fine opinion, and I believe I 
will be able to join you subject to the following 
reservations. 
From the outset, my primary concern has been the 
Compensation Clause issue that you address in Part IV. For 
the most part, I think you have disposed of the issue very 
well indeed. Your holding is clear: the taking issue is 
prematurely presented, and remedies remain available to 
individual owners or operators. 
s 
undertake an anticipatory summary of what may be the 
1\ 
applicable law in future cases. It is this dicta that 
concerns me. I would be content if you were to omit it 
entirely. Or, if you wish to include it, there are some 
language changes that I consider important, and would 







First, the quotation on page 20 from Agins is not 
entirely accurate. Your draft states: 
"A statute regulating the uses that can be 
made of property effects a taking if the law 
'does not substantially advance legitimate 
state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 
u.s. 183, 188 (1928), or denies the property 
owner all economically viable use of his land 
.•.• ' Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 260. See 
Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City, 
438 u.s. 104 (1978) ." 
The word "all" is not in the u.s. Reports. The clause in 
question reads: "denies an owner economically viable use of 
his land." Agins v. Tiburon, 447 u.s. 255, 260. The word 
"all" is repeated in your opinion in the fifth line from the 
bottom of p. 29, ~ in footnote 37 on that page, and near 
the top of p. 30. 
The addition of the word "all" is a substantial 
change. Although the language in our Compensation Clause 
cases has not been uniform, I do not think the Court has 
ever held that compensation need not be paid so long as the 








If, for example, an owner were left with 10% of his 
marketable coal and deprived of 90%, surely there would be a 
compensable taking. In Agins, we found no taking but 
emphasized that the property owner there retained 
substantial value in his property. Similarly, in Penn 
Central (cited in your opinion with Agins}, the Court made 
clear that its holding was "based on Penn Central's present 
ability to use the terminal for its intended purposes and in 
a gainful fashion." 438 u.s., at 138, n. 36. 
I therefore am particularly concerned with the 
u-H&<-~ ~ 
emphasis~ you ~Be on "nonmining uses," and ~ suggestion 
that no "taking" exists where some such use remains, see p. 
29, n. 37. See also the sentence beginning at the bottom of 
p. 29 and carrying over to the top of p. 30. 
rt.L 
I am troubled, also, by ~r comment that owners 
" 
"presumably retain the option of simply leveling the land 
without first mining the coal," thereby creating exceptional 
< '· ~~... . 







value per acre (n. 38}. Having been in the mining country 
of southwest Virginia, I am familiar with the terrain there. 
There are few possible "alternative uses" to most of it. It 
tends to be rugged and rocky. The cost of leveling it in 
;9r-ca. ""<"&. ;z;.-: •. 4 i4c~ c... 
most places is wholly p~ohibitive ,{unless the owner or 
~t-~e~. 
operator is permitted ~Q aQll the coal ~nearthee in ~he "' .-
J!IOee,;S1J~r ~hanges in language in n. 38 
could limit what you say to such mining land as is 
susceptible of being leveled economically to a practical, 
profitable guess, however, that if there is 
in fact any such land that can be leveled 
sold, this already would have been don )i(il' eo·.r-e-r , <:;" xcept -
or a plant site (both rather sparse in 
southwest Virginia} , the leveled ~ lana would be worthless 
" 
for 
residential or commercial purposes, and the soil will grow 





As our cases have said, the underlying reason for 
the Compensation Clause is to ensure that the public at 
large -- rather than a single owner -- bears the burden of 
an exercise of state power that is in the general public 
interest. Agins, supra, at 260. I do not think our cases 
' 
support the position that there is no taking as long a~ 
.-·--··-.. .... ,~·,.... 
_..., ..... 
C "some" nonmining use remains. 
Although it has taken me much too long to identify 
(for illustrative purposes) language that concerns me, I 
think relatively few changes would be required. If you 
wish, I would be happy to suggest the changes. Or, as I 
noted at the outset, I would be content to omit the dicta 
entirely. 
Sincerely, 
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JUSTICE POTTER S T EWART 
.:§upr mtt <!I ttUrl 0 f 14 t %tfult j;ta.tt g 
'J}T rur Jrhtg:ton, ~ . <!J. 2 11~ JI. 2 
May 11, 1981 
Re: Nos. 79-1538 & 79-1596, Hodel v. 
Virginia Surface Min. & Reel. Assn., etc. 
Dear Thurgood, 











..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~ltpTttttt C!Jaurl of tl1t~tb ~tilig 
~lyingfon, ~. C!J. 20gl)[.~ 
May 12, 1981 
Re: 79-1538 and 79-1596 -
Hodel v. Virginian Surface Mining 
and Reclamation Assn., Inc, etc. 
Dear Thurgood, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
., 
May 14, 1981 
79-1538 and 79-1596 Virginia 
Dear Thurgood: 
You have written a fine opinion, and I expect to 
be able to join you. 
My only concern relates to some of the language 
Part IV. Your holding there is quite clear: The taking 
issue is prematurely presented on a facial attack, and 
remedies remain available to individual owners or operators. 
It seems to me, however, that some of the language in Part 
IV, particularly in footnotes 38 and 40, may create some 
doubt as to remedies. 
Footnote 38 refers to the District Court's 
of fancy as to land "left leveled or stabilized with 
benches" being worth up to $300,000 per acre. The paragraph 
of the opinion that contains this language is not easy to 
understand. It commences with the statement that "95% of 
the strippable coal lands in Virginia are located on slopes 
in excess of 20%". This suggests the rugged character of 
the mountainous area in question. Having been in the mining 
country of southwest Virginia (and attended college in sight 
of the Allegheny range), I am familiar with the terrain. It 
tends to be rugged, and sparsely settled. Mining and 
bootlegging support this poverty stricken area. The cost of 
leveling these hils in most places is wholly prohibitive -
certainly unless the owner or operator is permitted to mine 
the coal at the same time. Moreover, except where coal land 
is located near a town or a plant site (both of which are 
rare in southwest yirginia), the leveled land would be 
largely worthless for residential or commercial purposes. 
The soil will grow little except scrub trees of no value. 
Thus, when note 38 suggests that "owners 
presumably retain the option of simply leveling the land 
without first mining the coal" it is an option that may 










eliminate the note entirely, as the purpose of Part IV is 
merely to leave open all questions of taking. In any event, 
I think it is necessary - in the interest of accuracy - to 
add the word "some" in the second line of n. 38 immediately 
prior to the words "land owners". 
The last two sentences of note 40 purport to 
identify specific remedies. Resort to the Tucker Act is 
characterized "as a first step", and then if that "remedy 
unavailable", you say that "declaratory and injunctive 
relief" may be sought. I would think it more appropriate 
for us not to speculate as to the types of remedies 
available. You have correctly said that a "taking is not 
constitutional unless just compensation is available". If 
there is any doubt as to recovery under the Tucker Act, an 
owner or operator should be able to obtain an injunction, 
and he should not be deprived of his property without 
assurance - such as that available under the condemnation 
laws of the states - that a fair compensation proceeding is 
available. · --
In sum, on this second point, after making clear 
that just compensation must be provided for a taking, we 
should not undertake in this case to indicate what remedies 
are available or the order in which they must be pursued. 
Identifying two possible remedies also could be read as 
excluding all others. I hope you will be willing to omit 
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.:%U:Vrtlttt <!J:ottrl of tfrt ~nitt~ ~htf.tg 
'JM'alllrht¢lltt. ~. <!):. 20~'!~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN May 15 
1 
19 81 
Re: No. 79-1538 - Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
and Reclamation Association, Inc. 
No. 79-1596 - Virginia Surface Mining and 
Reclamation Association, Inc. v. Hodel 
Dear Thurgood : 
Please join me. 
• • 'U<,;"' 
Sincerely, 
jJC. 6-
Mr. Justice Marshal l 






C H AMBERS OF 
JUS TI CE B Y R ON R . WHITE 
~uvumt C!Jottrl of tJrt JnUtb: ~tate.&' 
~Jrtngtan. ~. C!J. 2il,?J!.~ 
May 15, 1981 
Re: 79-1538 and 79-1596 - Virginia 
Surface Mining cases 
De ar Thurgood, 
I have no objection to your making 
the changes Lewis suggests. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Marshall 






















JUSTICE w ... . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.§uprtntt Qfcurl cf f!rt> 2lfuilt>b ,.§taifg 
~a,s:fting:Lrn.. tB. <!f. 20 c? JI. ~ 
May 19, 1981 ( 
RE: Nos. 79-1538 & 1596 Andrus v. Va. Surface Mining 
Dear Thurgood: 




cc: The Conference 
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Nos. 79-1538 AND 79-1596 
~ UJ 1:-f J< Donald Paul Hodel, Acting Sec-
/ ~ -r' J J A ... re~a:~Aof the Interior, ~ -{ ~~ / ppellant, 
> ..-;; / j(\ 7~153JV '" ~ v. -- u,) 
-" {_ KrfJVirgf~ing and 
On Appeals from the United 
States District Court for 
the Western District of 
Virginia. 
. !... ·. 11( ~ • 
U,ecl,amation Association, 
Inc., et al. 
Virginia .SJ.rrface Mining and 
Iteclamation Association, 
Inc., et al., Appellants, 
79-1596 v, 
Ponald Paul Hodel, Acting Sec-
retary of the Interior, et al. 
[May -, 1981] 
JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
'£hese cases arise out of a pre-enforcement challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977 (Surface Mining Act or Act), 30 U.S. C. 
§ 1201 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III). The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Virginia declared 
several central provisions of the Act unconstitutional.. and 
permanently enjoined their enforcement. 483 F. Supp~ 425 
(WD Va. 1980) . In these appeals, we consider whether Con-
gress, in adopting the Act, exceeded its powers under the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution/ or transgressed affir-
1 The Commerce Clause empowers Congress "[t]o regulate Commerce· 
with foreign nations and among the several States, and with the, Indian: 
'frihe•." U. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; .. 
1'1)-1568 & 79- 1.196-0PINION 
2 HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN. 
mative limitations on the exercise of that power contained 
in the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. We conclude that in 
the context of a facial challenge, the Surface Mining Act does 
not suffer from any of these alleged constitutional defects and 
we uphold the Act as constitutional. 
I 
A 
The Surface Mining Act is a comprehensive statute de ... 
signed to "establish a nationwide program to protect society 
and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal 
mining operations." § 102 (a), 30 U.S. C. § 1202 (a). Title 
II of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1211, creates the Office of Surface 
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM), within the 
Department of the Interior, and the Secretary of the Interior 
(Secretary) acting through OSM, is charged with primary 
responsibility for administering and imple~enting the Act 
by promulgating regulations and enforcing its provisions. 
§ 201 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1211 (c). The principal regulatory 
and enforcement provisions are contained in Title V of the 
Act. 30 U. S. C. §§ 1251- 1270. Section 501, 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1251, establishes a two-stage program for the regulation 
of surface coal mining, an initial, or interim regulatory phase, 
and a subsequent, permanent phase. The interim program 
mandates immediate promulgation and federal enforcement 
of some of the Act's environmental protection performance 
standards, complimented by continuing state regulation. 
Under the permanent phase, a regulatory program is to be 
adopted for each State mandating compliance with the full 
panoply of federal performance standards, with enforce-
ment responsibility lying with either the State or Federal 
Government. 
Section 501 (a) directs the Secretary to promulgate regu-
lations establishing an interim regulatory program during 
which mine operators will be required to comply with some 
79-1538 & 7 !J-159~0PINION 
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of the Act's performance standards, as specified by § 502 (c), 
30 U. S. C. § 1252 (c). Included among those selected stand-
ards are requirements governing: (a) restoration of land after 
mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration of land to its 
approximate original contour; (c) segregation and preserva .. 
tion of topsoil; (d) minimization of disturbance to the hy-
drologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine waste piles 
used as dams and embankments; (f) revegetation of mined 
areas; and (g) spoil disposal. § 515 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 
(b) .2 The interim regulations were published on December 
13. 1977, see 42 Fed. Reg. 62639,8 and they are currently in 
effect in most States, including Virginia.4 
2 Otlwr provi~ions of the Act are, by their own terms, made effective 
during the interim period. One example is § 522 (e), 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1272 (e), which prohibits, with some exceptions, surface coal mining on 
certain lands or within specified distances of particular structures or 
faciliti!:'8. 
8 Under §§ 502 (b), (c) of the Act, 30 U. S. C. §§ 1252 (b), (c), the 
interim standards are applicable only to surface mining operations in 
States that wen· themselves regulating surface mining when the Act be-
came law. All States in which surface mining was conducted on private 
lands had regulatory programs of their own when the Act was pa:;8ed in 
1977. Accordingly, the interim program became applicable in all relevant 
areas throughout the country, including Virginia. 
4 New surface mining operations, excluding tho~e on "Federal lands" or 
"Indian l and~," commencing on or after February 3, 1978 must comply 
with the performance standards established by the interim regulatory pro-
gram at the start of operations. And, with certain limited exceptions, sur-
fare mining operations begun prior to February 3, 1978, were required to 
be in compliance with the interim regulations by May 3, 1978. §§ 502 (b), 
(c) and 701 (11) , 30 U. S. C. §§ 1252 (b), (c) and 1291 (11). 
Some of the interim regulations were challenged in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to § 526 (a) (1) ot 
the Act , 30 U. S. C.§ 1276 (a)(l) . In reSurface Mining ReguLation 
Litigation, 452 F . Supp. 327 (D. C. 1978); In re Surface Mining ReguLa-
tion Litigation, 456 F . Supp 1301 (D. C. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in 
]>art,- U. S. App. D. C.-, 627 F . 2d 1346 (1980) . The plaintiffs in 
the District of Columbia litigation also challenged the validity of a num-
lJet of the ::1t11.tu1ory provisions that are at issue in the instant cases. The 
'· 
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The Secretary is responsible for enforcing the interim reg-
ulatory program. § 502 (e), 30 U. S. C. § 125,2 (e). A fed-
eral enforcement and inspection program is to be established 
for each State, and is to remain in effect until a permanent 
regulatory program is implemented in the State. States may 
issue permits for surface mining operations during the in-
terim phase, but operations authorized by such permits must 
comply with the federal interim performance standards. 
§ 502 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1252 (b). States may also pursue 
their· own regulatory and inspection programs during the in-
terim phase, and they may assist the Secretary in enforcing 
the interim standards.5 The States are not, however, re-
quired to enforce the interim regulatory standards and, until 
the permanent phase of the program, the Secretary may not 
cede the :Federal Government's independent enforcement role 
to States that wish to conduct thei~regulatory programs. ~ 
Section 501 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1251 (b), directs the Secre-
tary to promulga,te regulations establishing a permanent reg-
ulatory program incorporating all the Act's performance 
staudards. The Secretary published the permanent regula-
t1ous on March 13, 1979, see 44 Fed. Reg. 14902, but these 
regulations do not become effective in a particular State until 
either a permanent state program, submitted and approved 
in accordance with § 503 of the Act, or a permanent federal 
program for the State, adopted in accordance with § 504, is 
imp1emented. 
Under § 503, any State wishing to assume permanent regu-
latory authority over the surface coal mining operations on 
"non-Federal lands" 8 within its borders must submit a pro-
Di~trict Court 8ustained the validity of thos~ provisions, 452 F . Supp., at 
1319- 1321, and the attack was not renewed on appeal. 
5 Congress encouraged such assistance by providing for financial reim-
bursPrnents to States that aetively assist the federal enforcement effort 
dming the interim phase. See 30 U.S. C. § 1252 (e)(4) . 
6 A separate r~gulatory program governing "Federal lands" is established 
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posed permanent program to the Secretary for his approval. 
The proposed program must demonstrate that the state leg-
islature has enacted laws implementing the environmental 
protection standards established by the Act and accompany-
iug regulations, and that the State has the administrative and 
technical ability to enforce these standards. 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1253. The Secretary must approve or disapprove each such 
proposed program in accordance with time schedules and 
procedures established by §§ 503 (b), (c), 30 U.S. C. §§ 125q 
(b) , (c).7 In addition, the Secretary must develop and im-
plement a federal permanent program for each State that 
fails to submit or enforce a satisfactory state program. 
§ 504, 30 U. S. C. § 1254. In such situations, the Secretary 
d('.fined in § 701 ( 4) , 30 U. S. C. § 1291 ( 4). Section 710 of the Act, 30 
U. S. C. § 1300, r('gulate:; surface mining on "Indian lands." 
7 The proposed state programs were to have been submitted by l<'eb-
ruary a, 1979- 18 months after the Act was passed. Exercising his 
authority under § 504 (a), the Secretary extended the deadline until 
Augu"t 3, 1979. See 44 Fed . Reg. 15324 (1979). Because the Secretary's 
March 1979 publication of the permanent regulations occurred 7 months 
a t'ter the date set by the Act, see 30 U. S. C. § 1251 (b), the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia further extended the 
deadline for submission of state programs to and including March 3, 1980. 
In n Pennanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, Civ. No. 79-1144 
(D. C July 25, and Aug. 21, 1979) . See also 44 Fed. Reg. 60969 (1979) 
(announcing conforming changes in the Secretary's regulations governing 
submission of state programs) . 
With the exception of Alaska, Georgia, and Washington, all States in 
which surface mining is either conducted or is expected to be conducted 
submitted proposed state programs to the Secretary by March 3, 1980. 
The Secretary has made his initial decisions on these programs. Three 
p rograms were approved, eight were approved on condition that the States 
agr"'e to some modifications, 10 were approved in part and disapproved 
i11 part, and three were disapproved because the state legislatures had 
failed to enact the necessary implementing statutes. Virginia 's program 
was among those approved in part and disapproved in part. See 45 Fed. 
Rrg. 69977 (1980) . Under § 503 of the Act, a State may revise a plan 
that has been disapproved in whole or in part and resubmit it to the 
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constitutes the regulatory authority administering the Act 
within that State and continues as such unless and until a 
"state program" is approved. No later than 8 months after 
adoption of either a state-run or federally administered per-
manent regulatory program for a State, all surface coal min-
ing and reclamation operations on "non-Federal lands" 
within that State must obtain a new permit issued in accord-
ance with the applicable regulatory program. § 506 (a), 30 
U. S. C. § 1256 (a). 
B 
On October 23, 1978, the Virginia Surface Mining and 
Reclamation Association, Inc., an association of coal pro-. 
ducers engaged in surface coal mining operations in Virginia, 
63 of its member coal companies, and four individual land-
owners filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief against various provisions of the Act. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia and the Town of Wise, Va., 
intervened as plaintiffs.8 Plaintiffs' cha.llen ~ was primarily 
directed at Title V's ,_ erformance standar s ecause the 
permanent regu atory program was not scheduled to become 
effective until June 3, 1980, plaintiffs' challenge was directed 
at the sections of the Act establishing the interim regulatory 
vrogram. Plaintiffs alleged that these provisions violate the 
Commerce Clause, the equal protection and due process guar-
antees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment/ 0 
"The Virginia Citizens for Better Reclamation, Inc., and the Town of 
St Charles, Va ., intervened as defendants in support of the Secretary. 
t> Plaintiff::; abo challenged Title IV of the Act, 30 U. S. C. §§ 401-413, 
whieh establisheb a reclamation program for abandoned mines. The 
Di8trict Court, held, however, that it would exercise its discretion by "not 
grant jlllg] declaratory judgments as to the provisions of that title." 483 
F. Supp., at 429. There is no appeal from this. portion of the District 
Court ':; JUdgment. 
10 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no 
person :;hall ''bP deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due procest> 
(lf• lm ' U. S. Cou:'!t., Arndt. V. 
·~·-
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the Tenth Amendment,11 and the Just Compensation Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.12 
The District Court held a 13-day trial on plaintiffs' re-
quPst for a permanent injunction. The court subsequently 
issued an order and opinion declaring several central provi-
sions of the Act unconstituti~l. 483 F. Supp.~5 (1980), 
The court r · cted plain tiff~ommerce Claus~ual pro-
tection, an u ~taE.!iv~~y_r9.._cess c a enges to the Act. 
T"he"' court held, however~ that tne Act "'operates to displace 
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in numer-
ous areas of traditional functions,' and, therefore, is in con-
travention of the Tenth Amendment." Id., at 435, quoting 
v lvational League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). 
Tht' court also ruled that various provisions of the Act effect 
an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of 
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
FiHaliy, the court agreed with plaintiffs' due process chal-
lenges to some of the Act's enforcement provisions. The 
(~ourt permanently enjoined the Secretary from enforcing 
various provisions of the Act.18 
In No. 79-1538, the Secretary appeals from that portion 
of the District Court's judgment declaring various sections of 
the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoining their en-
foreernent. In. No. 79-1567, plai11tiffs cross-appeal from the 
11 Under the Tenth Amendment, "[]the powers nut delegated to the 
U11ite<.l State::, by the Con~titution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
rr~t·rv<'d to the State:> respectively, or to the people." U. S. Canst., 
Amdt. X. rtblJ 
1~ Tht> Compensation Clause pr~its -~he taking of private property "for 
public use, without just compensatiOn." U. S. Canst., Arndt. V. 
n The District Court demed the Secretary's motion for a stay pending 
dlf(·r·t appeal to this Court. At the same time, the court issued an order 
nnd orinion elarifying and modifying its earlier order. Jurisdictional 
Statement Appt>ndix (J. S. App.) la-16a. Upon the Secretary'~ applica-
tion , we issued an order staying the District Court's judgment "pending 
the I imely filing and disposition of the appeals in this Court." - U. S. 
- (19 0). 
• 
, .. ''" 
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District Court's rejection of their Commerce Clause challenge 
to the Act.14 Because of the importance of the .issues raised, 
we noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals, 15 - U. S. 
-· (1980), and consolidated the two cases.16 For conven-
ienec, we shall usually refer to plaintiffs as "appellees." 
II 
On cross-appeal, appellees argue that the District Court 
crrf'cl in rejecting their challenge to the Act as beyond the 
scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 
They insist that the Act's principal goal is regulating the use 
o£ private lands within the borders of the States and not, as 
the District Court found, regulating the interstate commerce 
effects of surface coal mining. Consequently, appellees con-
telld that the ultimate issue presented is "whether land as 
.'luch i8 subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause, 
i. e. whether land can be regarded as being 'in com-
merce.' ., Brief for Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Assn., Inc., et al. Appellees, at 12 (emphasis in original). 
In urging us to answer "no" to this question, appellees em-
phasize that the Court has recognized that land-use regula-
tion is within the inherent police powers of the States and 
11 Plaintiffs do not appeal from that portion of the District Court's 
judgment rejecting their equal protection and ~ubstantive due proce~s 
rhallenges to the Act. 
JG The jurisdiction of thb Court was invoked under 28 U. S. C . § 1252 
wliH'h provides for duect appeal to this Court from any deci;;ion by a 
('0111'1 of the United States invalidating an Act of Congress in any suit to 
winch the United States, its agencies, officer;;, or employees are parties . 
1 u We also agrt>ed to hear the appeal in No. 80-231, Hodel v. Indiana, 
whil'h involves ;;imilar constitutional challenges to different provisions of 
tlw Surfac!' Mining Act, and which we also decide today. Post, at-. At 
least three other District Courts have considered constitutional challenges 
lo provi;;ionb of the Surface Mining Act. In Concerned Citizens of 
Appulachia. Inc. v Andrus, 4!:14 F. Supp. 679 (ED Tenn. 1980), appeal 
pending, No. 80-1448 (CA6), the District Court upheld the Act in the 
I , 
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their political subdivisions,11 and argue that Congress may 
regulate land-use only insofar as the Property Clause 18 grants 
it control over federal lands. 
We do not accept either a pellees' framing of the question 
or the answer e would have us supp y. he task of a 
court t at IS asked to etermine w et er a particular exer-
cLe of congressional power is valid under the Commerce 
Clause is relatively narrow. The court must defer to a con-
gressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate 
commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding. 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 2H 
258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 303-304 
( 1964). This established, the only remaining question for 
judicial inquiry is whether "the means chosen by [Congress] 
is reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitu-
tion ." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, supra, 
at 262. See United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 121 
(1941); Katzenbach v. McClung, supra, at 304. The judi-
cial task is at an end once the court determines that Congress 
acted rationally in adopting a particular regulatory scheme. 
Ibid. 
Judicial review in this area is influenced above all by the 
the fact that the Commerce Clause is a ant of plenary au-
faee of challenges 8imilar to those raised by plaintiffs in the instant case. 
In Star Coal Co . v. Andrus, No. 79-171-2 (SD Iowa Feb. 13, 1980), 
8]1peal pending, No. 80-49 (CAS), the District Court rejected challenges 
bm.;Pd on the Fifth and Tenth Amendments, but enjoined some of the Act's 
('Jlforcement provisions. And in Andrus v. P-Burg Coal Co., 495 F. Supp. 
2 (SD Ind 1980), appeal pending, No. 80-1916 (CA7), the District Court 
tl'.ircted a Commerce Clause challenge to the Act. 
11 Appellees cite cases such as Village of Bette Terre v. Bor-aas, 416 
U. S. 1 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954); City of Euclid 
v. Amber Realty Co ., 272 U. S. 365 (1926). 
1 ~ The Property Clause provides: "Congress shall have the power to 
di;;po~e of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the· 
Territory or other property belonging to the United States." U.S Canst .~ 
Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
I . 
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thority to Congress. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426~0; Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 
19 (1946); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 
1, 37 (1937). This power is "complete in itself, may be ex-
ercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, 
other than are prescribed in the constitution." Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). Moreover, this Court has 
made clear that the commerce power extends not only to 
"the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce" and 
to "protection of the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce ... or persons or things in commerce," but also to 
"activities affecting commerce." Perez v. United States. 402 
U. S. 146, 150 (1971). As we explained in Fry v. United 
States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 (1975), "[e]ven activity that is 
purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, 
where the activity, combined with like conduct by others 
similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with 
foreign nations." See National League of Cities v. Usery, 
.o;upra, at 840 ; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States. 
s·upra, at 255; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128 
( 1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 
110, 119 (1942); United States v. Darby, supra, at 120- 121. 
Thus, when Congress has determined that an activity af-
fects interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only 
·whether the finding is rational. Here, the District Co11rt 
properly deferred to Congress' express £ndings, set out in the 
Act Itself, about the effects of surface coal mininp; on inter-
stakl commerce. Section 101 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1201 (c) re-
cite~' the congressional finding that 
"many surface mining operations result in disturbances 
of surface areas that burden and adversely affect com-
merce and the public welfare by aestroying or diminish-
ing the utility of land for commercial. industrial, resi-
dPntial, recreational, agricultural, alld forestry purposes,. 
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by causing erosion and landslides, by contributing to 
floods, by polluting the water, by destroying fish and 
wildlife habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by dam-
aging the property of citizens, by creating hazards dan-
~erous to life and property by degrading the quality of 
life in local communities, and by counteracting govern-
mental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and 
other natural resources." 
lThe legislative record provides ample support for these 
statutory findings. The Surface Mining Act became law 
only after 6 years of the most thorough leg-islative cons:dera-
tion.'9 Committees of both Houses of Congress held ex-
111 Hearings on proposed legislation regulating surface coal mining began 
in 1963. Surface Mining Reclamation: Hearings before the Senate Com-
tuittl'e on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1968). Three 
year:> later, additional hearings were held by Committees of both the House 
and the Senate. Regulation of Strip Mining: Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Mines and Mining of the House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affair;,, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Surface Mining: Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sel:il:i . (1971) . The Com-
mittees reported biJI::; for consideration by their respective houses. The 
Hon~e IJH~bed H. R. 6482, but Congress adjourned before the Senate could 
Ad on the meatjur·e. 
Rimilar bllls were reintroduced in the 93d Congress and further hear-
ings were held. Regulation of Surface Mining Operations: Hearings before 
I he Sf'nate Committee on Interior and Insular Affair::;, 93d Con g. , 1st Set's. 
( l87:3); Regulation of Surface Mining : Hearings before the Subnom-
ml1ter' ou Lhe Environment and the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining 
of thl' House Committee on Interior and ln::;ular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st 
Se~~ . (1973) At the rrque;:;l of the Chairman of the Senate Committee, 
tlu• Council on Environmental Quality prepared a report entitled Coal 
Surface Mining and Reclamation : An Environmental and Economic 
At<t-f'~cment of Alternative!:! (Comm. Print 1973), and the Senate Corn-
mittel~ ht'ld additional hearings to consider the report. Coal Surface 
Miui11g and Heelamation: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Minerals, 
Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affair;,, 93d Cong., ll:it Sess. (1973). The House and Senate Cornnl.ittces 
. ' i 
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tended hearings during which vast amounts of testimony and 
documentary evidence about the effects of surface mining on 
our Nation's environment and economy were brought to Con-
gress' attention. Both Committees made detailed findings 
about these effects and the urgent need for federal legislation 
to address the problem. The Senate Report explained that 
"[s]urface coal mining activities have imposed large so .. 
cial costs on the public ... in many areas of the country 
in the form of unreclaimed lands, water pollution, ero-
sion, floods, slope failures, loss of fish and wildlife re-
t·r]Jorted bills for consideration by both houses, and Congress passed a bill 
that was vetoed by President Ford in 1974. 
The ~urface mining legislation was reintroduced in the 94th Congress in 
1975, and the Senate Committee held a hearing on Administration objec-
tiOJJ~ to the bill. Surface Mining Briefing: Briefirg before the Senate 
Committee on Interior and IPsular Affairs, 94th CoPg., 1st Sess. (1975). 
Both Committees reported bills to the House and Senate, which again 
paol:led a bill reported by the Conference Committee. President Ford 
again vetoed the bill. 
The protacted congressional endeavor finally Lore fruit in 1977. The 
re!Pvant House and Senate Cf'mmittees held extersive hearings Phortlv 
after the opening of the 95th Congress to consider bills introduced at the 
very b~·ginning of the new legislative ses::;ion. Surface Mining Control and 
He~Jamahon Acl of 1977: Hearings on S. 7 before the Subrommittee on 
Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Committee on Energv and 
~atural Resources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (Hl77 Senate Hearings); 
8mfa<'e Miring Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: HeariflgH on H. H. 
'2 LPforr the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 
ht Sr~t< . (1\J77) (1977 House Hearings) . The legislation was reported to 
hoth Hou~es and pa~~age in both chambers followed , after lengthy floor 
debate. 123 Cong Rec . 12681-12886, 15691-Hi754 (1977). The Confer-
rnce Committee n>port was issued in July 1977, H. R. (Conf. Ren.) No. 
9.'5- 493 (1977), and after further floor debate, both Houses 11grecd to the 
bill rPrommended by the conferees. 123 Cong. Rec . 23967-23988, 24419-
24429 (1977) . Pre~ident Carter signed the Act into law on August 3, 
1977. The legislative history of the Act is summarized in S. Rep . No. 
f!,'i 1?~ 59- 61 (1977) , and in H . R. Ren. No. 95-218 140-141 (1977). See 
·:tl~o , Note,. 81 W. Ya. L. Rev. 775 (1979). 
. ' 
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sources, and a. decline in na.tural beftuty," S. Rep. N9. 
!>5-128, 50 ( 1977). 
See id., at 50-54. 
' Similarly, the House Committee documented the advetse 
~ffects of surface coal mining as including: 
11 'Acid drainage which has ruined an estimated 11,000 
miles of streams; the loss of prime hardwood forest 
and the destruction of wildlife habitat by strip min~ 
ing; the degradation of productive farmland; recurrent 
landslides; siltation and Eedimentation of river sys-
texm: .... '" H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, 58 (1977) , quoting 
H. R. Rep. No. 94--1445, 19 (1976). . 
Aud 1u discussin~ the impact of surface coal mining on water 
resourees, the House Committee explained that: 
"The most widespread damages . . . are environmental 
in nature. Water users incur significant economic and fi-
nancial losEes as well. 
~Reduced recreational values, fishkills, reductions in 
normal waste assimilation capacity, impaired water sup-
plies, metals and masonry corrosion and deterioration, 
increased flood frequencies and flood damages, reductions 
in designed water storage capacities at impoundments, 
and higher opera.ting costs for commercial waterway 
users are some of the most obvious economic effects that 
stern from mining-rela.ted pollution and sedimentation.'~ 
!d., at 59. 
See id., at 96- 122. 
The Committees also explained that inadequacies in exist-
ing state laws and the need for uniform minimum nationwide 
standards made federal regulations imperative. See S. Rep. 
No. 95-128, supm, at 49; H . R. Rep. No. 95-218, s'upra, at 
58. l11 light of the evidence available to Congress and the 
detailed consideration that the legislation received, we cannot 
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~h:at surface coal mining has substantial effects on interstatE:! 
commerce. 
Appellees do not, in general, dispute the validity of the 
congressional findings. 20 Rather, appellees' contention is that 
the "rational basis" test should not apply in this case be-
cause the Act regulates land use, a local activity not affect-
ing interstate commerce. But even assuming arguendo that 
appellees correctly characterize the land use regulated by the 
Act as a "local" activity, their argument is nonetheless 
u11 persuasive. 
The denomination of an activity as "local" or "intrastate" l 
activity does not resolve the question whether Congress may 
regulate it under the Commerce Clause. As previously 
noted. the commerce E.Q.Wer "extends to those activities intra-
state which so affectinterstate commerce, or the exertion of 
tli'e"power o ongress over it, as to mal{e -;;gulation 2f them 
appropnate means to the attaimrumt oralegitimate end, the 
e.ti'ective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate 
commerce." United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., s·upra, 
at 119 See fi,ry v. United States, ~rupra, at 547; NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., s·upra, at 37. This Court has 
loug held that Congress may regulate the conditions under 
which goods shipped in interstate commerce are produced 
where the "local" activity of producing these goods itself 
affects interstate commerce. See, e. g., United States v. 
Darby, supra; Wickard v. Filburn, supra; NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., supra; Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 
U. S. 517 (1942) . Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, supra. Ap-
pellees do not dispute that coal is a commodity that moves 
in intt>rstate commerce. Here, Congress rationally deter-
20 Appellee~:> do contend that surface mining enhances rather than 
diminishes the utility of lanu in the steep-slope areas of Virginia. Con-
grE'~ti , however, made contrary finding~, and it is ~ufficient for purposes of 
judicial review that Congre~s had a rational ba8is for concluding as it did: 
See Kleppe v. New Me:cico , 426 U. S. 529, 541, n. 10 (1976); United 
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mined that regulation of surface coal mining is necessary to 
protect interstate commerce from adverse effects that may 
result from that activity. This congressional finding is suffi· 
cient to sustain the Act as a valid exercise of Congress' power 
under the Commerce Clause. 
Moreover, the Act responds to a congressional finding that 
nationwide "surface mining and reclamation standards are 
essential in order to insure that competition in interstate 
commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States 
will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States 
to improve and maintain adequa.te standards on coal mining 
operations within their borders." 30 U. S. C. § 1201 (g). 
The prevention of this sort of destructive interstate competi· 
tion is a traditional role for congressional action under the 
Commerce Clause. In United States v. Darby, supra, the 
Court used a similar rationale to sustain the imposition of 
federal minimum wage and maximum hour regulations on a 
manufacturer of goods shipped in interstate commerce. The 
Comt explained that the statute implemented Congress' view 
that "interstate commerce should not be made the instrument 
of competition in the distribution of goods produced under 
substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurous 
to the commerce and to the states from which and to which 
the commerce flows." !d., at 115. The same rationale ap· 
pliPs here to support the conclusion that the Surface Mining 
Act is within the authority granted to Congress by the Com-
merce Clause. 
Finally, we agree with the lower federal courts that have 
uniformly found the power conferred by the Commerce 
Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of 
activities causing air or water pollution, or other environ· 
mental hazards.21 Appellees do not dispute that the envi-
2t See, e. g., United States v. Byrd, 610 F . 2d 1204, 1209-1210 (CA7 
1979); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F . 2d 657, 663 (CA3 1976); 
Sierra Club v. Train, - U. S. App. D . C. -, 540 F. 2d 1114, 1139 
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romnental and other problems that the Act attempts to con~ 
trol can properly be addressed through Commerce Clause 
legislation. In these circumstances, it is difficult to find any 
remaining foundation for appellees' argument that, because 
it regulates a particular land use, the Surface Mining Act is 
beyond congressional Commerce Clause authority. Accord-
ingly, we turn to the question whether the means selected by 
Congress were reasonable and appropriate. 
Appellees' essential challenge to thl ns 
1
' lected by the 
Act is that they a.re redundant or unnecessary. Appellees 
contend that a variety of federal statutes such as the Clea~ 
Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7401 et seq. (19'J ed., Supp. III), the 
Flood Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 701 et seq., and the Clean 
Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., adequately address the 
federal interest in controlling the environmental effects of 
surface coal mining without need to resort to the land use 
regulation scheme of the Surface Mining Act. The short 
answer to this argument is that the effectiveness of existing 
laws .in dealing with a problem identified by Congress is ordi-
narily a matter committed to legislative j1·dgment. Con-. 
gress considered the effectiveness of existing legislation and 
concluded that additional measures were necessary to deal 
with the interstate commerce effects of surface coal mining. 
SN' H. H. Rep. No. 95- 218, supra, at 58-60; S. Rep. No. 95-
128, supra, at 59-53. And we agree with the court below 
that the Act's regulatory scheme is reasonably related to the 
goals Congress sought to accomplish. The Act's restrictions 
on the practices of mine operators aU serve to control the 
environmental and other adverse effects of surface coal 
mi11i11g. 
- TT. S. Ap.[J . D . C. -, 521 F . 2d 971, 988 (1975), vacated and re-
mauded on other grounds sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 43i U. S. 99 (1977); 
United States v. Ashland Oil & Tra:nsportation Co., 504 F. 2d 1317, 1325 
(CA6 1974) ; Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F. 2d 246, 259 (CA3 1974); 
South T erminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F . 2d 6i6, 677, (CAl 1974); United 
S tate8 v. Bishop Processing Co ., 287 F . Supp. 624 (Md. 1968), aff'd, 42S; 
F 2d 469 (CA4) , cert , d<>nied, 398 U. S. 904 (1970). 
\..' 
·' 
. ' . 
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In sum, we conclude that the District Court properly re~ 
jected appellees' Commerce Clause challenge to the Act. W ~ 
therefore turn to the court's ruling that the Act contravenes 
affirmative constitutional limitations on congressional exer~ 
eise of the commerce power. 
III 
The District Court invalidated §§ 515 (d) and (e) of the 
Act, which prescribe performance standards for surface coal 
lflining on "steep-slopes," 22 on the ground that they violate 
a constitutio;al limitation on the commerce power imposed 
by the Tenth Amendment. These provisions require "steep-
elope" op'eratOrs to: (i) to reclaim the mined area by com .. 
pletely covering the highwall and returning the site to its 
"approximate original contour"; 28 (.ii) to refrain from dump-
ing spoil material on the downslope below the bench or min-
ing cut; and (iii) to refrain from disturbing la.nd above the 
highwall unless permitted to do so by the regulatory author-
ity. § 515 (d), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (d). Under § 515 (e) , a 
~'steep-slope" operator may obtain a variance from the ap-
proximate original contour requirement by showing that it 
will allow a post-reclamation use that is "deemed to con-
titute an equal or better economic or public use" than would 
therwise be possible. 30 U.S. C. § 1265 (e)(3)(A).24 
22 St>f'tion 515 (d)( 4), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (d) ( 4) defines a "steep ~lope'' 
fS "any ~:>lope above 20 degrees or such le;;ser slope as may be defined by 
.he regulatory authority after consideration of soil, climate, and othel 
fharacleristics of a region or State." 
28 The term "approximate original contour" is defined as "that surface 
'onfiguration achieved by backfilling and grading of the mined area so 
.hat the reclaimed area, including any terracing or access roads, closely 
Jetiembles the general surface configuration of the land prior to mining 
and bll'nds into and complementb the drainagE' pattern of the surrounding 
terrain, with all high walls and ::;poi! piles eliminated.'" § 701 (2), 30 
u. s. c. § 1291 (2). 
14 Section 515 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (c) , establitihes a separate vari-· 
Jnce p rocedure for mountaintop mining operations . 
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The District Court's ruling relied heavily on our decision 
in National League of Cities v. Usery, supra. The District 
Court viewed the central issue as whether the Act governs 
the activi~ies of private individuals, or whether it instead 
regulates the governmentai decisions of the States. · And 
although the court acknowledged that the Act "ultimately 
affects the coal mine operator," it concluded that the Act 
contravenes the Tenth Amendment because it interferes with 
the States' "traditional governmental function" of regulating 
land use. 483 F. Supp., at 432. The court held, that, as 
applied to Virginia, the Act's steep-slope provisions imper-
missibly constrict the State's ability to make "essential deci~ 
sions." 25 The court found the Act accomplishes this result 
"through forced relinquishment of state control of land use 
planning; through loss of state control of its economy; and 
through economic harm, from expenditure of state funds to 
implement the act and from destruction of the taxing power 
of certain counties, cities. and towns." 483 F. Supp., at 
25 The eourt reasoned that although the Act allows a State to elect to 
have its own regulatory program, the "choice that is purportedly given 
i;; rJo ehoice at all" because the state program must comply with federally 
. prescribed standards. 483 F. Supp., at 432. 
26 On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the co~rt found that 
post-mining restoration of steep slopes to their "approximate original 
contour" is "economically infeasible and physically impossible." 483 F. 
Supp., at 434. The court noted that the steep-;;lope provisions pa.rticu-
larly affect Virginia because 95% of its coal reserves are located on such 
lands. And the court indicated that several coal mine operators had 
bPen forced to shut down becau;;e they were unable to comply with the 
Act 's requirements, with adverse consequences for the economies of vari-
ous towns and counties that are dependent on coal mining. The court 
also found that there is a need for level land in the counties of the 
Virginia coal field:;, and it concluded that the Act's reclamation provi-
sions wuu pr ent " forward-looking land use planning" by the State. 
483 F . Supp., a l 434. Finally, the court found that restoration of mined 
laud to its original contour would diminish the value of the land from 
the $5,000-$300,000 an acre value of level land to the $5-$75 per acr~ 
vnlue of steep slope land, 
·, 
. •. 
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485.20 The eourt therefore permanently enjoined enforce-. 
ment of §§ 515 (d) and (e).27 
The District Court's reliance on National Leag'Ue of Cities 
requires a careful review of the actual basis and import of 
our decision in that case. There, we considered a constitu-
tional challenge to the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act which had extended federal minimum wage 
and maximum hour regulations to most state and local gov-
ernment employees. Because it was conceded that the chal-
leng·,d regulations were "undoubtedly within the scope of 
the Commerce Clause," id., at 841, the only question pre-
sented was whether that particular exercise of the commerce 
power "encounter[ed] a ... constitutional barrier because 
fthe regulations] ... applied directly to the States and sub-
divisions of States as employers." Ibid. We began by draw-
in!-!: a sharp distinction betw~en congressional regulation of 
private persons and businesses "necessarily subject to the 
dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the 
State in which they reside," id., at 845, and federal regula-
tion "directed not to private citizens, but to the States as 
States,'' ibid. As to the former , we found no Tenth Amend-
ment impediment to congressional action. Instead, we re-
affirmed our consistent rule: 
"Congressional power over areas of private endeavour, 
even when its exercise may pre-empt express state-law 
determiJJ.ations coutrary to the result that has com-
mended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress, has 
been held to be limited only by the requirement that 
2 '1 In its order and opinion accompanying its denial of the Secretary's 
rt•quest foi a stay of its judgment pending appeal, see n. 13, supra, the 
District Court explainl'd that the injunction against enforcement of the 
stPrp-slope standards was not intended to "allo [ w] spoil to be placed 
on the downslope in an uncontrolled manner." The court stated that 
''falny such down~lope spoil placement shall be in a controlled manner 
meeting the environmental protection standards ~pecified by the regula-
tNy authority." ,T. S. App. 2a. 
,. 
. . ~ 
·; . 
•·· 
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' the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably. 
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.! 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 
241, 262 (1964)." ld., at 840. 
We noted, however, that "the States as States stand on I ~. Cu~ 
quite a different footing from an ~orporation 
when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate 
commerce." I d. at 854. We indicated that when Congress 
attempts to 4'[!e~~ii)regulate ~he States as States the Tenth 
Amendment reqmres recognitiOn "that there are attributes 
of sovereignty attaching to every state government which 
may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may 
lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the 
matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exer-
cising the authority in that manner." Id., at 845. We held 
that the power to set the wages and work hours of state em-
ployees was 11an undoubted attribute of state sovereignty." 
Ibid. And because we further found that the challenged 
regulations would 11displace the States' freedom to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions," we concluded that Congress could not, consistently 
with the Tenth Amendment, "abrogate the States' other-
wise plenary authority to make [these decisions]." I d., at 
845-846.28 
28 National Leagtte of Cities expressly left open the question "whether 
different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral opera-
tion~ of state governments by exerci~ing authority granted it under other 
sections of the Constitution such as the spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 
1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." National League of Cities v. 
U&ery, 426 U. S. 833, 852, n. 17 (1977). In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzet, 427 
U. S. 445 (1976) , the Court upheld Congress' power under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . to authorize private damages actions against 
~tate government~ for discrimination in employment. The Court ex-
plained that, beeause the Amendment was adopted with the specific 
purpose of limiting State autonomy, constitutional principles of federalism 
do not restrict ·congressional power to invade State autonomy when 
'• 
• •'. 
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n should be apparent from this discussion that in orden 
io succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legis-
lation is invalid under the reasoning of National League of 
Cities must satisf e c of three requirements. First, there 
must be a showing t at the cha lenged statute regulates the 
States as States. Second, the federal regulation must ad-
dress matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sov-
ereignty.'' ld., at 845. And third, it must be apparent that 
the States' compliance with the federal law would directly 
impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas 
of traditional functions." Id., at 852.1s 'When the Surface 
Mining Act is examined in light of these principles, it is 
clear that appellees' Tenth Amendment challenge must fail 
because the first of the three requirements is not satisfied. 
The District Court's holding to the contrary rests on an un-
warranted extension of our holding in National Leag·ue of 
Cit·ies. 
As the District Court itself acknowledged, the steep-slope 
provisions of the Surface Mining Act govern only the activ-
ities of coal mine operators who are private individuals and 
businesses. Moreover, the States are not compelled to en-
force the steep-slope standards, to expend any state funds, 
or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any 
manner whatsoever. If a Sta.te does not wish to submit a 
proposed permanent program that complies with the Act and 
implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will be 
borne by the Federal Government. Thus, there can be no 
Congress legislates under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id, at 
452-456. 
~9 Demonstrating that these three requirements are met does not , how-
ever, guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional 
commerce power action will succeed. There are situations in which the 
nature of the federal intere~:~t advanced may be such that it .iustifies 
State submission . See f!'ry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975), re-
affirmed in National Leag·ue of Cities v. Usery , supra, at 852-853 (1977). 
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suggf'stion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes 
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and en-
force a federal regulatory program. Cf. Maryland v. EPA, 
530 F. 2d 215, 224-228 (CA4 1977), vacated and remanded 
sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U. S. 99 (1977); District of 
Colum-b-ia v. Train, - U. S. App. D. C. -. 521 F. 2d 971, 
990-994 (1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. EPA v. 
Brown , 431 U. S. 99 ( 1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F. 2d 827, 
837-R42 (CA9 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U. S. 99 
(1977) . The most that can be said is that the Surface Mining 
Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism that 
allows the States, within limits established by federal mini-
m urn standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory 
programs, structured to meet their own particular needs. See 
ln re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, -
U. S. App. D. C. -, 617 F. 2d 807, 808 (1980). In this 
respect, the Act resembles a number of other federal statutes 
that have survived Tenth Amendment challenges in the lower 
feder-al courts.30 
Appellees argue, l1owever, that the threat of federal usur-
pation of their regulatory roles coerces the States into en-
forcing the Surface Mining Act. Appellees also contend that 
the Act directly regulates the States as States because it es-
tablishes mandatory minimum federal standards. In essence, 
appellees urge us to join the District Court in looking beyond 
the activities actually regulated by the Act to its conceivable 
effects on the States' freedom to make decisions in areas of 
"integral governmental functions." And appellees empha-
size, as did the court below, that the Act interferes with the· 
so See, e. g., United States v. Helsley, 615 F . 2d 784 (CA9 1979) (up-
holding the Airborne Hunting Act, 16 U. S. C. § 742j-1); li'riends of the 
Ea1·th , Inc . v. Carey, 552 F . 2d 25, 36-39 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 
90'2 (1977) (upholding the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7401 et seq. 
(1976 ed., Supp. III) ; Sierra Club v. EPA - U. S. App. D. C. -, 
540 F. 2d 1114, 1140 (1976) , cert .. denied, 430 U.S. 959 (1977) (uphold-
ing the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq.) . 
•. !. .. I l · kUL. .. I' 
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States' ability to exercise their police powers by regulating 
land use. 
Appellees' claims accurately characterize the Act insofar as 
it prescribes federal minimum standards governing surface 
coal mining, which a State may either implement itself or 
else yield to a federally administered regulatory program. 
'To object to this scheme, however, appellees must assume 
that the Tenth Amendment limits congressional power to 
pre-empt or displace state regulation of private activities af-
fecting interstate commerce. This assumption is incorrect. 
i 
A wealth of precedent attests to congressional authority to 
displace or pre-empt state laws regulating private activity 
affecting interstate commerce when these laws conflict with 
federal law. See, e. g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U. S. 
519, 525-526 (1977); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U. S. 637, 649-
650 (1971) ; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 
3~7 U. S. 132. 141-143 (1963); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New 
York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U. S. 767, 772-776; 
Hines v. Davidotvitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67-68 (1941) . Moreover, 
it is clear that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to 
prohibit all--and not just inconsistent-state regulation of 
such activities. See, e. g., Burbank: v. Lockheed Air Termi-
nal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 
297 (1961); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U. S. 218 
(1947); Transit Comm'n v. United States, 289 U. S. 121 
(1933) . Although such congressional enactments obviously 
curtail or prohibit the States' prerogatives to make policy 
choices respecting subjects the States may consider impor-
tant, the Supremacy Clause permits no other result. See 
Chicaqo North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile, 
- U. S. -, --·- (1981); Sanitaru Distr·ict v. United 
States, 266 U. S. 405. 425-426 (1925); 1'he Minnesota Rate 
Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 399 (1913); Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. , 
at 211. As the Court long ago stated: "It is elementary and 
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state commerce, and that the acts of Congress on that sub-
ject are supreme and exclusive." Missour'i Pacific R. Co. v. 
Stroud, 267 U. S. 404, 408 (1925). 
Thus, Congress could constitutionafly have enacted a stat-
tJ t<> prohibiting any state regulation of surface coal mining. 
We fail to see why the Surface Mining Act should become 
constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to 
allow the States a regulatory role. Contrary to the assump-
tion by both the District Court and appellees, nothing in 
National League of Cities suggests that the Tenth Amend-
ment shields the States from pre-emptive federal regulation 
of private activities affecting iuterstate commerce. To the 
contrary, National League of Cities explicitly reaffirmed the 
teaching of earlier cases that Congress may, in regula.ting pri-
vate activities pureuant to the commerce power, "pre-empt 
E-xpress state-law determinations contrary to the result which 
ha!l commended itself to the collective wisdom of Con-
gress .... " !d., at 840. The only limitation on congres-
sional authority in this regard is the requirement that the 
means selected be reasonably relat<>d to the goal of regulat-
ing interstate commerce. Ibid. We have already indicated 
that the Act satisfies this test.31 
Thir. conrlusion applies regardless of whether the federal 
legislation rlisplaces laws enacted under the States' "police 
r.owers." The Court long ago rejected the suggestion that 
Congrrss invades areas reserved to the States by the Tenth 
Amendment sinwly because it exercises its authority under 
the Commerce Clause in a manner that displaces the States' 
exercise of their police powers. See Hoke v. United States, 
227 U. S. 308, 320- 323 (1913); Athanasaw v. United States, 
SI Sre S'upra, at ll~17. It is ,;ignificant that the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia prel:iSes its Tenth Amenument challenge to the Act simply as an-
other regulator of ~urface coal mining whose regulatory program has been 
displaced or pre-empted by federal law. As indicated in text, no Tenth 
Amendment concerns are implicated in :;urh ~ituation~:;, 
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'227 U. S. 326 (1913); Cleveland v. United States, supra, at 
19; United States v. Darby, supra, at 113-114; United States 
·v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., supra, at 119. Cf. United States 
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 147 (1938) ("it is 
uo objection to the exertion of the power to regulate inter-
state commerce that its exercise is attended by the same in-
cidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the 
states"); 32 accord, FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 
U. S. 575, 582 (1942); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & 
Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156 (1919); Seven Cases v. 
United States, 239 U. S. 510, 514 (1916). This Court has 
upheld as constitutional any number of federal statutes en-
acteJ under the commerce power that pre-empt particular 
exrrciscs of state police power. See, e. g., United States v. 
Walsh, 331 U. S. 432 (1947) (upholding Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U. S. C. §§ 301--392); N LRB v. Jones 
(e: Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937) (upholding Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-168); United 
States v. Darbu, supra (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act, 
29 U. S. C. §§ 2)1-219). It would therefore be a radical de-
parture from long-established precedent for this Court to 
hold that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from 
displacing state police power laws regulating private activity. 
Nothing in National League of Cities compels or even hints 
at such a departure.83 
3 ~ This huldirg disposes of the contention by appellees and variou~:. 
rw!ici that the Surface Mining Act is unconstitutional becau~e it pre-
sumes the exi~tence of a federal police power. A~ the Court has 10tated: 
' 'The authority of the Federal Government over interstate comm r e does 
not differ in extent or character from that rett 1ed by the states over 
intrnstate commerce." United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 116 
(1941). quoting United States v. Rock Royal r'o-operative, 307 U.S. 533 
Mi9- !\70 (1939) . 
q 3 The remamirg justification H8serted by the District Court for its 
frnth Am"?ndment ruling, one that appellee urge here, is that the steep-
Hlop0 mining requirements will harm Virginia'~ economy and destroy the 
jnxirg power of ~orne town~ and counties in the Commonwealth. In this 
>· 
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In sum, appellees' Tenth Amendment challenge to the Sur .. 
face Mining Act must fail because here, in contrast to the 
situation in National League of Cities, the statute at issue 
regulates only "individuals and businesses necessarily subject 
to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and 
the State in which they reside." National League of Cities 
v. Usery, supra, at 845.84 Accordingly, we turn to the Dis-
trict Court's ruling that the Act contravenes other constitu-
tional limits on congressional action. 
IV 
The District Court held that two of the Act's provisions ~ 
violate the J~t C~~~~ ~e of the Fifth Amend-
ment. First, tfie court found that the steep-slope provisions ~ · 
discussed above effect an uncompensated taking of private 
property by requiring operators to perform the "economically 
and physically impossible" task of restoring steep-slope sur .. 
regard, thf' courf may have been influencf'd by the discussion in National 
League of Oities about the likely impact of the challenged regulations on 
the finnnces of St11te and local governments. National League of Cities 
v. Use1':t/. supra, at 846-847. But as the Court made clear, the determi-
native factor in that rase was the nature of the federal action, not the 
nltimnte reonomic impact on the States. !d., at 847. Moreover, even 
if it i:;:; true that the Act's rf'quirements will have a measurable impact 
on Virginia's economy, thi, kind of effect., standing alone, is insufficirnt to 
e;tnblii-ih a violation of the Tenth Amendment. In Oklahoma v. Atkinson 
Co .. 213 U. S. 508, 524-535 (1941), thE' Court rejected the assertion that 
an arlvl'l'RE' impact on State and local economies is a barrier to Congress• 
exl'rrise of itR power 11ndf'r the Commerce ClausE' to regulate private acti-
vitlrR affecting intrrstate commf'rce. We are not pE'rsuaded that there 
a.re compelling reasons presf'nted in the instant case for rever~ing the· 
Court's poHition. 
94 We have a~<sumed, m·guendo, that the District Court correctly held 
that lanrl use regulation is an "integral governmental function" as that 
tf'rm wn~ used in National League of Cities. Our resolution of the Tenth 
Amendment challenge to the Act makes it unnecessary for us to decide· 
whethct thi::; is actually the case. 
I lj, 
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face mines to their approximate original contour. 483 F. 
Supp., at 437.35 The court further held that, even if steep., 
slope surface mines could be restored to their approximate 
original contour, the value of the mined land after such res-
toration would have "been diminished to practically noth-
ing." 1 bid. Second, the court found that § 522 of the Act 
effects an unconstitutional taking because it expressly pro-
hibits mining in certain locations and "clearly prevent [s] a 
person from mining his own land or having it mined." ld., 
at 441.8'l Relying on this Court's decision in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 265 U. S. 393 (1922), the District Court 
held that both of these provisions are unconstitutional be-
cause they "deprive[] [coal mine operators] of any use of 
85 The District Court acknoweldged the existence of a statutory pror·e-
dure for requesting variances from the steep-slope provisions. But the 
court ~uggested that the statutory requirement that highwalls of re-
claimed mining cuts be completely covered makes this variance procedure 
"meaningle~;s" to steep-slope mine operators. 483 F. Supp., at 437. This 
conclusion was premature. See n. 39, ·infra. 
8 0 With certain specified e~tions, and subject to "valid existing 
rights ." § 522 (e) prohibits surface miniPg operations in national parks 
and forests, or where they will adversely affect publicly owned parks 
or places that are included in the National Register of His•oric ~ites . 
30 U. S. C. 1272 (e)(l), (2) , and (3) . It also prohibits surface mining 
within 100 feet of a cemetery or the right-of-way of a public road . and 
within 300 feet of an occu11ied dwelling, public building, school, church, 
community or institutional building, or public park. §§ (e)(4) and (5). 
Sections 552 (a), (c) and (d), which become applicable durir>g thP 
permanent phase of the regulatory program, require the establishment of' 
procedure8 for designating particular lands as unsuitable for some or all 
surface mining. §§ 1272 (a), (c), and (d) . The District Court's ruling 
that these latter provisions effect an unconstitutional taking of private 
propE-rty is puzzling and cannot stand. SincE' these provisions do not come· 
into effect until the permanent phase of the Act's regulatory program, 
1hey have not been applied to appellePs or any other private landowner 
in Virginia . In these circumstances, there was no justiciable case or ron-
troversy with regard to these sections of the Act . See United Public; 
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[their 1 land, not only the most profitable. 483 F . Supp., at 
441. 
We conclude that the District Court's ruling on the "tak-
ing issue suffers from a fataldenCiency: neither -appellees 
nor t e cour i en 1 e any property m which appellees have 
an interest that has allegedly been taken by operation of the 
Act. By proceeding in this fashion, the court below ignored 
this Court's oft-repeated admonition that the constitution .. 
ality of statutes ought not be decided except in an actual 
factual setting that makes such a decision necessary. See 
Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583, 588 (1972); 
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568- 575 
584 (1947); Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 
325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945). Adherence to this rule is particu .. 
larly important in cases raising allegations of an unconstitu-
tional taking of private property. Just last Term, we re-
affirmed that 
" this Court has generally 'been unable to develop any 
"set formula" for determining when "justice and fair-
ness" require that economic injuries caused by public 
action be compensated by the government, rather than 
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few per-
sons.' Rather, it has examined the 'taking' question by 
engagi11g in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have 
identified several factors-such as the economic impact 
of the regulation, its interference with reasonable in-
vestment backed expectations, and the character of the 
government action-that have particular significance.'' 
Ka·iser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979) 
(~ions omitted). ' 
These "ad hoc, factual inquiries" must be conducted with 
respect to specific property, and the particular estimates of 
economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant in the 
uniquo eircumstances. 
Because appellees' taking claim arose in· the context of a. 
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facial challenge, it presented no concrete controversy con-
cerning either application of the Act to particular surface 
mining operations or its effect on specific parcels of land. 
Thus, the only issue properly before the District Court and, 
in turn, this Court, is whether the "mere enactm;mt" of the 
Surface Mining Act constitutes a taking. See Agins v. Tib-
uron, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980). The test to be applied in 
considering this facial challenge is fairly straightforwarcy A 
statute regulating the uses that can be made of property 
effects a taking if the law "does not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests, see N ectow v. Cambridge2 277 U. S. .,..-~ 
183, 188 (1928), or denies Mie p! ~fk!~~owner ~conom- ' ~ 
ically viable use of his land .... " Agi:ns v. Tibu
at 260. See Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City, 
43/i U. S. 104 (1978). The Sur~ce Mining Act easily sur-
vives scrutiny under these tests. 
}i'irst, there can be no question t at the Act furthers gov-
ernmental interests in controlling the adverse economic and 
environmental effects of surface coal mining. Such govern-
mental interests have long been recognized as legitimate. 
See Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City, supra. at 
127--129; Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962); 
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272 (1928). Moreover, the Act 
does not, on its face, prevent all beneficial use of coal bear-
iug lands. Except for the pr~ription of mining near cer-
t l ~cations by § 522 (e), the Act does not categorically 
\.../ prom~ surface coal mining; it merely regulates the condi-
tions under which such operations may be conducted.37 And 
87 Although § 552 (e) prohibits any surface coal mining in certain 
areas, appellees' "takings" challenge to this provision is premature. First, 
appellees made no showing in the District Court that they own tracts of 
land that are affected by this provision. Second, 522 (e) does not, on 
{ 
it~ face , deprive owners of land within its reach of al economJCa y VIa le 
use of their land since it does not proscribe nonn imn s s of ·uch land. 
Third, § 522 (e)'s restn · ns are express y made subject to "valid exis • 
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the Act does not purport to re~es to which 
coal bearing lands may be put. 88 Thus, in the posture .in 
which the case comes before us, there is no reason to suppose 
that, "rnere enactment" of the Surface Mining Act has de., 
}Jrived appellees of~ economically viable use of the~ 
property. ------- -o 
Mor(•over, appellees cannot at this juncture legitimately 
raise complaints in this Court about the manner in which 
the chall~ed provisions of the Act have been or will be 
applied iu specific circumstances, or about their effect on 
particular coal mining operations. There is no indication in 
thP record that appellees have availed thermelves of the op .. 
portunities provided by the Act to obtain administrative re-
lief by requesting either a variance from the approximate 
origilla1 contour requirement of § 515 (d) or a waiver from 
thf' surface mining restrictions in § 522 (e). If appellees 
were to seek administrative relief uuder these procedures, a 
mutually acceptable solution might well be reached with re-
gard to individual properties. thereby obviating auy need to 
spcclfie f>ttrface mining opera t ionb for which all required permit:, were 
issnerl prior to Angu;.;t 3, 1977, thl' rffective date of the Act." Brief for 
Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation A~::;ociation, Inc., et a!., at 48. Thib 
interpretation of thr exception i~ not C'Ompelled either by the statutory 
languagf' 01 it~ legislative histor) . See H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, supra, 
n . 19, at 95. It i" apparrntly bat'ed on ao CFR § 761.5 (a) (2) (i), a reg-
Illation pronmlgatPd by Secretary. That rrgulation, however, was n•-
mandPd to the S1•eretary for reconsidrration by the United State~ Di~triet 
Court lor the Di~triet of Columbia . In re ?ermanent :Surface Miuiny 
Regulatiun Litigation,- F. Supp. -.- (DC 1980), appeaiH pl'llding, 
No:, 80-lt-10 et seq . (CADC). Tlw Secretary did not a::;k the Court 
of Appml~ to reviPw this portion of the Dis'riet Court'~ jud 
~b If, a::. the D1~trict Court found, level land in th ep-~lOJJC arcus 
of V1rginia j, worth 85,000-$300,000 per acre • owne · presumably 
n·tuin tlw option of Himpl · lt>vl'ling the land wit! out fir::;t mining the coal. 
I 
l\1oreovl·r, 1f at euc an Ji> trul; as valuable a;,; the court below found, 
thPre ::;lwuld hP no financial impediment to the ree~:;tablishment of flut 
area:, on the silt>::; of old mining opPra1ions, once those area::; have been 
re~torrd aJJd ' 1abilized in the mnnncr required by the Act. 
7 7 
· .... 
79-153& & 79-1596-0PINION 
HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN. 31 
address the constitutional questions.3~ The potential fol' 
such administrative solutions confirms the conclusion that 
the takings issue decided by the District Court simply is not 
ripo for judicial resolution.40 
v 
A 
The District Court next ruled that the Act contravenes the 
Fifth Amendment because a number of its enforcement pro-
visions offend the Amendment's Due Process Clause. One 
such provision is § 521 (a) (2), 30 U. S. C. § 1271 (a)(2), 
which instructs the Secretary immediately to order total or 
partial cessation of a surface mining operation whenever he 
determines, on the basis of a federal inspection, that the op-
eration is in violation of the Act or a permit condition re-
quired by the Act and that the operation 
"creates an immediate danger to the health or safety of 
su The District Court's conclusion that the steep-slope variance proee-
dure in § 515 (e) doe::> not offer a meaningful opportunity for adminis-
tra1ive relief was premature. Appellees did not identify any im;tance in 
which the statutory obligation to cover the highwall had prevented a 
mine operator from taking advantage of the variance procedure. 
tu Although we conclude that "mere enactment" of the Act did not 
effec1 a taking of private property, this holding does not preclude ap-
pellees or other coal mine operators from attempting to show that as 
applied to particular parcels of land, the Act and the Secretary's regu-
lationt> effect a taking. Even then, such an alleged taking is not 
uncon,;titutional unless just compensation is unavailable. See Duke 
Powet Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 
94, n. 39 (1978); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 
125-136 (1974); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp, 337 
U. S. 682, 697, n. 18 (1949). Thus, uggrieved coal mine operators may, 
ab a first step, attempt to obtain just compensation for property they 
believe ha::> been taken by the Surf~tce Mining Act by pursuing a claim 
under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491. If it is determined that a 
Tucker Act remedy is unavailable, and we intimute no views on thib 
question, the coal mine operator may bring an action in district court 
for appropriate deelaratory and injunctive relief. 
. . 
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the public, or is causing, or can reasonably be expected to 
cause sigilificant, imminent enviroumental harm to land, 
air, or water resources .... " 11 
A mine operator aggrieved by an immediate cessation order 
issuPd under § 521 (a) (2) or by a cessation order issued after 
a notice of violation and expiration of an abatement period 
under § 521 (a) (3) may immediately request temporary re-
lief from the Secretary, and the Secretary must respond to 
the request within 5 days of its receipt. § 525 (c), 30 
U. S. C. § 1257 (c) . Section .526 (c) of the Act, 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1276 (c). authorizes judicial review of a decision by the 
Secretary denying temporary relief. In addition. cessation 
orders are subject to informal admillistrative review under 
§ 521 (a)( 5), and formal administrative review, including an 
adjudicatory hearing, under § 525 (b), 30 U. S. C. ~ 1275 
(b) ,12 The Secretary's decision in the formal review proceed-
ing is subject to judicial review pursua.nt to § 526 (a) (2), 30 
U. S. C. § 1276 (a). 
The District Court held that § 521 (a)(2)'s authorization 
of immediate cessation orders violates the Fifth Amendment 
because the statute does not provide sufficiently objective 
criteria for summary administrative action. In this regard, 
the court relied on its finding that OSM inspectors had is-
sued against a particular company three immediate cessa-
tion orders which were later overturued on appeal, and that 
the company involved had suffered significant losses. The 
41 Where the Secretary detPrmine<' tlwt a violation of the Act or of a 
pC'rrnit. condition does not ('ntail ~nch a serious threat, he mu~t issue a 
notice of violation fixing a rea~onablc timC' for abatE'liJent. § 521 (a) (3) , 
30 U. S. C. § 1271 (a) (3). If the violation i~ not. abated within ]1re-
scribed veriod, the Secretary mu~t immediately order total or partial 
cessa tion of the offending mining 011eration. 
42 Under § 521 (a) (5), 30 U. S. C.§ 1271 (a) (5), ces:;ation order::: auto-
maticaUy expire after 30 days, "unless a public hearing is held aL the· 
site or within :;uch reasonable proximity to the site that any viewii~gs 
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court enjoined the Secretary from issuing any immediate ces-
sation orders "until such time as Congress makes provisions 
to correct the use of subjective criteria by OSM inspectors." 
483 F . Supp., at 448.4 8 In addition. the court ruled even if 
the Act is amended to correct this problem, the 5-day re-
sponse period prescribed by the Act does not meet the re-
quirements of due process. Instead. the court held that the 
Secretary must respond within 24 hours to a mine operator's 
request for temporary relief from an immediate cessation 
order. We find both aspects of the District Court's reasou-
ing unpersuasive. 
Our cases have indicated that due process ordinarily re-
quires an opportunity for "some ku1d of heariJ1g" prior to the 
deprivation of a significant property interest. See Parratt 
v. 'Paylor,- U. S. -,- (1981); Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971). The Court has often acknowl-
edged, however, that summary administrative action may be 
justified in emergency situations. See, e. g., Calero-1'oledo 
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 677- 680 (1974) ; 
Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, at 378- 379; Ewing v. Mytinyer 
& Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594, 599-600 (1950); Fahey v. 
Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 253-254 (1947); Yakus v. United 
States, 321 U. S. 414, 442-443 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 
321 U. S. 503, 519-520 (1944); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 
U. S. 589, 595-599 (1931); North American Cold Storage Co. 
v. Chicayo, 211 U. S. 306, 315-321 (1908). The question 
then. is whether the issuance of immediate cessation orders 
under § 521 (a) falls under this emergency situation excep-
tion to the 1~le that due rocess requires a hearing 
prior to deprivation of a roperty right. a it 
does, 
13 'The Di~triet Court'~ .Tan. 21, 1980, supplemental order und opinion, 
see n. 13, wupm, explained that its injunction did not apply to imm!:'diate 
cessation ord!:'r" i~S:;ued pur~uant to § 521 (n) (3) against mine opPrators 
who had failed to abate violations within the lime period specified in the · 
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The immediate cessati011 order provisions reflect Congress' 
concern about the devastating damage that may result from 
mining disasters.41 They represent an attempt to reach an 
accommodation between the legitimate desire of mining com-
panies to be heard before submitting to administrative reg-
ulation and the goverumental interest in protecting the pub-
lic health and safety and the environment from imminent 
dauger. Protection of the health and safety of the public 
is a paramount govemmeutal interest which justifies sum-
mary administrative action. Indeed, deprivation of property 
to protect the public health and safety is "one of the oldest 
examplps" or permissible summary action. Ewing v. My-
tinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra, at 599. See Mackey v. 
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-18; id., at 21, u. 1, 25 (S'l'EWAH'r, 
J., dissenting); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 
supra, at 315- 316. Moreover, the administrative action pro-
vided through immediate cessation orders responds to situa-
tions in which swift action is necessary to protect the public 
health and safety. This is precisely the type of emergency 
situation in which this Court has found summary administra-
tive action justified. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 
Inc. , supra ; North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 
supra. 
Rather than taking issue with any of these principles, the 
District Court held that the Act does not establish sufficiently 
objective criteria. goveming the issuance of summary cessa-
tion orders. We disagree. In our judgment, the criteria 
44 The legi;;lativc hi~tory of§ 521 (a) (2) indicatE'~ that Congress viPwed 
the Secretary 's power to i~sue immrdiate ce~sation arden:; as criticnl, and 
that the measure was primarily intendrd to avert the po~~ible occurrence 
of sueh di:msters as the Buffalo Creek flood. Sre H. R. Rep. No . 95-218, 
supra, n. 19, al 129- 130 ; S. Rep . No. 95-128, supra, n . 19, at 90-91. 
The Buffalo Creek flood was cau~ed by the suddf'n collapse of a coal mine 
wnste impoundment dam iu 1972 1war Buffalo Creek, W. Va. The fiood 
left 124 per~ons dead and rendered 4,000 persons homeless. See H . R. 
Rep. No. 94- 1445, 19 (1976). 
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,t·stablisheu by the Act auu the Secretary's implemeuting reg., 
ulations are specific enough to control governmental action 
anu reduce the risk of erroneous deprivation. Section 701 
(8) of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1291 (8) , defines the threat of 
"imminent danger to the health and safety of the public" as 
the existence of a condition or practice which could: 
"reasonably be expected to cause substantial physical 
harm to pE>rsons outside the permit area before such 
condition, practice. or violation can be abated. A rea-
sonable expectation of death or serious injury before 
abatement exists if a rational person , subjected to the 
same conditions or practices giving rise to the peril , 
would not expose himself or herself to the danger during 
the time necessary for abatement." 45 
If anything. these standards are more specific than the cri-
teria in other statutes authorizing summary administrative 
action that have been upheld against due process challenges .. 
See, e. (J., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra, at 
595 ("dangerous to health ... or would be in a material 
respect misleading to the injury or damage of the purchaser 
or consumer''); Fahey v. Mallonee, supra, at 250-251. n. 1 
(''is unsafe or unfit to manage a Federal savings and loau 
association" or "[i]s in immineut danger of becoming im-
paired"); Air East, Inc. v. National Transportation Safety 
Board, 512 },. 2d 1227, 1232 (CA3), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 
~"The Seeretary'::; regulalionb define "a signific!mt, imminent environ-
meut al lwrm" in lhe following terms: 
"(i) An t-uvironmental harm JS any adver,;e impact on laud, air, or water 
re~:>oure(·~, wcludmg but not lmutrd to plaut and animal life. 
"(ii) An rnvironmental harm i~ imminrnt if a C'ondition, practice or 
violation ex1~t8 which (a) i~:> cau~ing ;,;nrh harm or (b) may reaoonalJly 
Lr t·xpPC'ted to cau~e ~ucb harm at any time before the end of the rca-
bonahle aLa1Pmeut time that would be set under Seetiou 521 (a) (3) of the 
Act. 
"(iii) An enviromnentuJ lwrm is ignificauL if that harm is appreciable-
uud' uot numediately reparable." 30 CFI-t §§ 700.5 aud 701.5. 
. 
' 
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I 
Sud (1975) ("emergency requiring immedit:tte action . . in 
I 
respect to air safety in commerce"). 
The fact that OSM inspectors have issued immediate ces-
sation orders that were later overturned on administrative 
appeal does 11ot undermine the adequacy of the Act1s criteria 
but instead demonstrates the efficacy of the r.eview proce-
dun's 'Phe relevant 'inquiry is not whether a cessation order 
should l1ave been issued in a particular cas.e. but whether the. 
statutory procedure itself is incapable of affording due proc-
~ss. Yakus v. United States, supra, at 434-435. The po~-: 
sibility of administrative error inheres in any regulatory 
program; statutory programs authorizing emergency admin .. 
istrative action prior to a hearing are no exception.46 As we 
explained in Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra, 
at .599 : 
"Discretion of any official action may be abused. Yet 
it is not a requirement of due process that there be 
judicial illquiry before discretioll can be exercised. It 
is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, 
Lhat there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing 
and s judicial determination." 
Here, mine operators are afforded ~ompt and adequate 
post-deprivation administrative hearings and an opportunity 
for judiclalreview. We are satisfied that the Act's immedi-
ate cessation order provisions comport with the requirements 
of due proces~. 
We also conclude that the District Court erred in reducing 
the statutorily prescribed time period for the Secretary's re-
46 A differeut case might be pre:sE>nied if a pattern of aburse and arbi-
trary action were di:;cernable from review of au ageney'~:; adminiotration 
of a ;;urnmary procedure. Although the Di~triet Court sought to charac-
terh:e the OSJ\1':; record in is~uing ce~::;ation ordrn:~ in therse terms, a 
showing tlutt three ccs~:;at ion order:; were overturned on administrative 
appeal i:; far from sufficient to c::;tabli8h a pattern of abuse and arbitrary 
action. 
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sponse to requests for temporary relief. In the first place, 
the 5-day period is a statutory maximum and there is no in-
dication in the record that the Secretary has not responded 
or will not respond iu less than 5 days. Second, appellees 
have not demonstrated that they have been adversely affected 
by the 5-day response period in a particular case or that it is 
genrrally unreasonable. In addition, no evidence was intro-
duced to show that a shorter reply period is administratively 
feasible. In these circumstances, there simply is no basis 
for the District Court's decision to substitute a judicial policy 
preference for the scheme adopted by Congress. Cf. V er-
mollt Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Cu'Unc-£7, l11c. , 435 U. S. 519 (1978). Accordingly, we turn 
to the District Court's holdiHg that other sectious of the Act 
violat.e the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
B 
The District Court ruled that the Act's civil penalty pro-
visions do not comport with the requirements of due process. 
Under these provisions, the Secretary is to notify the recip-
ient of a notice of violation or a cessation order of the pro-
posed amount of any civil penalty that is to be assessed 
against it. § 518 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1268 (a). Section 518 
(c) further states that, if the operator "wishes to contest 
either thr amount of the 1Je11alty or the fact of the violation," 
it must "forward the proposed amount to the Secretary for 
placemE'nt in an escrow account." 47 Once the escrow re-
quiremell t is met, the operator receives a full adjudicatory 
hearing. before au administrative law judge, with a right of 
appeal to an administrative board and .i udicial review of the 
4' Howeve1 , no pe11altieR are finally irupooed uutil the allegpd offender 
hai- lwen provided an opportunity for a public hearing. SPction 518 (b) 
prov1de~: "A civil penalty tlhall be aHRPoHed by the Secretary only after 
t he per~01 1 eharged with a violation ... hm; been given an opvortnnity 
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final decision. See 30 U. S. C. § 1276 (a) (2). If, after ad-
ministrative or judicial review, it is determined that no vio-
lation occurred or that the amount of the proposed penalty 
should be reduced, the appropriate amount must promptly 
be refunded to the operator with interest. 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1268 (c). 
In challe11ging the Act's civil penalty provisions appellees 
did not allege that they, or any one of them have had civil 
penalties assessed against them. Moreover, the District 
Court did not find, as it did in ruling on the immediate ces-
sation order provisions. that any of appellee coal mine opera-
tors have been affected or harmed by any of the statntory 
procedures for the assessment and collection of fines. Thus. 
the record in the case belies any snggestion that there is a 
concrete caE"e 0r controversy concerning the operation of t"hese 
provisions. In these circPmstances, we mw~t conclude that 
appellees' challenge is :premature, and that it was improper 
for the court below to render a decision on this claim. 
VI 
011r ('xamina tion of appellees' consritutional challene-es to 
t,he Sl'rface Mining Act persuades us that the Act is not 
vulw'rable to their pre-enforcement challenge. Accord;n!rly. 
we affirm the judgment of the District Court upholdi11g the 
Art against. appellees' Commerce ClauFe attack (No. 79-
1596) , a11d we reverse the judgment below im:ofar as it held 
variou~:~ provisions of the Act unconstitutional (No. 7~-1538). 
The cases are remanded to the District Court with instrl'c-
tionR to dissolve the in.iunction issued against the Serretary 
and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
So ordered . 
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JusTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
These cases arise out of a pre-enforcement challenge to the 
constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977 (Surfa.ce Mining Act or Act ) , 30 U.S. C. 
§ 1201 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III). The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Virginia declared 
several central provisions of the Act unconstitutional and 
permnnently enjoined t.heir enforcement. 483 F. Supp. 425 
(WD Va. 1980). In these appeals, we consider whether Con-
gress, in adopting the Art., exceeded its powers under the 
Commerce Cln.use of the Con::;titution/ or tra.nRgressed affir-
1 Th<· Conunprrr Cl:ltt>'t' Plllpower~ Congrrss "[tlo rr~uhte C'ommrrce 
with forri~n nation~ :11111 :unon~ the several 8tatP~, and with the Indian 
Tribes." U. S. Const Art. I, § 8, cl. 3 . 
, .. 
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mative limitations on the exercise of that power contained 
in the Fifth and Tenth Ame~dlvents. We conclude that in 
the context of a facial challenge, the Surface Mining Act does 
not suffer from any of these alleged constitutional defects and 
we uphold the Act as constitutionaL 
][ 
A 
, The Surface Mining Act is a comprehensive statute de-
Bigned to "establish a nationwide program to protect society 
and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal 
mining operations." § 102 (a) , 30 U.S. C. § 1202 (a). Title 
II of the Act, 30 U. S. c: § 1211, creates the Office of Surface 
Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) , within the 
Department of the Interior, and -the -·secretary of the Interior 
(Secretary) acting through OSM, is charged with primary 
responsibility for administering and implementing the Act 
by promulgating regulations and enforcing its provisions. 
1201 (c), 30 U. S. C. §' 1211 (c) . -The principal regulatory 
and enforcement provisions are contained in- Title V of the 
Act, 30 U. S. C. §§ 1251-1270. Section 501, 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1251 , establishes a two-sta.ge program for the regulation 
of surface coal mining, ari initial, or interim regulatory phase, 
and a subsequent, permanent phase. ·· The interim program 
mandates immediate promulgation and federal enforcement 
of some of the Act's environmental protection performance 
standards, complimented by continuing state regulation. 
Under the permanent phase, a regulatory program is to be 
adopted for each State mandating compliance with the full 
panoply of federal performance standards, with enforce-
ment responsibility lying with either the State or Federal 
Government. 
Section 501 (a) directs the Secretary to promulgate regu-
lations establishing an interim regulatory program during 
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of the Act's performance standards, as specified by § 502 (c), 
30 U. S.C. § 1252 (c). Included among those selected stand-
ards are requirements governing: (a) restoration of land after 
mining to its prior condition; (b) restoration of land to its 
approximate original contour; (c) segregation and preserva-
tion of topsoil; (d) minimization of disturbance to the hy-
drologic balance; (e) construction of coal mine waste piles 
used as dams and embankments; (f) revegetation of mined 
areas; and (g) spoil disposal. § 515 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 
· {b).2 The interim regulations were published on December 
· 13, 1977, see 42 Fed. Reg. 62639,8 and they are currently in 
effect in most States, including Virginia.' 
1 Other provisions of the Act are, by their own terms, made effective 
during the interim period. One example is § 522 (e), 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1272 (e), which prohibits, with some exceptions, surface coal mining on 
certain lands or within specified distances of particular r:,1:ructures or 
facilities . 
1 Under §§ 502 (b), (c) of the Act, 30 U. S. C. §§ 1252 (b), (c), the 
interim standards are applicable only to surface mining operations in 
States that were themselves regulating surface mining when the Act be-
came law. All States in which surface mining was conducted on private 
lands had regulatory programs of their own when the Act was pa:,'Sed in 
1977. Accordingly, the interim program became applicable in all relevant 
areas throughout the country, including Virginia. 
• New surface mining operations, excluding those on "Federal lands" or 
"Indian lands," commencing on or after February 3, 1978 must comply 
with the performance standards established by the interim regulatory pro-
gram at the start of operations. And, with certain limited exceptions, sur-
face mining operations begun prior to February 3, 1978, were required to 
be in compliance with thP intrrim regulation::: of May 3, 1978. §§ 502 (b), 
(c) and 701 (11), 30 U. S. C. §§ 1252 (b), (c) and 1291 (11) . 
Some of the interim regulation~; were challenged in the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to § 526 (a) (1) of 
the Act , 30 U. S. C. § 1276 (a) (1) . In re Surface Mining Regulation 
Litigation, 452 F. Supp. 327 (D. C. 1978) ; In re Surface Mining Regula-
tion Litigation, 456 F . Supp 1301 (D. C. 1978), aff'd in part and rev'd in 
part,- U. S. App. D . C.-, 627 F . 2d 1346 (1980) . The plaintiffs in 
the District of Columbia litigation also challenged the validity of a num-
ber of the statutQry provisions that are at issue in the instant cases. The 
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The Secretary is responsible for enforcing the interim reg .. 
ulatory program. § 502 (e), 30 U. S. C. § 1252 (e). A fed-
eral enforcement and inspection program is to be established 
for each State, and is to remain in effect until a permanent 
regulatory program is implemented in the State. States may 
issue permits for surface mining operations during the in-
terim phase, but operations authorized by such permits must 
comply with the federal interim performance standards. 
§ 502 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1252 (b). States may also pursue 
their own regulatory and inspection programs during the in-
terim phase, and they may assist the Secretary in enforcing 
the interim standards.8 The States are not, however, re-
CJUired to enforce the interim regulatory standards and, until 
the permanent phase of the program, the Secretary may not 
cede the Federal Government's independent enforcement role 
to States that wish to conduct their regulatory own programs. 
Section 501 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1251 (b), directs the Secre-
tary to promulgate regulations establishing a permanent reg-
ulatory program incorporating all the Act's performance 
standards. The Secretary published the permanent regula-
tions on March 13, 1979, see 44 Fed. Reg. 14902, but these 
regulations do not become effective in a particular State until 
either a permanent state program, submitted and approved 
in accordance with § 503 of the Act, or a permanent federal 
program for the State, adopted in accordance with § 504, is 
implemented. 
Under § 503, any State wishing to assume permanent regu-
latory authority over the surface coal mining operations on 
"non-Federal lands" • within its borders must submit a pro-
District Court sustained the validity of those provisions, 452 F . Supp., at 
1319-1321, and the attack was not renewed on appeal. 
b Congress encouraged such aS!:iistance by providing for financial reim-
bursements to State~ that actively assist the federal enforcement effort 
during the interim phase. See 30 U. S. C. § 1252 (e)(4) . 
1 A separate regulatory program governing "Federal lands" is ·el:itablished 
by § 523 of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1273. The term "Federal lands" is 
·. 
79-1538 & 79-1596-0PINION 
HODEt v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN. 5 
posed permanent program to the Secretary for his approval. 
The proposed program must demonstrate that the state leg-
islature has enacted laws implementing the environmental 
protection standards established by the Act and accompany-
ing regulations, and that the State has the administrative and 
technical ability to enforce these standards. 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1253. The Secretary must approve or disapprove each such 
proposed program in accordance with time schedules and 
procedures established by §§ 503 (b), (c), 30 U.S. C. §§ 1253 
(b), (c) .1 In addition, the Secretary must develop and im-:-
plement a federal permanent program for each State that 
fails to submit or enforce a satisfactory state program. 
§ 504, 30 U. S. C. § 1254. In such situations, the Secretary 
defined in § 701 (4), 30 U. S. C. § 1291 (4) . Section 710 of the Act, 30 
U. S. C. § 1300, regulates surface mining on "Indian lands." 
7 The proposed state programs were to have been submitted by Feb-
ruary 3, 1979-18 months after the Act was passed. Exercising his 
authority under § 504 (a), the Secretary extended the deadline until 
August 3, 1979. See 44 Fed. Heg. 15324 (1979) . Because the Secretary's 
March 1979 publication of the permanent regulations occurred 7 months 
after the date set by the Act, see 30 U. S. C. § 1251 (b), the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia further extended the 
deadline for submission of state programs to and including March 3, 1980. 
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, Civ. No. 79-1144 
(D. C. July 25, and Aug. 21, 1979) . See also 44 Fed. Reg. 60969 (1979) 
(announcing conforming changes in the Secretary's regulations governing 
submission of state programs) . 
With the exception of Alaska, Georgia, and Washington, all States in 
which surface mining is either conducted or is expected to be conducted 
submitted proposed state programs to the Secretary by March 3, 1980. 
The Secretary has made his initial decisions on these programs. Thres 
programs were approved, eight were approved on condition that the States 
agree to some modification~ , 10 were approved in part and disapproved 
in part, and three were disapproved because the state legislatures had 
failed to enact the necessary implementing statutes. Virginia's program 
was among those approved in part and disapproved in part. See 45 Fed. 
Reg. 69977 (1980) . Under § 503 of the Act, a State may revise a plan 
that has been disapproved in whole or in part and resubmit it to the 
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constitutes the regulatory authority administering the Act 
within that State and continues as such unless and until a 
"state program" is approved. No later than 8 months after 
adoption of either a state-run or federally administered per-
manent regulatory program for a State, all surface coal min-
ing and reclamation operations on "non-Federal · lands" 
within that State must obtain a new permit issued in accord-
ance with the applicable regulatory program. § 506 (a), 30 
U. S. C. § 1256 (a). 
n 
On October 23, 1978, the Virginia Surface Mining and 
Reclamation Association, Inc., an association of coal pro-
ducers engaged in surface coal mining operations in Virginia, 
63 of its member coal companies, and four individual land-
owners filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory 
and injunctive relief against various provisions of the Act. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia and the Town of Wise, Va., 
intervened as plaintiffs.8 Plaintiffs' cha.Ilenge was primarily 
directed at Title V's performance standards.9 Because the 
permanent regulatory program was not scheduled to become 
effective until June 3, 1980, plaintiffs' challenge was directed 
at the sections of the Act establishing the interim regulatory 
program. Plaintiffs alleged that these provisions violate the 
Commerce Clause, the equal protection and due process guar-
antees of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,1~~-' 
! The Virginia Citizens for Better Reclamation, Inc., and the Town of' 
St. Charles, Va ., intervened as defendants in support of the Secretary. 
9 Plaintiffs also challenged Title IV of the Act, 30 U. S. C. §§ 401-413, 
which establishes a reclamation program for abandoned mines. The· 
District Court , held, however, that it would exerCise its discretion by ' 'not 
grant[ing] declaratory judgments as to the provisions of that title." 483' 
F . Supp., at 429. There is no appeal from this portion of the District 
Court 's judgment. 
10 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no· 
person shall ''be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process· 
of law." U. S. ConsL, Arndt. Y. 
. ... · 
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the Tenth Amendment,11 and the Just Compensation Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.12 
The District Court held a 13-day trial on plaintiffs' re-
quest for a permanent injunction. The court subsequently 
issued an order and opinion declaring several central provi-
sions of the Act unconstitutional. 483 F. Supp. 425 (1980). 
The court rejected plaintiffs' Commerce Clause, equal pro-
tection, and substantive due process challenges to the Act. 
The court held, however, that the Act " 'operates to displace 
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in numer-
ous areas of traditional functions,' and, therefore, is in con-
travention of the Tenth Amendmeht." fd., at 435, quoting 
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) . 
The court also ruled that various provisions of the Act effect 
an uncompensated taking of private property in violation of 
the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Finally, the court agreed with plaintiffs' due process chal-
lenges to some of the Act's enforcement provisions. The 
court permanently enjoined the Secretary from enforcing 
various provisions of the Act.13 
In No. 79-1538, the Secretary appeals from that portion 
of the District Court's judgment declaring various sections of 
the Act unconstitutional and permanently enjoining their en-
forcement. In No. 79-1567, plaintiffs cross-appeal from the 
11 Under the Tenth Amendment, "[]the powers not delegated to the 
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the State~ respectively, or to the people." U. S. Const., 
Arndt. X . 
12 The Compensation Clause prohibit~ the taking of private vroperty 
" for pubhc u:::e, without JU~t compensation.· U. S Const., Amdt. V. 
13 The District Court denied the Secretary's motion for a stay pending 
direct appeal to this Court. At the same time, the court issued an order 
and opinion clarifying and modifying its earlier order. Jurisdictional 
Statement Appendix (J. S. App.) la-16a. Upon the Secretary's applica-
tion , we issued an order staying the District Court 's judgment "pending· 
the timely filing and disposition of the appeals in this Court." - U. S .. 
- '(1980) . 
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District Court's rejection of their Commerce Clause challenge 
to the Act.14 Because of the importance of the issues raised, 
we noted probable jurisdiction of both appeals,15 - U. S, 
- (1980), and consolidated the two cases.16 For conven~ 
ience, we shall usually refer to plaintiffs as ''appellees." 
II 
On cross-appeal, appellees argue that the District Court 
erred in rejecting their challenge to the Act as beyond the 
~Scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause. 
They insist that the Act's principal goal is regulating the use 
of private lands within the borders of the States and not, as 
the District Court found, regulating the interstate commerce 
effects of surface coal mining. Consequently, appellees con-
tend that the ultimate issue presented is "whether land as 
~uch is subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause, 
i. e. whether land can be regarded as being 'in com~ 
merce.'" Brief for Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation 
Assn., Inc., et al. Appellees, at 12 (emphasis in original) . 
In urging us to answer "no" to this question, appellees em-
phasize that the Court has recognized that land-use regula-
tion is within the inherent police powers of the States and 
14 Plaintiffs do not appeal from that portion of the District Court's 
judgment rejecting their equal protection and sub~tantive due process 
challenges to the Act. 
15 The jurisdiction of this Court was invoked under 28 U. S. C. § 1252 
which provides for direct appeal to this Court from any decision by a 
court of the United States invalidating an Act of Congress in any suit to 
which the United States, its agencies, officers, or employees are parties. 
16 We also agreed to hear the appeal in No. 80-231, Hodel v. Indiana, 
which involves similar constitutional challenges to different provisions of 
the Surface Mining Act, and which we also decide today. Post, at-. At 
least three other District Courts have considered constitutional challenges 
to provision::; of the Surface Mining Act. In Concerned Citizens of 
Appalachia, Inc . v. Andrus, 494 F . Supp. 679 (ED Tenn. 1980), appeal 
pending,· No. 80-1448 (CA6) , the District Court upheld the Act in the-
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their political subdivisions, 17 and argue that Congress may 
regulate land-use only insofar as the Property Clause ' 8 grants 
it control over federal lands. 
We do not accept either appellees' framing of the question 
or the answer they would have us supply. The task of a 
court that is asked to determine whether a particular exer-
cise of congressional power is valid under the Commerce 
Clause is relatively narrow. The court must defer to a con-
gressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate 
commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding. 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 2i1 
258 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U. S. 294, 303-304 
(1964). This established, the only remaining question for 
judicial inquiry is whether "the means chosen by [Congress] 
is reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitu-
tion." Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, supra, 
at 262. See United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 121 
(1941); Katzenbach v. McClung, supra, at 304. The judi-
cial task is at an end once the court determines that Congress 
acted rationally in adopting a particular regulatory scheme. 
Ibid. 
Judicial review in this area is influenced above all by the 
the fact that the Commerce Clause is a grant of plenary au-
face of challenges similar to those raised by plaintiffs in the instant case. 
In Star Coal Co. v. Andrus, No. 79-171-2 (SD Iowa Feb. 13, 1980), 
appeal pending, No. 80-49 (CA8), the District Court rejected challenge::; 
based on the Fifth and Tenth Amendments, but enjoined some of the Act's 
enforcement provisions. And in Andrus v. P-Burg Cocil Co. , 495 F . Supp. 
82 (SD Ind. 1980), appeal pending, No. 80-1916 (CA7), the District Court 
rejected a Commerce Clause challenge to the Act. 
17 Appellees cite ca~es such as Village of Belle 'ferre v Boraas, 416 
U S. 1 (1974) ; Berman v Parker, 348 U. S. 26 (1954) : City of Euclid. 
v. Amber R ealty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926) . 
18 The Property Clause provides: "Congress shall have the power to· 
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the· 
Territory or other property belonging to the United States.'' U. S Const.,. 
Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
.. . ' 
79-1538 & 79-1596-0PINION 
10 HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN. 
thority to Congress. See National League of Cities v. Usery1 
~26 U. S., at 840; Cleveland v. United States, 329 U. S. 14, 
19 (1946); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S: 
l, 37 (1937). This power is "complete in itself, may be ex-
ercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, 
other than are prescribed in the constitution." Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). Moreover, this Court has 
made clear that the commerce power extends not only to 
"the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce" and 
to "protection of the instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce ... or persons or things in commerce," but also to 
"activities affecting commerce." Perez v. United States, 402 
U. S. 146, 150 (1971). As we explained in Fry v. United 
States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 (1975), "[e]ven activity that is 
purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, 
where the activity, combined with like conduct by others 
similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with 
foreign nations.'' See National League of Cities v. Usery, 
supra, at 840 ; Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
supra, at 255 ; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111, 127-128 
(1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 
110, 119 (1942); United States v. Darby, supra, at 120-121. 
Thus, when Congress has determined that an activity af-
fects interstate commerce, the courts need inquire only 
whether the finding is rational. Here, the District Co11rt 
properly deferred to Congress' express findings, set out in the 
Act itself, about the effects of surface coal mining on inter-
state commerce Section 101 (c) , 30 U. S. C. § 1201 (c) re-
cites the congressional finding that 
"many surface mining operations result in disturbances· 
of surface areas that burden and adversely affect com-
merce and the public welfare by destroying or diminish-
ing the utility of land for commercial, industrial, resi-
dential, recreational, agricultural, and forestry purposes,. 
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by causing erosion and landslides, by contributing to 
floods. by polluting the water, by destroying fish and 
wildlife habitats, by impairing natural beauty, by dam-
aging the property of citizens, by creating hazards dan-
p;erous to life and property by degrading the quality of 
life in local communities, and by counteracting govern-
mental programs and efforts to conserve soil, water, and 
other natural resources." 
The legislative record provides ample support for these 
statutory findings. The Surface Mining Act became law 
only after 6 years of the most thorough lep;islative considera-
tion.19 Committees of both Houses of Congress held ex-
10 Hearings on proposed legislation regulating surface coal mining b~gan 
in 1968. Surface Mining Reclamation: Hearings before the Senate Com-
mittee on Interior and In~ular Affairs, 90th Con g., 2d Sess. ( 1968) . Three 
years later, additional hearings were held by Committees of both the House 
and the Senate. Rrgulation of Strip Mining: Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Mines and Mining of the House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Surface Mining: Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Minerals, Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee 
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Con g., 1st Sess. ( 1971). The Com-
mittees reported bills for consideration by their respective houses. The 
House pa~sed H. R. 6482, but Congre~ adjourned before the Senate could 
Act on the measure. 
Similar bills were reintroduced in the 93d Congress and further hf.'ar-
ings were held . Regulation of Surface Mining Operations: Hearin~rR before 
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1973) ; Regulation of Surface Mining: Hearings b2fore the Subnom-
mittee on the Environment and the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining 
of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1973) . At the request of the Chairman of the Senate Committee, 
the Council on Environmental Quality prepared a report entitled Coal 
Surface Mining and Reclamation : An Environmental and Economic 
Asses~ment of Alternatives (Comm. Print 1973), and the Sem1te Com-
mittee held additional hearings to consider the report . Coal Surface 
Mining and Reclamation : Hearings before the Subcommittee on Minerals, 
Materials and Fuels of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insula"!' 
Affairs, 93d Cong, lst Sess. ( 1973) . The House and Senate · Committees-
..S'' 
~if '~" 
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tended hearings during which vast amounts of testimony and 
documentary evidence about the effects of surface mining on 
our Nation's environment and economy were brought to Con-
~ress' attention. Both Committees made detailed findings 
about these effects and the urgent need for federal legislation 
to address the problem. The Senate Report explained that 
" [slurface coal mining activities have imposed large so-
cial costs on the public . . . in many areas of the country 
in the form of unreclaimed lands, water pollution, ero-
sion, floods, slope failures, loss of fish and wildlife re-
reported bills for con~ideration by both houses, and Congress passed a bill 
that was vetoed by President Ford in 1974. 
The surface mining legislation was reintroduced in the 94th Congress in 
1975, and the Senate Committee held a hearin~~: on Administration objec-
tions to the bill. Surface Mining Briefing: BriefiPg before the Senate 
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Con g., 1st Srss. ( 1975). 
Both Committees reported bills to the House and Senate, which again 
passed a bill rrported by the Conference Committee. President Ford 
again vetoed the bill. 
The protacted eongressional endeavor finally bore fruit in 1977. The 
relevant House and Senate C0mmittees held extePsive hearini!'S Fhortly 
after the opening of the 95th Congress to consider bills introduced at the 
very beginning of the new legislative session. Surface Mining Control and 
Re,lamation Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 7 before the Subrommittee on 
Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Committee on Energv and 
Natural Resources, 95th Conj!'., 1st Sess. (1977) (1977 Senate HeariPI!'S); 
Surface MiPing Control and Reclamation Act of 1977: Hearini!'S on H. R. 
2 before the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1977) (1977 House Hearings). The legislation was reported to 
both Houses and pa~sage in both chambers followed, after lengthy floor 
debate. 123 Cong. Rec. 12681-12886, 15691-1.5754 (1977). The Confer-
ence Committee report was issued in July 1977, H. R. (Conf. Rep.) No. 
95--493 (1977), and after further floor debate, both Houses ae:reed to the 
bill recommended by the conferees. 123 Cong. Rec. 23967-23988, 24419-
24429 (1977). President Carter signed the Act into Jaw on August 3, 
1977. The lf'gislative history of the Act is summarized in S. Rep. No. 
fl5-128 59-61 (1977), and in H R. Ren. No. 95-218 140-141 (1977) See-
also, Note, '81 W. Va. L. Rev. 775 (1979) . 
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sources, and a decline in natural beauty." S. Rep. No, 
95- 128 50 (1977). 
See id. , at 50-54. 
• Similarly, the House Committee documented the adverse 
effects of surface coal mining as including : ' 
' "'Acid drainage which has ruined an estimated 11,000 
miles of streams; the loss of prime hardwood forest 
and the destruction of wildlife habitat by strip min~ 
ing; the degradation of productive farmland; recurrent 
landslides ; siltation and sedimentation of river sys-
tems .... ' ., H . R. Rep. No. 95- 218 58 (1977), quotil)g 
H. R. Rep. No. 94-1445 19 (1976) . . 
A.nd in discussing the impact of surface coal mining on water. 
resources, the House Committee explained that : 
"The most widespread damages ... are environmental 
in nature. Water users incur significant economic and fi-
nancial losses as well. 
"Reduced recreational values, fishkills, reductions in 
normal waste assimilation capacity, impaired water sup-
plies, metals and masonry corrosion and deterioration, 
increased flood frequencies and flood damages, reductioh&. 
in designed water storage capacities at impoundments, 
and higher operating costs for commercial waterway 
users are some of the most obvious economic effects that 
stem from mining-related pollution and sedimentation."· 
ld., at 59. 
See id., at 96-122. 
The Committees also explained that inadequacies in exist-
ing state laws and the need for uniform minimum nationwide 
standards made federal regulations imperative. See S. Rep, 
No. 95- 128, supra, a.t 49 ; H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, supra. at 
58. In light of the evidence available to Congress and the 
detailed consideration that the legislation received, we cannot 
s~y that. Co.ngtess did not have a rational basis for concluding· 
• • < 
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that surface coal mining has substantial effects on interstate 
commerce. 
Appellees do not, in general, dispute the validity of the 
congressional findings. 20 Rather, appellees' contention is that 
.the "rational basis" test should not apply in this case be-
cause the Act regulates land use, a local activity not affect-
ing interstate commerce. But even assuming arguendo that 
appellees correctly characterize the land use regulated by the 
Act as a "local" activity, their argument is nonetheless 
un persuasive. 
The denomination of an activity as a "local" or "intrastate" 
activity does not resolve the question whether Congress may 
regulate it under the Commerce Clause. As previously 
noted, the commerce power "extends to those activities intra-
state which so affect interstate commerce, or the exertion of 
the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them 
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the 
effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate 
commerce." United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., supra, 
at 119. See Fry v. United States, supra, at 547; NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra, at 37. This Court has 
long held that Congress may regulate the conditions under 
which goods shipped in interstate commerce are produced 
where the "local" activity of producing these goods itseli 
affects interstate commerce. See, e. g., United States v. 
Darby, supra,· Wickard v. Filburn, supra; NLRB v. Jones~ 
Laughlin Steel Corp., s'upra; Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 
U. S. 517 (1942). Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, supra. Ap-
pellees do not dispute that coal is a commodity that moves 
in intE>rstate commerce. Here, Congress rationally deter-
20 Appellees do contend that surface mining enhances rather than 
diminishes the utility of land in the steep-slope areas of Virginia. Con-
gress, however, made contrary findings, and it is sufficient for purposes of 
judicial review that Congress had a rational basis for coneluding as it did. 
See Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U. S. 529, -541, n. 10 (1976) ; UniteZt 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-154 (1938) . 
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mined that regulation of surface coal mining is necessary to 
protect interstate commerce from adverse effects that may 
Tesult from that activity. This congressional finding is suffi-
cient to sustain the Act as a valid exercise of Congress' power 
under the Commerce Clause. 
Moreover, the Act responds to a congressional finding that 
nationwide "surface mining and reclamation standards are 
essential in order to insure that competition in interstate 
commerce among sellers of coal produced in different States 
will not be used to undermine the ability of the several States 
to improve and maintain adequate standards on coal mining 
operations within their borders." 30 U. S. C. § 1201 (g) . 
The prevention of this sort of destructive interstate competi-
tion is a traditional role for congressional action under the 
Commerce Clause. In United States v. Darby, supra, the 
Court used a similar rationale to sustain the imposition of 
federal minimum wage and maximum hour regulations on a 
manufacturer of goods shipped in interstate commerce. The 
Court explained that the statute implemented Congress' view 
that "interstate commerce should not be made the instrument 
of competition in the distribution of goods produced under 
substandard labor conditions, which competition is injurous 
to the commerce and to the states from which and to which 
the commerce flows." /d., at 115. The same rationale ap-
plies here to support the conclusion that the Surface Mining 
Act is within the authority granted to Congress by the Com-
merce Clause. 
Finally, we agree with the lower federal courts that have 
uniformly found the power conferred by the Commerce 
Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of 
activities causing air or water pollution, or other environ-
mental hazards that may have effects iu more than one State/1 
21 See, e. g., United States v. Byrd, 610 F. 2d 1204, 1209-1210 (CA7 
1979) ; Bethlehem Steel Cor]>. v. 'l'rain, 544 F . 2d 657, 663 (CA3 1976); 
Sierra Club v. 'l'rain, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 540 F. 2d 1114, 1139 
(1976) , cert. denil'd, 430 U. S. 959 (1977) ; District of Columbia v. 'l'rain,. 
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Appellees do not dispute that the environmental and other 
problems that the Act attempts to control can properly be 
addressed through Commerce Clause legislation. In these 
circumstances, it is difficult to find any remaining foundation 
for appellees' argument that, because it regulates a particular 
land use, the Surface Mining Act is beyond congressional 
Commerce Clause authority. Accordingly, we turn to the 
question whether the means selected by Congress were reason-
able and appropriate. 
Appellees' essential challenge to the means selected by the 
Act is that they are redundant or unnecessary. Appellees 
contend that a variety of federal statutes such as the Clean 
Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7401 et seq. (1976 ed., Supp. III) , the 
Flood Control Act, 33 U. S. C. § 701 et seq., and the Clean 
Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq., adequately address the 
federal interest in controlling the environmental effects of 
surface coal mining without need to resort to the land use 
regulation scheme of the Surface Mining Act. The short 
answer to this a.rgument is that the effectiveness of existing 
laws in dealing with a problem identified by Congress is ordi-
narily a matter committed to legislative j' ·dgment. Con-
gress considered the effectiveness of existing legislation and 
concluded that additional measures were necessary to deal 
with the interstate commerce effects of surface coal mining. 
See H. R. Rep. No. 95- 218, supra, at 58-60; S. Rep. No. 95-
128, supra, at 59-53. And we agree with the court below 
that the Act's regulatory scheme is reasonably related to the 
goals Congress sought to accomplish. The Act's restrictions 
on the practices of mine operators all serve to control the 
- U. S. App. D. C. -, 521 F. 2d 971, 988 (1975), vacated and re-
manded on other grounds sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U. S. 99 (1977) ; 
United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co ., 504 F. 2d 1317, 1325 
(CA6 1974) ; Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F. 2d 246, 259 (CA3 1974); 
South Terminal Corp . v. EPA , 504 F. 2d 646, 677, (CAl 1974) ; Unitea 
8tates v. Bishop Processing Co , 287 F. Supp. 624 (Md. 1968) , aff'd, 423~ 
F . 2d 469 (CA4) , cert. denied, 398 U. S. 904 (1970). 
. ' 
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~nvironmental and other adverse effects of surface coal 
mining. 
In sum, we conclude that the District Court properly re-
jected appellees' Commerce Clause challenge to the Act. We 
therefore turn to the court's ruling that the Act contravenes 
affirmative constitutional limitations on congressional exer-. 
cise of the commerce power. 
III 
The District Court invalidated §§ 515 (d) and (e) of the 
Act, which prescribe performance standards for surface coal 
mining on "steep-slopes," 22 on the ground that they violate 
a constitutional limitation on the commerce power imposed 
by the Tenth Amendment. These provisions require "steep-
slope" operators to: (i) to reclaim the mined area by com-
pletely covering the highwall and returning the site to its 
uapproximate original contour"; 28 (ii) to refrain from dump-
ing spoil material on the downslope below the bench or min-
ing cut; and (iii) to refrain from disturbing land above the 
highwall unless permitted to do so by the regulatory author-
ity. § 515 (d), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (d). Under § 515 (e), a 
"steep-slope" operator may obtain a variance from the ap-
proximate original contour requirement by showing that it 
will allow a post-reclamation use that is "deemed to con-
12 Section 515 (d)(4), 30 U.S. C. § 1265 (d)(4) defines a "steep slope'' 
as "any slope above 20 degret>S or ~uch }e:;ser slope as may be defined by 
the regulatory authority after consideration of soil, climate, and other 
characteristics of a region or State." 
2a The term "approximate original contour" is defined as "that surface 
configuration achieved by backfilling and grading of the mined area so 
that the reclaimed area, including any terracing or access roads, closely 
resembles the general surface configuration of the land prior to mining 
~nd blends into and complements the drainage pattern of the surroundin~ 
terrain , with all high walls and spoil piles eliminated.' " § 701 (2), 30 
u. s. c. § 1291 (2) • 
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etitute an equal or better economic or public use" than would 
otherwise be possible. 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (e)(3)(A).24 
The District Court's ruling relied heavily on our decision 
in National League of Cities v. Usery, supra. The District 
Court viewed the central .issue ~s whether the Act governs 
the activities of private individuals, or whether it instead 
regulates the governmental decisions of the States. And 
although the court acknowledged that the Act "ultimately 
affects the coal mine operator," it concluded that the Act 
contravenes the Tenth Amendment because it interferes with 
the States' "traditional governmental function" of regulating 
land use. 483 F. Supp., at 432. · The court held, that, as 
applied to Virginia, the Act's steep-slope provisions imper-
missibly constrict the State;s abiiity to make "essential deci-
sions." 25 The court found the Act accomplishes this result 
"through forced relinquishment of state control of land use 
planning; through loss of state control of its economy; and 
u Section 515 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1265 (c) , establishes a separate vari-
ance procedure for mountaintop mining operations. 
25 The court reasoned that although the Act allows a State to elect to 
have its own regulatory program, the "choice that is purportedly given 
is no choice at all" because the state program must comply with federally 
prescribed standards. 483 F . Supp., at 432. 
26 On the basis of the evidence presented at trial, the court found that 
po::;t-mining restoration of steep slopes to their "approximate original 
~ontour" is "econ?mically infeasible and physically impossible." 483 F . 
Supp., at 434. The court noted that the steep-slope provisions particu-
larly affect Virginia because 95% of its coal reserves are located on such 
lands. And the court indicated that several coal mine operators had 
been forced to shut down because they were unable to comply with the 
Act's requirements, with adverse consequences for the economies of vari-
ous towns a.nd counties that are dependent on coal mining. The court 
also found that there is a need for level land in the counties of the 
Virginia coal fields, and it concluded that the Act 's reclamation provi-
~>ions would prevent "forward-looking land use planning" by the State. 
483 F . Supp., at 434. Finally, the court found that restoration of mined 
land to its original contour would diminish the value of the land from 
the $5,000-$300,000 an acre value of level land to the $5-$75 per acre 
value of steep slope land. 
·. 
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through economic harm, from expenditure of state funds to 
implement the act and from destruction of the taxing power 
of certain counties, cities, and towns." 483 F. Supp., at 
435. 26 The court therefore permanently enjoined enforce· 
ment of §§ 515 (d) and (e).27 
The District Court's reliance on National L9ague of Cities 
requires a careful review of the actual basis and import of 
our decision in that case. There, we considered a constitu-
tional cha1lenge to the 1974 amendments to the Fair ·Labor 
Standards Act which had extended federal minimum wage 
and maximum hour ree;ulations to most state and local gov-
ernment employees. Because it was conceded that the chal-
leng~d regulations were "undoubtedly within the scope of 
the Commerce Clause," id., at 841, the only question pre-
sented was whether that particular exercise of the commerce 
power "encounter [ ed] a . . . constitutional b9rrier because 
fthe regulations] ... applied directly to the States and sub· 
divisions of States as employers." Ibid. We began by draw-
in~ a sharp distinction between congressional regulation of 
private persons and businesses "necessarily subject to the 
dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the 
State in which they reside," id., at 845, and federal regula-
tion "directed not to private citizens, but to the States as 
States." ibid. As to the former, we found no Tenth Amend-
ment impediment to congressional action. Instead, we re-
affirmed our consistent rule: 
eccongressional power over areas of private endeavour, 
even when its exercise may pre-empt express state-law 
27 In its order and opinion accompanying its denial of the Secretary's 
request for a stay of its judgment pending appeal, see n. 13, supra, the 
District Court explained that the injunction against enforcement of the· 
steep-slope standards was not intended to "allo[w] spoil to be placed 
on the· downslope in an uncontrolled manner." The court stated that 
"[a lny such downslope spoil placement shall be in a controlled manner 
meeting the environmental protection standards specified by the regula-
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determination~ contrary to the result that has com.., 
mended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress, has 
been held to be limited only by the requirement that 
'the means chosen by [Congress] must be reasonably 
adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.' 
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S, 
241, 262 (1964)." · Id., at 840. 
The Court noted, however, that "the States as States stand 
on quite a different footing from an individual or corporation 
when challenging the exercise of Congress' power to regulate 
commerce." Id., at 854. It indicated that when Congress 
attempts to directly regulate the States as States the Tenth 
Amendment requires recognition "that there are attributes 
of sovereignty attaching to every state government which 
may not be impaired by Congress. not because Congress may 
lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the 
matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exer-
cising the authority in that manner." !d., at 845. The Court 
held that the power to set the wages and work hours of state 
employees was "an undoubted attribute of state sovereignty." 
Ibid. And because it further found that the challenged 
regulations would "displace the States' freedom to structure 
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions,' ' the Court concluded that Congress could not, con-
sistently with the Tenth Amendment, "abrogate the States' 
otherwise plenary authority to make [these decisions]." Id., 
at 845-846/ 8 
28 National League of Cities expressly left. open the question "whether 
different results might obtain if Congress seeks to affect integral opera-
tions of state governments by exercising authority granted it under other 
sections of the Constitution such as the spending power, Art. I, § 8, cl. 
1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." National League of Cities v. 
Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 852, n. 17 (1977). In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 
U. S. 445 ( 1976) , the Court upheld Congress ' power under § 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to authorize private damages actions against 
state governments for discrimination in employment. The Court ex-
~ .. 
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it should be apparent from this discussion that in order 
to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power legis-
lation is invalid under the reasoning of National League of 
Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there 
must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the 
States as States. Second, the federal regulation must ad-
dress matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sov-
ereignty." l d., at 845. And third, it must be apparent that 
the States' compliance with the federal law would directly 
impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas 
of traditional functions." !d., at 852/6 When the Surface 
Mining Act is examined in light of these principles, it is 
clear that appellees' Tenth Amendment challenge must fail 
because the first of the three requirements is not satisfied. 
The District Court's holding to the contrary rests on an un-
warranted extension of the decision in National League of 
Cities. 
As the District Court itself acknowledged, the steep-slope 
provisions of the Surface Mining Act govern only the activ-
ities of coal mine operators who are private individuals and 
businesses. Moreover, the States are not compelled to en-
force the steep-slope standards, to expend any state funds, 
or to participate in the federal regulatory program in any 
manner whatsoever. If a State does not wish to submit a 
proposed permanent program that complies with the Act and 
plained that because the Amendment was adopted with the specific 
purpose of limiting State autonomy, constitutional principles of federalism 
do not restrict congressional power to invade State autonomy when 
Congress legislates under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id, at 
452-456. 
29 Demonstrating that these three requirements are met does not, how-
ever, guarantee that a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional 
commerce power action will succeed. There are situations in which the 
nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies 
State submission. See Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975), r~ 
affirmed in National League of Cities v. Usery , supra, at 852-853 (1977),. 
See also, id., at 856 (BLACKMUN, .T., concurring). 
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(\ 1uggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes 
I )-~f the States by directly compelling them to enact and en-
force a federal regulatory program. Cf. Maryland v. EPA, 
630 F. 2d 215, 224-228 (CA4 1977), vacated and remanded 
3Ub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U. S. 99 (1977); District of 
'Columbia v. Train, - U. S. App. D. C. -, 521 F. 2d 971, 
990--994 (1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. EPA v. 
!Jrown, 431 U. S. 99 (1977); Brown v. EPA, 521 F. 2d 827, 
~37-842 (CA9 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U. S. 99 
(1977). The most that can be said is that the Surface Mining 
Act establishes a program of cooperative fedetalisrh that 
allows the States, within limits established by federal mini-
mum standards. to enact and administer their own regulatory 
programs, structured to meet their own particular needs. See 
In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, -
U. S. App. D. C. -, 617 F. 2d 807. 808 (1980). In this 
respect, the Act resembles a number of other federal statutes 
that have survived Tenth Amendment challenges in the lower 
federal courts.80 
Appellees argue, however, that the threat of federal usur-
pation of their regulatory roles coerces the States into en-
forcing the Surface Mining Act. Appellees also contend that 
the Act directly regulates the States as States because it es-
tablishes mandatory minimum federal standards. In essence, 
appellees urge us to join the District Court in looking beyond 
the activities actually regulated by the Act to its c9nceivable 
effects on the States' freedom to make decisions in areas o£ 
implementing regulations, the full regulatory burden will be 
borne by the Federal Government. Thus there can be no 
so See, e. g., United States v. Helsley, 615 F. 2d 784 (CA9 1979) (up-
holding the Airborne Hunting Act, 16 U. S. C. § 742j-1); Friends of the 
Earth, Inc. v. Carey, 552 F. 2d 25, 36-39 (CA2), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 
902 (1977) (upholding the Clean Air Act, 42 U. S. C. § 7401 et seq. 
(1976 ed., Supp. III) ; Sierra Club v. EPA - U. S. App. D. C. -, 
540 F. 2d 1114, 1140 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U. S. 959 (1977) (uphold-
ing the Clean Water Act, 33 U. S. C. § 1251 et seq.). 
.. . 
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well settled that there can be no divided authority over inter-
state commerce, and that the arts of Congress on that sub-
Ject are supreme and exclusive." Missouri Pacific R. Co. v, 
Stroud, 267 U. S. 404, 408 (1925). 
Thus. Congress could constitutionally have enacted a stat-
ute prohibiting any state regulation of surface coal mining. 
We fail to see why the Surface Mining Act should become 
constitutioPally suspect simply because Congress chose to 
allow the States a regulatory role. Contrary to the assump-
tion by both the District Court and appellees, nothing in 
National Leag11e of Cities suggests that the Tenth Amend-
ment shields the States from pre-emptive federal regnlation 
of priva •e artivities affecting interstate commerce. To the 
contr::~ry, National League of Cities explicitly reaffirmed the 
teaching of earlier cases that Congress may, in regulating pri-
vate activities purmant to the commerce power, "pre-empt 
~>xnre~s ~tat~ law determinations contrary to the result which 
harl commended itself to the collective wisdom of Con-
gres!'l .. . . " !d., at 840. The only limitation on congres-
sional authority in this regard is the requirement that the 
mcanR selert€d be reasonably relat."d to the goal of regulat-
ing interstate commerce. Ibid. We have already indicated 
that the Act satisfies this test. 81 
Thir. rondns;on annlies re!!ardless of whether the federal 
legislation rlisplarcs laws enacted nndf'r the States' "police 
r.owcrs." T1H' Court long ago re.jpnted t,_,e suage~tion that 
Conl!r~ss invades areas reserved to the States by the Tenth 
A nv'ndment simnly because it E'X"rrises its authoritv nnder 
tl-,0. Commerce Clause in a manner tlrflt displares the States' 
~X"r~it:f> of t1,eir nolire powf'rS. Sne Hoke v. United Sta~es, 
227 U. S. 308, 320-323 (1913); Athanasaw v. United States, 
81 Sre supra, at 16-17. It is significant that the Comm:mwealth of Vir- · 
ginia pr~sses its Tenth Amendment challenge to the Act simply as an-
o·her regulator of surface coal mining whose regulatory program has been 
displared or pre-empted by federal Jaw. As indicated in text, no Tenth.-
Amt'lldment cQncern~ are imi?licat.ed in S)Jch situation1 .. 
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227 U. S. 326 (1913); Cleveland v. United States, supra, at 
19; United States v. Darby, supra, at 113-114; United States 
v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., supra, at 119. Cf. United States 
v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 147 (1938) ("it is 
no objection to the exertion of the power to regulate inter-
state commerce that its exercise is attended by the same in-
cidents which attend the exercise of the police power of the 
states"); 82 accord, FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 
U. S. 575, 582 (1942); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & 
Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156 (1919); Seven Cases v. 
United States, 239 U. S. 510, 514 (1916). This Court has 
upheld as constitutional any number of federal statutes en-
acted under the commerce power that pre-empt particular 
ex"rcises of state police power. See, e. g., United States v. 
Walsh, 331 U. S. 432 (1947) (upholding Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act, 21 U. S. C. §§ 301·-392); NLRB v. Jones 
f· Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937) (upholding Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 29 U. S. C. §§ 151-168); United 
Statrs v. Darbu, supra (upholding Fair Labor Standards Act, 
29 U. S. C. §§ 2')1-219). It would therefore be a ra.dical de-
parture from long··established precedent for this Court to 
hold that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from 
displacing state police power laws regulating private activity. 
Nothing in National League of Cities compels or even hints 
at, such a departure.88 
"~This holdirg disposes of the contention by appellees and various 
amici that the Surface Mining Act is unconstitutional because it pre-
sumrs the existence of a federal police power. As the Court has stated: 
"Thr nnthority of the Federal Government over interstute commerce doe!! 
not differ in extent or charucter from that retained by the l:itates over-
iPtrn>;tate rommrrre." United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 115 
( 1941). quotiPg United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, 307 U. S. 533' 
5119-570 (1939) . 
H:J The rrmainit' g justification asserted by the District Court for itl! 
Tellth AmandmPnt ruling, one that appellees urge here, is that the steep-
~l opP mining requirements will harm Virginia's economy and destroy the 
• nxir~ rower QJ ~O!Jl.e tQwn~ al!.d CQU.Uties in the Commonwealth. In thif!· 
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In .sum, appellees' Tenth Amendment challenge to the Sur~ 
face Mining Act must fail because here, in contrast to the 
situation in National League of Cities, the statute at issue 
regulates only "individuals and businesses necessarily subject 
to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and 
the State in which they reside." National League of Cities 
v. Usery, supra, at 845.34 Accordingly, we turn to the· Dis~ 
trict Court's ruling that the Act contravenes other constitu~ 
tional limits on congressional action. 
IV 
The District Court held that two of the Act's provisions 
violate the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amend~ 
ment. First, the court found that the steep-slope provisions 
discussed above effect an uncompensated taking of private 
property by requiring operators to perform the "economically 
and physically impossible" task of restoring steep~slope sur~ 
regard, the court may have been influenced by the discussion in National 
League of Cities about t-he likely impact of the challenged regulations on 
the finances of State and local governments. National League of Cities 
v. Usery, supra, at 846-847. But as the Court made clear, the determi-
native factor in that case was the nature of the federal action, not the 
ultimate economic impact on the States. /d ., at 847. Moreover, even 
if it is true that the Act's requirements will have a measurable impact 
on Virginia's economy, this kind of effect, standing alone, is insufficient to 
establish a violation of the Tenth Amendment. In Oklahoma v. Atkinson 
Co., 313 U. S. 508, 534-535 (1941), the Court rejected the assNtion that 
1.n adverse impact on State and local economies is a barrier to Congress' 
exercise of its power under the Commerce Clause to regulate private acti-
vities affecting interstate commerce. We are not persuaded that there 
are compelling reasons presented in the instant case for reversing the · 
Cotirt's position. 
~4 We have assuincd, arguen(lo, that the District Court correctly held 
tl1at lnnd use regulation is nn "integral governmental function" as that 
term was used in National League of Cities. Our resolution of the Tenth 
Amendment challenge to the Act makes it unnecessary for us to decide· 
whether this is actually the case. 
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face mines to their approximate original contour. 483 F. 
Supp., at 437.3u The court further held that, even if steep-
slope surface mines could be restored to their approximate 
original contour, the value of the mined land after such res-
toration would have "been diminished to practically noth-
ing." Ibid. Second, the court found that § 522 of the Act 
effects an unconstitutional taking because it expressly pro-
hibits mining in certain locations and "clearly prevent [s 1 a 
person from mining his own land or having it mined." !d., 
at 441.86 Relying on this Court's decision in Pennsylvania 
Coal Co. v. Mahon, 265 U. S. 393 (1922), the District Court 
held that both of these provisions are unconstitutional be-
cause they "deprive[] [coal mine operators] of any use of 
85 The District Court ncknoweldged the existence of a statutory prore-
dure for requesting variances from the steep-slope provisions. But the 
court suggested that the statutory requirement that highwalls of re-
claimed mining cuts be completely covered makes this variance nroccdure 
"meaningless" to steep-slope mine operators. 483 F. Supp., at 437. This 
conclusion was premature. See n. 39, infra. 
80 With certain r:;pecified exceptions, and r:;ubject to "valid existi~·g 
'rights," § 522 (e) prohibits surface mining operations in national parks 
and forests, or where they will adversely affect publidy owned p11rks 
or places that are included in the National Register of His•oric Flites. 
30 U. S. C. 1272 (e) (1), (2), and (3). It alr:;o prohibits su,.fare mining 
within 100 feet of a cemetery or the right-of-way of a public rond . a!id 
within 300 feet of an occupied dwelling, public buildiPg, school, church, 
community or institutional building, or public park. ~~ (e) ( 4) and ( 5) . 
Sectionr:; 552 (a) , (c) and (d), which become applicable c!urirg the 
permanent phase of the regulatory program, require the establishment of 
procedures for designating particular lands as unsuitable fo,. some or all 
surface mining. §§ 1272 (a), (c), and (d). The Distrirt Court's ruling 
that ther:;e latter provisions effect an unronr:;titutional taking of pri,atc 
property is puzzling and cannot stand. Since these provisions do not rome 
into effect until the permanent phase of the Act 's regulatory program, 
they have not been applied to appellees or any other private landowner 
in Virginia . In these circumstances, there was no justiciable case or ron-
troversy with regard to thes" sections of the Act. See United Public 
Works v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 89- 91 (1947). 
i.~ . ' {. , . ' " 
;9-1538 & 79- 1596--0PINION 
a:!8 HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN. 
[their] land, not only the most profitable. 483 F. Supp., at 
441. 
We conclude that the District Court's ruling on the "tak-
ing issue suffers from a fatal deficiency: neither appellees ~ 
nor the court iE.._entified any__property in which appellees have 
an interest that has allegedly been taken by operation of the 
Act. By proceeding in this fashion, the court below ignored 
this Court's oft-repeated admonition that the constitution-
ality of statutes ought not be decided except in an actual 
factual setting that makes such a decision necessary. See 
Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U. S. 583, 588 ( 1972) ; 
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U. S. 549, 568-575 
584 (1947) ; Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 
B25 U. S. 450, 461 (1945). Adherence to this rule is particu., f 
larly important in cases raising allegations of an unconstitu-
tional taking of private property. Just last Term, we re., 
affirmed that 
"this Court has generally 'been unable to develop any 
"set formula" for determining when "justice and fair-
ness" require that economic injuries caused by public 
action be compensated by the government, rather than 
remain disproportionately concentrated on a few per-
sons.' Rather, it has examined the 'taking' question by 
engaging in essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries that have 
identified several fadors-such as the economic impact 
of the regulation, its interference with reasonable in-
vestment backed expectations, and the character of the 
government action-that have particular significance.'~ 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164,175 (1979) 
(citations omitted) . 
These "ad hoc, factual inquiries" must be conducted with 
respect to specific property, and the particular estimates of 
economic impact and ultimate valuation relevant ·in the 
unique circumstances. 
Because appellees' taking claim arose in the context of a. 
79-1538 & +'9-1596--0PINION 
HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN. 2~ 
acial challenge it presented no concrete controversy con., 
cernmg r application of the Act to particular surface 
mining operations or its effect on specific parcels of land, 
Thus, the only issue properly before the District Court and, 
in turn, this Court, is whether the "mere enactment" of the 
Surface Mining Act constitutes a taking. See Agins v. Tib.., 
uron, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980). · The test to be applied in 
considering this facial challenge is fairly stra-ightforward. A 1 
statute regulating the uses that can be made of property ~IYltS .r I biY' 
effects a taking if it "denies an owner economically viable 
use of his land ... . " Agins v. Tiburon, supra, at 260. See 
Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978). The Surface Mining Act easily survives scrutiny 
under this test. 
First, the Act does not, on its face, prevent beneficial use / b /VI. 1 ff 1 b.tY 
of coal bearing lands. Ex~ept for the proscription of mining 
near certain locations by § 522 (e), the Act does not cate-
gorically pr~hibit surface coal mining; it merely regulates the 
conditions under which such operations may be conducted.a7 
37 Although § 552 (e) prohibits any surface coal mining in certain 
areas, appellees' "takings" challenge to this provision is premature. First, 
appellees made no showing in the District Court that they own tracts of 
land that are affected by this provision. Second, § 522 (e) does not, on 
its_f~ deprive owners of land within its reach of economically viable / t!Jto'\l)f ft!JN' 
use o their land since it does not proscribe nonmining uses of such land. 
Third, § 522 (e)'s restrictions are expressly made subject to "valid exist-
ing rights." Appellees contend that this exception "applies only to 
specific surface mining operations for which all required permits were 
issued prior to August 3, 1977, the effective date of the Act." Brief for 
Virginia Surface Mining Reclamation Association, Inc., et al., at 48. This 
interpretation of the exception is not compelled either by the statutory 
language or its legislative history. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, supra, 
n. 19, at 95. It is apparently based on 30 CFR § 761.5 (a) (2) (i), a reg-
ulation promulgated by Secretary. That regulation, however, was re-
manded to the Secre•ary for recon::;ideration by the United States District 
. <:;ourt for . the District of Columbia. In re Permanent Surface Mining· 
Regulation ,Litigation, - F . Supp. - , - (DC 1980) , appeals pending,. 
.. 
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Moreover the Act does not purport to regulate alternative 
uses to which coal bearing ands may e put.:;8 · Thus, in the CJ1{ 
posture in whic t e case comes e ore us. there is no reason / 
to suppose that "mere enactment" of the Surface Mining Act /, 
has deprived appellees of economically viable use of their. { '0 t'V\. t"' S / t> IV' 
property. 
Moreover, appellees cannot at this juncture legitimately 
raise complaints in this Court about the manner in which 
the challenged provisions of the Act have been or will be 
applied in ,specific circumstances, or about their effect on 
particular coal mining operations. 'There is no indication in 
the record that appellees have availed themselves of the op .. 
portunities provided by the Act to obtain administrative re-
lief by requesting either a variance from the approximate 
original contour requirement of § 515 (d) or a waiver from 
the surface mining restrictions in § 522 (e). If appellees 
were to seek administrative relief under these procedures, a 
mutua.Ily acceptable solution might well be reached with re~ 
gard to individual properties, thereby obviating any need to 
address the constitutional questions.3Q The potential for 
such administrative solutions confirms the conclusion that 
Nos. 80-1810 et seq. (CADC) . The Secretary did not ask the Court 
·of Appeals to review this portion of the District Court's judgm 
38 !!, as the District Court found, )~vel Ia.rul in t ep-slope areas 
of Virginia is worth $5,000-$300,000 per acre, and owners presumably 
retain the option of simply leveling the land without first mining the coal. 
Moreover, if flat bench land is truly as valuable as the court below found, 
there shouid be no financi:rl impediment to the reestablishment of fiat 
areas on the sites of old mining operations, once those areas have been 
restored and stabilized in the manner required by the Act. 
89 The District Court's conclusion that the steep-slope variance proce; 
dure in § 515 (e) does not offer a meaningful opportunity for adminis-
trative relief was premature. Appellees did not identify any instance in 
which the statutory obligation to cover the high wall had prevented ·a. 
mine operator from taking advantage of the variance procedure. 
. ,. 
~ .. ·,. 
' 
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the takings issue decided by the District Court simply is not 
ripe for judicial resolution.40 
v 
A 
The District Court next ruled that the Act contravenes the 
Fifth Amendment because a number of its enforcement pro-
visions offend the Amendment's Due Process Clause. One 
such provision is § 521 (a) (2), 30 U. S. C. § 1271 (a) (2), 
which instructs the Secretary immediately to order total or 
partial cessation of a surface mining operation whenever he 
determines, on the basis of a federal inspection, that the op-
eration is in violation of the Act or a permit condition re-
quired by the Act and that the operation 
"creates an immediate danger to the health or safety of 
the public, or is causing, or can reasonably be expected to 
cause significant, imminent environmental harm to land, 
air, or water resources .... " 41 
A mine operator aggrieved by an immediate cessation order 
issued under § 521 (a)(2) or by a cessation order issued after 
•o Although we conclude that "mere enactment" of the Act did not I 
eff<>ct a taking of private property, this holding does not preclude ap-
pellees or other coal mine operators from attemptiug to show that as 
applied to particular parcels of land, the Act and the Secretary's regu-
lations effect a taking. Even then, such an alleged taking is not 
unconstitutional unless just compensation is unavailable. See Duke 
Power Co . v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 
94, n. 39 (1978); Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 1021 
125-136 (1974); Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp ., 337 
U. S. 6 97, n . 18 (1949) . Thus, aggrieved coal mine operators may, 
te , attempt to obtain just compensation for property they 
~:_,:.;-~---
}) en taken by the Surface Mining Act by I?!!rsuing_ a claim 
un.£er the Tucker _Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491. If it is determined that a J 
Tucl<er Act remedy is unavailable, and we intimate no views on thi~ · 
9uestion, the coal mine operator may bring an action in district court . 
for appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief. 
79-1538 & 79- 1596-0PINION 
132 HODEL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN. 
a notice of violation and expiration of an abatement period 
under § 521 (a) (3) may immediately request temporary re-
lief from the Secretary, and the Secretary must respond to 
the request within 5 days of its receipt. § 525 (c), 30 
U. S. C. § 1257 (c). Section 526 (c) of the Act, 30 U. S. C. 
§ 1276 (c), authorizes judicial review of a decision by the 
Secretary denying temporary relief. In addition, cessation 
orders are subject to informal administrative review under 
§ 521 (a)(5), and formal administrative review, including an 
adjudicatory hearing, under § 525 (b), 30 U. S. C. § 1275 
(b)!2 The Secretary's decision in the formal review proceed-
ing is subject to judicial review pursuant to § 526 (a) (2), 30 
U. S. C. § 1276 (a). 
The District Court held that § 521 (a)(2)'s authorization 
of immediate cessation orders violates the Fifth Amendment 
because the statute does not provide sufficiently objective 
criteria for summary administrative action. In this regard, 
the court relied on its finding that OSM inspectors had is-
sued against a particular company three immediate cessa-
tion orders which were later overturned on appeal, and that 
the company involved had suffered significant losses. The 
court enjoined the Secretary from issuing any immediate ces-
sation orders "until such time as Congress makes provisions 
to correct the use of subjective criteria by OSM inspectors." 
483 F. Supp., at 448!3 In addition, the court ruled even ii 
41 Where the Secretary determines that a violation of the Act or of a 
permit condition does not entail such a serious threat, he must issue a 
notice of violation fixing a reasonable time for abatement. § 521 (a) (3), 
30 U. S. C. § 1271 (a) (3). If the violation is not abated within pre-
scribed period, the Secretary must immediately order total or partial' 
cessation of the offending mining operation. 
42 Under § 521 (a) (5), 30 U. S. C. § 1271 (a) (5), cessation orders auto-
matically expire after 30 days, "unless a public hearing is held at the· 
site or within such reasonable proximity to the site that any viewings-· 
of the site can be conducted during the course of the public hearing." 
43 The District Court's Jan. 21, 1980, supplemental order and opinion, 
see n. 13, supra, explained that its injunction did not apply to immediate-: 
''1 
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'the Act is amended to correct this problem, the 5-day re-
sponse period prescribed by the Act does not meet the re-
quirements of due process. Instead, the court held that the 
Secretary must respond within 24 hours to a mine operator's 
·request for temporary relief from an immediate cessation 
order. We find both aspects of the District Court's reason-
ing unpersuasive. 
Our cases have indicated that due process ordinarily re-
quires an opportunity for "some kind of hea.ring" prior to the 
deprivation of a significant property interest. See Parratt 
v. Taylor,- U.S.-,- (1981); Boddie v. Connecticut, 
401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971). The Court has often acknowl-
edged, however, that summary administrative action may be 
justified in emergency situations. See, e. g., Calera-Toledo 
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 663, 677-680 (1974); 
Boddie v. Connecticut, supra, at 378-379; Ewing v. Mytinger 
& Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594, 599-600 (1950); Fahey v. 
Mallonee, 332 U. S. 245, 253-254 (1947); Yakus v. United 
States, 321 U.S. 414, 442-443 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 
321 U. S. 503, 519-520 (1944); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 
U.S. 589, 595-599 (1931); North American Cold Storage Co. 
v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306, 315-321 (1908). The question 
then, is whether the issuance of immediate cessation orders 
under § 521 '(a) falls under this emergency situation excep~ 
tion to the normal rule that due process requires a hearing 
prior to deprivation of a property right. We believe that it 
does. 
The immediate cessation order provisions reflect Congress' 
concern about the devastating damage that may result from 
mining disasters.4 ' They represent an attempt to reach an 
cessation orders issued pursuant to § 521 (a) (3) against mine operators 
who had failed to abate violations within the time period specified in the 
notice of violation. J. S. App., at 2a-3a. 
44 The legislative history of § 521 (a) (2) indicates that Congress viewed 
the Secretary's power to issue immediate cessation orders as critical, and 
that the m~as\lre was primarily intended to avert the possible occurrence 
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accommodation between the legitimate desire of mining com~ 
panies to be heard before submitting to administrative reg-
ulation and the governmental interest in protecting the pub-
lic health and safety and the environment from imminent 
danger. Protection of the health and safety of the public 
is a paramount governmental interest which justifies sum-
mary administrative action. Indeed, deprivation of property 
to protect the public health and safety is "one of the oldest 
examples" or permi~sible summary action. Ewing v.- My-
tinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra, at 599. See Mackey v. 
Montrym, 443 U. S . 1, 17- 18; id., at 21, n. 1, 25 (STEWART, 
J., dissenting); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 
IUpra, at 315-316. Moreover, the administrative action pro-
vided through immediate cessation orders responds to situa-
tions in which swift action is necessary to protect the public 
health and safety. This is precisely the type of emergency 
situation in which this Court has found summary administra-
tive action justified. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 
Inc., S'Upra ,· North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 
supra. 
Rather than taking issue with any of these principles, the 
District Court held that the Act does not establish sufficiently 
ob.iective criteria governing the issuance of summary cessa-
tion orders. We disagree. In our judgment, the criteria 
established by the Act and the Secretary's implementing reg-
ulations are specific enough to control governmental action 
and reduce the risk of erroneous depriva.tion. Section 701 
(8) of the Act, 30 U. S. C. § 1291 (8) , defines the threat -or 
'of such disasters as the Buffalo Creek flood. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-218, 
supra, n. 19, at 129-130 ; S. Rep. No. 95-128, supra, n. 19, at 90-91. 
The Buffalo Creek flood was caused by the sudden collapse of a coal mine 
waste impoundment dam in 1972 near Buffalo Creek, W. Va. · The flood 
left 124 persons dead and rendered 4,000 persons homeless. See H. R. 
Rep. No 94-1445, 19 (1976). 
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' 'imminent danger to the health and safety of the public" ali 
the existence of a condition or practice which could: 
"reasonably be expected to cause substantial physical 
harm to persons outside the permit area before such 
condition, practice, or violation can be abated. A rea-
sonable expectation of death or serious injury before 
abatement exists if a rational person, subjected to the 
same conditions or practices giving rise to the peril, 
would not expose himself or herself to the danger during 
the time necessary for abatement." 45 
If anything, these standards are more specific than the cri-
teria in other statutes authorizing summary administrative 
action that have been upheld against due process challenges. 
See, e. g., Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra, at 
595 ("dangerous to health ... or would be in a material 
respect misleading to the injury or damage of the purchaser 
or consumer") ; Fahey v. Mallonee, supra, at 250-251, n. 1 
("is unsafe or unfit to manage a Federal savings and loan 
association" or "[i]s in imminent danger of becoming im-
paired") ; Air East, Inc. v. National Transportation Safety 
Board, 512 F. 2d 1227, 1232 (CA3), cert. denied, 423 U. S. 
863 (1975) ("emergency requiring immediate action ... in 
respect to air safety in commerce"). 
The fact that OSM inspectors have issued immediate ces-
4 ti The Secretary's regulations define "a significant, imminent environ-
mental harm" in the following terms : 
" (i) An environmental harm is any adverse impact on land, air, or water 
resources, including but not limited to plant and animal life. 
11 (ii) An environmental harm is imminent if a condition, practice or 
violation exists which (a) is causing such harm or (b) may reasonably 
be expected to cause such harm at any time before the end of the rea-
, sonable abatement time that would be set under Section 521 (a) (3) of the 
Act. 
" (iii) An environmental harm ie significant if that harm is appreciable 
and not immediately reparable." 30 CFR §§ 700,5 and 701.5. 
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sation orders that were later overturned on administrative 
appeal does not u.ndermine the adequacy of the Act's criteria 
but instead demonstrates the efficacy of the review proce-
dures. The relevant inquiry is not whether a cessation orde!\ 
should have been issued in a particular case, but whether the 
statutory procedure itself is incapable of affording due proc-
ess. Yakus v. United States, supra, at 434-435. The pos-
sibility of administrative error inheres in any regulatory 
program; statutory programs authorizing emergency admin,. 
istrative action prior to a hearing are no exception.46 As we 
explained in Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., supra, 
at 599: 
"Discretion of any official action may be abused. Yet 
it is not a requirement of due process that there be 
judicial inquiry before discretion can be exercised. It 
is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned, 
that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing 
and a judicial determination." 
Here, mine operators are afforded a prompt and adequate 
post-deprivation administrative hearings and an opportunity 
for judicial review. We are satisfied that the Act's immedi-
ate cessation order provisions comport with the requirements 
of due process. 
We also conclude that the District Court erred in reducing 
the statutorily prescribed time period for the Secretary's re-
sponse to requests for temporary relief. In the first place, 
the 5-day period is a statutory maximum and there is no in-
dication in the record that the Secretary has not responded 
46 A different case might be presented if a pattern of abuse and arbi-
trary action were discernable from review of an agency's administration 
of a summary procedure. Although the District Court sought to cha.rac-
terize the OSM's record in issuing cessation orders in these terms, a 
showjng that three cessation orders were overturned on administrative 
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or will not respond in less than 5 days. Second, appellees 
have not demonstrated that they have been adversely affected 
by the 5-day response period in a particular case or that it is 
generally unreasonable. In addition, no evidence was intro-
duced to show that a shorter reply period is administratively 
feasible. In these circumstances, there simply is no basis 
for the District Court's decision to substitute a judicial policy 
preference for the scheme adopted by Congress. Cf. V er-
mont Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 435 U. S. 519 (1978) . Accordingly, we turn 
to the District Court's holding that other sections of the Act 
violate the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
B 
The District Court ruled that the Act's civil penalty pro-
visions do not comport with the requirements of due process. 
Under these provisions, the Secretary is to notify the recip-
ient of a notice of violation or a cessation order of the pro-
posed amount of any civil penalty that is to be assessed 
against it. § 518 (c), 30 U. S. C. § 1268 (a). Section 518 
(c) further states that, if the operator "wishes to contest 
either the amount of the penalty or the fact of the violation," 
it must "forward the proposed amount to the Secretary for 
placement in an escrow account." 47 Once the escrow re-
quirement is met, the operator receives a full adjudicatory 
hearing, before an administrative law judge, with a right of 
appeal to an administrative board and judicial review of the 
final decision. See 30 U. S. C. § 1276 (a)(2). If, after ad-
ministrative or judicial review, it is determined that no vio-
lation occurred or that the amount of the proposed penalty 
hould be reduced, the appropriate amount must promptly 
47 However, no penalties are finally imposed until the alleged offender· 
has been provided an opportunity for a public hearing. Section 518 (b) 
provides : "A civil penalty shall be assessed by the Secretary only after 
the person charged with a violation ... has been given an opportunity 
for a public hearing." 30 U. S. C. § 1268 (b). 
,, 
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be refunded to the operator with interest. 30 U. S. ·C. 
§ 1268 (c) , 
In challenging the Act's civil penalty provisions appellees 
did not allege that they, or any one of them have had civil 
penalties assessed against them. Moreover, the District 
Court did not find, as it did in ruling on the immediate ces-
sation order provisions, that any of appellee coal mine opera-
tors have been affected or harmed by any of the statutory 
procedures for the assessment and collection of fines. Thus, 
the rerord in the case belies any suggestion that there is a 
concrete case or controversy concerning the operation of these 
provisions. In these ·circumstances, we must conclude that 
appellees' challenge is premature, and that it was improper 
for the court below to render a decision on this claim. 
VI 
Our examination of appellees' constitutional challenges to 
the Surface Mining Act persuades us that the Act is not 
vulnerable to their pre-enforcement challenge. Accordi.ngly, 
we affirm the judgment of the District Court upholding the 
Act against appellees' Commerce Clam:e attack (No. 79-
1596), and we reverse the judgment below insofar as it held 
various provisions of the Act unconstitutional (No. 79-1538). 
The cases are remanded to the District Court with instruc-
tiom: to dissolve the injunction issued against the Secretary 
: and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion . 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In terms of the relationship between the federal 
and state governments, the Surface Mining Act -- as the 
Commonwealth of Virginia's brief emphasizes -- mandates an 
extraordinarily intrusive program of federal regulation 15 
and control of land use and land reclamation, areas 
normally left to state and local governments. Whatever 
one may think of the wisdom of this Act, I agree with the 
Court that the Commerce Clause, as construed by many 
decisions, confers upon Congress the power to enact this 20 
legislation. 
The Act also has troubling and farreaching 
implications with respect to its effect on the owners and 
lessees of the land and coal, particularly in this case in 
the seven western most counties in Virginia. I agree with 25 
the Court, however, that it was premature to consider in 
this case "taking" questions under the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Appellees have made a 
facial attack only, identifying no specific property that 
2. 
is alleged to have been taken. The Court's decision is 
confined to a holding that the Act in this respect is not 
facially unconstitutional. The taking issue remains 
available to, and may be litigated by, any owner or lessee 
whose property inte~est is adversely affected by the 
enforcement of this Act. The federal government is 
prohibited by the plain language of the Fifth Amendment to 
pay just compensation for any taking of private property 
for public use. But whether there has been such a taking 
and the amount of just compensation are questions to be 
30 
35 
decided in specific cases. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 40 
444 U.S. 164 (1979) ~ Agins v. Tiburon, 447 u.s. 164 
(1979) ~ Agins v. Tiburon, 447 u.s. 255 (1980) .1 
I add a word about the area of Virginia that 
will be significantly affected by this Act, as its 
location, topography and geology are highly relevant to an 45 
understanding of the affect of this Act. Bituminous coal, 
said to be Virginia's "most valuable natural resource", is 
found in a region of mountainous terrain with limited 
level land area. The region is marked by steep mountain 
slopes, sharp ridges, massive outcrops of rock, and narrow 50 
valleys which severely limit development of the land for 
any other economic use. Because of thin soi 1 and this 
rugged terrain, the land in its natural state is not 
suited for agricultural use nor does it grow merchantable 
timber. Its value lies, in most instances, solely in the 55 
underlying and surface coal. Mining this coal is a major 
1 See also Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in 
San Diego Light & Power Co. v. , ___ u.s. 
(1981). The taking question considered by Justice Brennan 
and the three Justices who joined him was not reached by a 
majority of the Court. 
3. 
industrial activity in an otherwise impoverished area of 
Virginia.2 A number of the Act's provisions appear to 
have been written with no comprehension of its potentional 
affect on this rugged area. For example, the requirement 60 
in § 515(d) that steep slope areas be restored 
approximately to their original contours, seems 
particularly unrealistic - as the District Court's opinion 
emphasizes. The cost of resoration is some situations 
could exceed substantially the value of the coal. In most 65 
situations, restored steep mountain slopes would have no 
economic utility. In sum, if the Act is implemented 
broadly in accordance with its terms, the economic 
consequences individually and to the area as a whole, 
could be far reaching. But ajudication of claims arising 
from such implementation are for the future. I agree with 
the Court that we cannot say that the Act is facially 
invalid. 
2 It is said, perhaps 
bootlegging was the secondmost 
that part of the state. 
frivolously now, that 
remunerative activity in 
70 
lfp/ss 5/25/81 
80-180 McDaniel v. Sanchez 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
The decision today is foreshadowed by Wise v. 
Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, and I join the Court's opinion. 
The constitutionality of §5 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 has been sustained by prior cases. If the question 
were presented for reconsideration, I would adhere to~ 
contrary view as previously expressed. City of Rome v. 
United States, u.s. at (Powell, J., 
dissenting)~ Dougherty County v. White, u.s. , at 
__ (Powell, J., dissenting)~ Georgia v. United States, 411 
U.S. 526, at 545 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also 
United States v. Board of Commissioners of Sheffield, 435 
5 
10 
U.S. 110, at 141 (Stevens, J., dissenting)~ Allen v. State 15 
Board of Elections, 393 u.s. 544, at 586 and n. 4 (Harlan, 
J. , concurring and dissenting)~ South Carol ina v. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
The Surface Mining Act--as appellees' brief 10 
emphasizes--mandates an extraordinarily intrusive program 
of federal regulation and control of land use and land 
reclamation, activities normally left to state and local 
governments. But the decisions of this Court over many 
years make clear that, under the Commerce Clause, Congress 15 
has the power to enact this legislation. 
The Act could af feet seriously the owners and 
lessees of the land and coal in the seven westernmost 
counties of Virginia. The Federal Government is compelled 
by the Fifth Amendment to pay just compensation for any 20 
taking of private property for public use. See San Diego 
.. 
2. 
Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, u.s. 
(1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) .1 But whether 
there has been such a "taking" and the amount of just 
compensation are questions to be decided in specific 25 
cases. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 
(1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 u.s. 164, 175 
(1979). I agree with the Court, therefore, that it is 
premature to consider in this case questions under the 
Compensation Clause. Ante, at Appellees have 30 
identified no specific property that is alleged to have 
been taken. The Court's decision thus is confined to a 
holding that the Act in this respect is not facially 
unconstitutional. Id., at The "taking" issue 
remains available to, and may be litigated by, any owner 35 
or lessee whose property interest is adversely affected by 
the enforcement of this Act. 
I add a word about the area of Virginia that 
will be affected by this Act, as its location, topography 
lThe "taking" question considered 
BRENNAN and the three Justices who joined 






and geology are highly relevant to an understanding of the 40 
"taking" question. Bituminous coal, which is Virginia's 
most valuable natural resource,2 is found in a region 
marked by steep mountain slopes, sharp ridges, massive 
outcrops of rock, and narrow valleys--conditions that 
severely limit alternative uses for the land. Because of 45 
thin soil and rugged terrain, the land in its natural 
state is not suited for agricultural use or the growing of 
merchantable timber. Its value lies, in most instances, 
solely in its coal. Mining the coal is a major industrial 
activity in an otherwise impoverished area of Virginia. 3 
A number of the Act's provisions appear to have 
been written with little comprehension of its potential 
affect on this rugged area. For example, the requirement 
in § 515(d) that steep slope areas be restored 
approximately to their original contours seems 
particularly unrealistic. As the District Court found, 
2The District Court found that the mining of coal 
is a $2 billion per year industry in the Commonwealth. 
3rt is said, perhaps frivolously now, that 
bootlegging was the second most remunerative activity in 




95% of the strippable coal lands in Virginia are located 
on slopes in excess of twenty degrees. App. 44a. The 
cost of restoration in some situations could exceed 
substantially the value of the coal. In any event, 60 
restoring steep mountain slopes generally would diminish 
rather than increase the land's worth. 
In sum, if the Act is implemented broadly in 
accordance with its terms, the consequences to individual 
lessees and owners, and to the area as a whole, could be 65 
far-reaching. But ajudication of claims arising from such 
implementation is for the future. I agree with the Court 
that we cannot say that the Act is facially invalid, and I 
therefore join its opinion. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
The Surface Mining Act mandates an 
extraordinarily intrusive program of federal regulation 
and control of land use and land reclamation, activities 
normally left to state and local governments. But the 
decisions of this Court over many years make clear that, 
under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power to enact 
this legislation. 
The Act could affect seriously the owners and 
lessees of the land and coal in the seven westernmost 
counties of Virginia. The Federal Government is 
required oy the Fifth Amendment to pay just compensation 
for any taking of private property for public use.l See 
lwe assume, of course, that Congress weighed this 
probable cost against the desirable environmental goals of 
the Act. 
2. 
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 
u.s. (1981) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) .2 But 
whether there has been such a "taking" and, if so, the 
amount of just compensation are questions to be decided in 
specific cases. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 
260 (1980) ~ Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 
175 (1979). I agree with the Court, therefore, that it is 
premature to consider in this case questions under the 
Compensation Clause. Ante, at Appellees have 
identified no specific property that is alleged to have 
been taken. The Court's decision thus is confined to a 
holding that the Act in this respect is not facially 
unconstitutional. Id. , at The "taking" issue 
remains available to, and may be litigated by, any owner 
or lessee whose property interest is adversely affected by 
the enforcement of the Act.3 
2The "taking" question considered by Justice 
BRENNAN and the three Justices who joined him was not 
reached by a majority of the Court. 
3In A~ins, supra at )l~b , we observed that the 
"determination that government action constitutes a taking 
is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, 
rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an 
exercise of state power in the public interest." 
,, 
3. 
I add a word about the area of Virginia that 
will be affected by this Act, as its location, topography 
and geology are highly relevant to an understanding of the 
"taking" question. Bituminous coal, Virginia's most 
valuable natural resource,4 is found in a region marked by 
steep mountain slopes, sharp ridges, massive outcrops of 
rock, and narrow valleys--conditions that severely 1 imi t 
alternative uses of the land. Because of thin soil and 
rugged terrain, the land in its natural state is not 
suited for agricultural use or the growing of merchantable 
timber. Its value lies, in most instances, solely in its 
coal. Mining the coal is a major industrial activity in 
an otherwise impoverished area of Virginia.S 
A number of the Act's provisions appear to have 
been written with little comprehension of its potential 
affect on this rugged area. For example, the requirement 
in § 515(d) that steep slope areas be restored 
4The District Court found that the mining of coal 
is a $2 billion per year industry in the Commonwealth. 
Sit is said, perhaps 
bootlegging was the second most 






approximately to their original contours seems 
particularly unrealistic. As the District Court found, 
95% of the str ippable coal lands in Virginia are located 
on slopes in excess of twenty degrees. App. 44a. The 
cost of restoration in some situations could exceed 
substantially the value of the coal. In any event, 
restoring steep mountain slopes often would diminish 
rather than increase the land's worth. 
In sum, if the Act is implemented broadly in 
accordance with its terms, the consequences to individual 
lessees and owners, and to the area as a whole, could be 
far-reaching. But ajudication of claims arising from such 
implementation is for the future. I agree with the Court 
that we cannot say that the Act is facially invalid, and I 
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JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
The Surface Mining Act mandates an extraordinarily in-
trusive program of federal regulation and control of land use 
and land reclamation, activities normally left to state and 
local governments. But the decisions of this Court over 
many years make clear that, under the Commerce Clause, 
Congress has the power to enact this legislation. 
The Act could affect seriously the owners and lessees of the 
land and coal in the seven westernmost counties of Virginia. 
The Federal Government is required by the Fifth Amend-
ment to pa.y just compensation for any taking of private 
property for public use.1 See San Diego Gas & Electric Co. 
v. City of San Diego,- U. S. -,--- (1981) (BREN-
1 We as~ume, of course, that Congress weighed thii:l probable cost against 
the desirable environmental goals of the Act. 
79-1538 & 7fJ-1596-CONCUR 
2 HODBL v. VIRGINIA SURFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN, 
NAN, J ., dissenting).2 But whether there has been such a 
"taking" and, if so, the amount of just compensation are 
f!Uestions to be decided in specific cases. Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 260 (1980); Kaiser Aetna v. United 
States, 444 U. S. 164, 175 (1979). I agree with the Court, 
therefore, that it is premature to consider in this case ques-
tions under the Compensation Clause. Ante, at ---. 
Appellees have identified no specific property that is alleged 
to have been taken. The Court's decision thus is confined to 
a holding that the Act in this respect is not facially uncon-
lltitutional. I d., at -. The "taking" issue remains avail-
able to, and may be litigated by, any owner or lessee whose 
property interest is adversely affected by the enforcement of 
the Act.3 
I add a word about the area of Virginia that will be af-
fected by this Act, as its location, topography and geology 
are highly relevant to an understanding of the "taking" ques-
tion. Bituminous coal, Virginia's most valuable natural re-
~ource,4 is found in a region marked by steep mountain slopes. 
11harp ridges, massive outcrops of rock, and narrow valleys--
conditions that severely limit alternative uses of the land. 
Because of thin soil and rugged terrain, the land in its nat-
ural ..8{ate is not suited for agricultural use or the growing 
of /nerchantable timber. Its value lies, in most instances, 
solely in its coal. Mining the coal is a major industrial ac-
tivity in an otherwise impoverished area of Virginia. 5 
t The "taking" question considered by JusTICE BRENNAN and the three 
Justice~ who joined him was not reached by a majority of the Court. 
8 In Agins, supra, at 260, we observed that the "determination that gov-
ernment action constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determation that the 
public nt large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an 
t~xercise of :;tate power in the public interest." 
"The Di~:~trict Court found that the mining of coal is a $2 billion per 
year industry in the Commonwealth. 
1 It i::; said, perhaps frivolously now, that bootlegging was the second 
111ost remunerative activity in that part of the State. 
79-1538 & 19-1596-CONCUR 
HODEL v. VIRGINIA SUHFACE MIN. & RECL. ASSN. 3 
A numbrr of the Act1s provisions appear to have been 
written with little comprehension of its potential affect on 
this rugged area. For example, the requirement in § 515 (d) 
that steep slope areas be restored approximately to their orig-
inal contours seems particularly unrealistic. As the District 
Court found, 95o/o of the strippable coal lands in Virginia 
are located on slopes in excess of 20 degrees. App. 44a. The 
cost of restoration in some situations could exceed substan-
tia11y the value of the coal. In any event restoring steep 
mountain slopes often would diminish rather than increase 
the land's worth. 
In sum, if the Act is implemented broadly in accordance 
with its terms, the consequences to individual lessees and 
owners, and to the area as a whole. could be far-reaching. 
But adjudication of claims arising from such implementa-
tion is for the future. I agree with the Court that we cannot 
say that the Act is facially invalid, and I therefore join its-
opinion. 
